37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1023381 |
Time | |
Date | 201207 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | SAV.Airport |
State Reference | GA |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Orion (P3) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Approach Departure |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types |
Narrative:
While working the south radar sector; I was vectoring a P-3 on a downwind for the GPS/RNAV runway 28 approach at svn at 2;500 ft MSL. On this particular approach; a discreet code appeared in the flight path of my P-3; opposite direction at 2;200 ft MSL. My aircraft had to be vectored wide around the unknown and steadily tracking westbound aircraft on the discreet code. The sav radar was questionable at the time; ibi mode was in effect due to continued problems with the sav mode-south system. With no primary targets to verify the legitimacy of this target; evasive actions were required. Post event research reveals that the discreet code was in fact an aircraft that was 20 miles northeast of sav; having just departed from ridgeland; sc (3j1) and climbing westbound. It had in fact been another 'ghost' target generated by the aged sav ARTS system. These events where we have to react to ghost or 'duplicate' targets continue to increase and no longer visibly impact sav management or tech ops; as the flm watched this event occurred; yet no log entry was made; nor was any follow up with tech ops management; even though evasive vectors were required. This complacent culture is as dangerous as the false targets the sav ARTS creates. Recommend the sav ARTS system be replaced; recommend the sav mode-south system be stabilized until that replacement system is in place. Recommend that sav at and tech ops both avoid using the ibi mode. Recommend that all tech ops maintenance on the mode-south or ibi (radar) and ARTS systems involve senior technicians. Recent 'events' and 'outages' have been on the rise when less experienced techs are doing 'routine' maintenance. Recommend the sav ARTS system be replaced! The sav ASR-8 is aged; but stable; it has a digitizer on both the primary and the secondary systems; additionally; two DOD facilities have ASR-11 digital radars within 30 miles of sav; all of which makes sav perfect for a stars like replacement as quickly as possible. Sav is in a modern base building and rack space is available to immediate installation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SAV Controller voiced concern regarding a 'ghost' target that resulted in unnecessary vectors for an IFR aircraft. The reporter recommended RADAR system replacement.
Narrative: While working the South RADAR sector; I was vectoring a P-3 on a downwind for the GPS/RNAV Runway 28 approach at SVN at 2;500 FT MSL. On this particular approach; a discreet code appeared in the flight path of my P-3; opposite direction at 2;200 FT MSL. My aircraft had to be vectored wide around the unknown and steadily tracking westbound aircraft on the discreet code. The SAV RADAR was questionable at the time; IBI Mode was in effect due to continued problems with the SAV Mode-S system. With no primary targets to verify the legitimacy of this target; evasive actions were required. Post event research reveals that the discreet code was in fact an aircraft that was 20 miles northeast of SAV; having just departed from Ridgeland; SC (3J1) and climbing westbound. It had in fact been another 'GHOST' target generated by the aged SAV ARTS system. These events where we have to react to ghost or 'duplicate' targets continue to increase and no longer visibly impact SAV management or Tech Ops; as the FLM watched this event occurred; yet no log entry was made; nor was any follow up with Tech Ops management; even though evasive vectors were required. This complacent culture is as dangerous as the false targets the SAV ARTS creates. Recommend the SAV ARTS system be replaced; recommend the SAV Mode-S system be stabilized until that replacement system is in place. Recommend that SAV AT and Tech Ops both AVOID using the IBI mode. Recommend that all Tech Ops Maintenance on the Mode-S or IBI (RADAR) and ARTS systems involve senior technicians. Recent 'events' and 'outages' have been on the rise when less experienced techs are doing 'routine' maintenance. Recommend the SAV ARTS system be replaced! The SAV ASR-8 is aged; but stable; it has a digitizer on both the primary and the secondary systems; additionally; two DOD facilities have ASR-11 Digital RADARs within 30 miles of SAV; all of which makes SAV perfect for a STARS like replacement as quickly as possible. SAV is in a modern base building and rack space is available to immediate installation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.