Narrative:

Extreme precipitation was depicted on my scope and observed by pilots at scattered areas within my area of jurisdiction. The areas around maxim; tadpo; mth; eyw; and the carnu navaids/fixes were blocked off due to this extreme precipitation. Despite this; I was working the adjacent sector's (41) departure and arrival traffic in addition to my own. The arrival traffic were deviating east of tadpo and overflying the mnate fix (which is where the departure traffic comes out of miami approach) before they could then turn to the northwest toward the curso fix (where inbound traffic enters miami approach) traffic northbound from the canoa/maxim side were entering my airspace from havana center either already on or turning to a 360 heading in order to deviate for the weather depicted at maxim. My supervisor then asked me what warning areas I could give away immediately (we are required to have a 30 minute notice prior to warning area activation so that we can clear the airspace of traffic). I explained to my supervisor that I could give away the warning areas surface to FL230 immediately; but that I really needed FL240 and above for all of the deviations that were taking place and that if the warning areas were going to go active; the canoa and maxim fixes would need to be closed because of previous management guidance that restricts us from allowing a deviation into an active warning area and instead forces aircraft into thunderstorms. Shortly after that; my d-side received a phone call from the supervisor stating that W174B/east/F/G were active with immediate effect. A321 was 20 miles south of canoa and had already been given guidance to deviate. The aircraft had checked in with a canoa estimate and then returned to havana center's frequency. I told my supervisor that I needed the 30 minute notice required and that the warning area needed to be capped at least at FL340 to ensure the safety of the airbus. My d-side was instructed by the supervisor to call havana and request the aircraft on a 90 heading in havana's airspace to remain clear of the warning area. Havana did not comply with this and A321 checked on at canoa; deviating left for weather; which immediately placed the aircraft in W174B. I asked my supervisor for guidance. The A321 said that he was unable anything further east than a 005 heading. I then noticed that nqx had already launched F5 traffic; which was headed toward the A321. I issued several traffic calls to the A321 and my supervisor instructed me to have the A321 squawk emergency so that the fighter traffic could see the aircraft. I complied with this and the aircraft deviated through the warning area on an emergency squawk. W174B was eventually capped at FL340; but only after A321 was squawking emergency and 40 miles within the area. Recommendation; the 'new' procedures for deviating traffic and the release of the warning areas in the wsc area do nothing to promote safety. There is zero accountability for the tmu missions position's reckless decision making to prevent these situations from occurring. The 'real time' release of these areas should never happen without the express consent of the sector and only after the assurance that no traffic will enter has taken place.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZMA Controller described a probable loss off separation event when the TMU released warning area airspace without coordination with the sector controllers handling traffic; weather deviations contributed to the occurrence.

Narrative: Extreme precipitation was depicted on my scope and observed by pilots at scattered areas within my area of jurisdiction. The areas around MAXIM; TADPO; MTH; EYW; and the CARNU navaids/fixes were blocked off due to this extreme precipitation. Despite this; I was working the adjacent sector's (41) departure and arrival traffic in addition to my own. The arrival traffic were deviating east of TADPO and overflying the MNATE fix (which is where the departure traffic comes out of Miami Approach) before they could then turn to the northwest toward the CURSO fix (where inbound traffic enters Miami Approach) Traffic Northbound from the CANOA/MAXIM side were entering my airspace from Havana Center either already on or turning to a 360 heading in order to deviate for the weather depicted at MAXIM. My Supervisor then asked me what warning areas I could give away immediately (we are required to have a 30 minute notice prior to warning area activation so that we can clear the airspace of traffic). I explained to my Supervisor that I could give away the warning areas surface to FL230 immediately; but that I really needed FL240 and above for all of the deviations that were taking place and that if the warning areas were going to go active; the CANOA and MAXIM fixes would need to be closed because of previous management guidance that restricts us from allowing a deviation into an active warning area and instead forces aircraft into thunderstorms. Shortly after that; my D-Side received a phone call from the Supervisor stating that W174B/E/F/G were active with immediate effect. A321 was 20 miles South of CANOA and had already been given guidance to deviate. The aircraft had checked in with a CANOA estimate and then returned to Havana Center's frequency. I told my Supervisor that I needed the 30 minute notice required and that the warning area needed to be capped at least at FL340 to ensure the safety of the Airbus. My D-Side was instructed by the Supervisor to call Havana and request the aircraft on a 90 heading in Havana's airspace to remain clear of the warning area. Havana did not comply with this and A321 checked on at CANOA; deviating left for weather; which immediately placed the aircraft in W174B. I asked my Supervisor for guidance. The A321 said that he was unable anything further east than a 005 heading. I then noticed that NQX had already launched F5 traffic; which was headed toward the A321. I issued several traffic calls to the A321 and my Supervisor instructed me to have the A321 squawk emergency so that the fighter traffic could see the aircraft. I complied with this and the aircraft deviated through the warning area on an emergency squawk. W174B was eventually capped at FL340; but only after A321 was squawking emergency and 40 miles within the area. Recommendation; the 'new' procedures for deviating traffic and the release of the warning areas in the WSC area do nothing to promote safety. There is zero accountability for the TMU missions position's reckless decision making to prevent these situations from occurring. The 'real time' release of these areas should never happen without the express consent of the sector and only after the assurance that no traffic will enter has taken place.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.