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Attributes | |
ACN | 1032180 |
Time | |
Date | 201208 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZAB.ARTCC |
State Reference | NM |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | SR22 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Right-side trainee; I'm working alone on the d-side. An SR22 assigned an altitude that violates mia for a direct/as-filed clearance. I release the SR22 off runway 20 at saf; turn left heading 160 climb to 110 to comply with mia. Somewhere south of saf VOR; the r-side cleared the aircraft direct hot while the aircraft was still below the mia. We lost radar on the aircraft shortly after (expected; by me at least; due to known area of poor radar coverage). The direct clearance put the aircraft in to a 120 mia area some miles east. Emsaw began to flash. I ask what the r-side's intentions; they did not respond; and the aircraft penetrated the 120 mia areas with no action taken. Controllers appear cavalier about mias. If someone is 'just clipping' an mia that's above an aircraft's current or assigned altitude; many do not bother to turn an aircraft or otherwise react to remedy the situation; presumably because there's 'no way' they will hit anything. As a related tangent; many controllers seem to be of the impression that simply asking an aircraft if they 'can maintain [their] own terrain and obstruction clearance' (not done in the above case; but was performed for another aircraft shortly before this incident) alleviates their responsibility to not provide course guidance below the mia. The workforce needs to be directly educated and trained about the provisions and consequences of 4-2-8.d; particularly the note. Also 5-6-1.c which is more applicable for this particular event; ZAB has in the past issued briefing items about this very problem; as it is commonplace around here. It has not stuck in any meaningful fashion that I have seen. Some-one's going to be driven in to terrain by a controller if this keeps up and the controller's going to think they're in the right. Again; this is not an isolated incident. This happens on a fairly regular basis; and not just with trainees.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZAB Controller expressed concern regarding the facility's controllers adherence to the MIA requirements; the reporter claiming the event witnessed was not a isolated event.
Narrative: R-Side Trainee; I'm working alone on the D-Side. An SR22 assigned an altitude that violates MIA for a direct/as-filed clearance. I release the SR22 off Runway 20 at SAF; turn left heading 160 climb to 110 to comply with MIA. Somewhere south of SAF VOR; the R-Side cleared the aircraft direct HOT while the aircraft was still below the MIA. We lost RADAR on the aircraft shortly after (expected; by me at least; due to known area of poor RADAR coverage). The direct clearance put the aircraft in to a 120 MIA area some miles east. EMSAW began to flash. I ask what the R-Side's intentions; they did not respond; and the aircraft penetrated the 120 MIA areas with no action taken. Controllers appear cavalier about MIAs. If someone is 'just clipping' an MIA that's above an aircraft's current or assigned altitude; many do not bother to turn an aircraft or otherwise react to remedy the situation; presumably because there's 'no way' they will hit anything. As a related tangent; many Controllers seem to be of the impression that simply asking an aircraft if they 'can maintain [their] own terrain and obstruction clearance' (not done in the above case; but was performed for another aircraft shortly before this incident) alleviates their responsibility to not provide course guidance below the MIA. The workforce needs to be directly educated and trained about the provisions and consequences of 4-2-8.d; particularly the note. Also 5-6-1.c which is more applicable for this particular event; ZAB has in the past issued briefing items about this very problem; as it is commonplace around here. It has not stuck in any meaningful fashion that I have seen. Some-one's going to be driven in to terrain by a Controller if this keeps up and the Controller's going to think they're in the right. Again; this is not an isolated incident. This happens on a fairly regular basis; and not just with trainees.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.