Narrative:

Upon arrival at destination; we were vectored onto final approach. On profile; pilot flying called for gear down; and flaps 30 degrees. By this point we were switched to tower frequency. As the gear deployed; only the nosewheel came down and we received a 'gear disagree' red caution message. We advised tower that we would execute a go-around. Tower gave us a climb to 4;000 ft and a vector to the east. The tower then asked the reason for going around. We advised them that we were having a gear malfunction and needed to run a checklist; and would require delay vectors. At this time; I estimate our fuel was at approximately 1;800-2;000 pounds. Pilot flying slowed to 190 KTS with flaps retracted in an attempt to manage the impending low-fuel situation. Pilot flying called for QRH procedure 'gear disagree message (down position selected).' the captain made the decision to transfer the controls to himself and pilot flying/pilot not flying switched roles. Pilot not flying ran QRH procedure; which first states that the procedure can be repeated more than once. Pilot not flying turned on hydraulic pumps 2 and 3B per QRH procedure and cycled the gear multiple times per the QRH. This was unsuccessful at getting either main landing gear to come down. Pilot not flying then pulled the landing gear manual release handle. On first attempt; the gear handle was jammed and would not come out to full position. Upon another few attempts at pulling the handle; the handle came to full extension and gear extended. We received a 'nose door open' warning message as the QRH said would be a possibility. The checklist then instructed the pilot to stow the landing gear manual release handle. The handle was jammed and after multiple attempts and a call to maintenance control; we made the decision to land with the handle pulled out. The QRH says that a landing with the handle pulled is allowed if stowing it causes the main gear or nose gear to retract. With the handle jammed; we were unable to accomplish this part of the procedure. We then decided to land at the nearest suitable airport; per the QRH. Captain asked the pilot not flying to confer with maintenance; advise the flight attendant; and advise the passengers. Pilot not flying advised maintenance that QRH procedure was executed and we were indicating 'landing gear down' with 3 green lights. Maintenance advised that we could continue for landing and to call on the ground. Pilot not flying then called the flight attendant on intercom and calmly advised her of the situation. Pilot not flying emphasized twice that there would be no need to brace the cabin and that we anticipated an uneventful landing. Pilot not flying advised passengers of the gear situation and that we successfully ran a checklist and that the gear appeared to be down and locked. Pilot not flying also advised them that we anticipated a normal landing and that safety equipment would be standing by as a precaution. Pilot not flying advised passengers that it was important to follow any commands or instructions given by the flight attendant. Pilot not flying advised ATC that we were ready to come in for landing and that we were requesting runway with the emergency equipment standing by for precaution. Tower asked if we wanted to do a fly-by so that we could have the gear inspected to confirm that it was down. Pilot not flying advised tower that we didn't have enough fuel for that and declared minimum fuel. Tower then cleared us to land. After pilot flying made a successful landing with a soft touchdown; the first officer called tower and advised that we were able to taxi clear of the runway and would like to have arff inspect the landing gear for any damage and also to visually inspect the rest of the plane for any resulting damage from any gear issue. The first officer advised the passengers that safety equipment would be pulling up to the plane to inspect the aircraft for any damage; and that this was completely normal and to remain seatedwith seat belts fastened. Arff confirmed that everything looked normal. We then contacted maintenance to ask if it was okay to taxi to the gate in the current condition. We made the decision with maintenance that it was safe to taxi to the gate. Upon arrival at the gate; the passengers exited the plane normally and seemed to be very calm and relaxed about the situation. The flight attendant did an outstanding job keeping the passengers advised and managing the situation in the cabin. Crew communication in cockpit was concise; clear; and efficient. Pilot flying and pilot not flying worked well together through situation. Captain did an excellent job managing the situation we were presented. Upon deployment of landing gear; we received a 'gear disagree' red warning cas message. We also showed a 'green' nose indication and two white main gear indications. This indicated to us that the nose gear was down and neither of the main landing gear were down. Cause: gear was selected down; but the main landing gear did not deploy as commanded. Maintenance told the first officer at gate; after inspection; that it appears the electronic signal was not sent to the main landing gear to deploy. Maintenance told the first officer that there was a maintenance code they found that alluded to this preliminary assessment. I believe the fuel situation resulted from our new fuel policy. Landing conditions were VFR and we did not require a landing alternate. Our planned reserve fuel was 1;521 pounds. With such low reserve fuel; and a potential emergency situation on hand; we were left with very little time to troubleshoot the problem. We would have liked to fly by the tower to confirm the gear indications we were receiving; but we determined that another go-around could result in a critical fuel situation.response: tower was advised; QRH procedure was accomplished; company maintenance was advised; flight attendant was advised; passengers advised.suggestions: the excellent simulator training I have received on a gear failure left me well-prepared for this situation. The QRH procedure was adequate and helped us successfully resolve the landing gear malfunction. Since it appears to have been a maintenance related malfunction of the landing gear system; I don't have any suggestions for how to avoid the landing gear issue in the future. The fuel situation was most definitely an issue and left us little options or time for running the QRH procedure and taking further precautionary action. Had we continued to have more trouble with the manual extension handle; or could not get the gear successfully deployed after running the QRH procedure on first attempt; an impending fuel emergency could have resulted. I believe the current fuel policy for how we calculate reserve fuel should be reassessed to ensure safety of our flights during an unplanned malfunction or emergency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 flight crew encountered a main landing gear extension problem and executed a missed approach. The Emergency Checklist was accomplished and Maintenance Control contacted. Company reserve fuel policy did not allow for a Tower fly-by landing gear inspection and an uneventful landing was accomplished.

Narrative: Upon arrival at destination; we were vectored onto final approach. On profile; pilot flying called for gear down; and flaps 30 degrees. By this point we were switched to Tower frequency. As the gear deployed; only the nosewheel came down and we received a 'Gear Disagree' red caution message. We advised Tower that we would execute a go-around. Tower gave us a climb to 4;000 FT and a vector to the east. The Tower then asked the reason for going around. We advised them that we were having a gear malfunction and needed to run a checklist; and would require delay vectors. At this time; I estimate our fuel was at approximately 1;800-2;000 LBS. Pilot flying slowed to 190 KTS with flaps retracted in an attempt to manage the impending low-fuel situation. Pilot flying called for QRH procedure 'GEAR DISAGREE Message (DOWN position selected).' The Captain made the decision to transfer the controls to himself and pilot flying/pilot not flying switched roles. Pilot not flying ran QRH procedure; which first states that the procedure can be repeated more than once. Pilot not flying turned on HYD pumps 2 and 3B per QRH procedure and cycled the gear multiple times per the QRH. This was unsuccessful at getting either main landing gear to come down. Pilot not flying then pulled the Landing Gear Manual Release Handle. On first attempt; the gear handle was jammed and would not come out to full position. Upon another few attempts at pulling the handle; the handle came to full extension and gear extended. We received a 'Nose Door Open' warning message as the QRH said would be a possibility. The checklist then instructed the pilot to stow the Landing Gear Manual Release handle. The handle was jammed and after multiple attempts and a call to Maintenance Control; we made the decision to land with the handle pulled out. The QRH says that a landing with the handle pulled is allowed if stowing it causes the main gear or nose gear to retract. With the handle jammed; we were unable to accomplish this part of the procedure. We then decided to land at the nearest suitable airport; per the QRH. Captain asked the pilot not flying to confer with Maintenance; advise the Flight Attendant; and advise the passengers. Pilot not flying advised Maintenance that QRH procedure was executed and we were indicating 'Landing Gear Down' with 3 green lights. Maintenance advised that we could continue for landing and to call on the ground. Pilot not flying then called the Flight Attendant on intercom and calmly advised her of the situation. Pilot not flying emphasized twice that there would be no need to brace the cabin and that we anticipated an uneventful landing. Pilot not flying advised passengers of the gear situation and that we successfully ran a checklist and that the gear appeared to be down and locked. Pilot not flying also advised them that we anticipated a normal landing and that safety equipment would be standing by as a precaution. Pilot not flying advised passengers that it was important to follow any commands or instructions given by the Flight Attendant. Pilot not flying advised ATC that we were ready to come in for landing and that we were requesting runway with the emergency equipment standing by for precaution. Tower asked if we wanted to do a fly-by so that we could have the gear inspected to confirm that it was down. Pilot not flying advised Tower that we didn't have enough fuel for that and declared Minimum Fuel. Tower then cleared us to land. After pilot flying made a successful landing with a soft touchdown; the First Officer called Tower and advised that we were able to taxi clear of the runway and would like to have ARFF inspect the landing gear for any damage and also to visually inspect the rest of the plane for any resulting damage from any gear issue. The First Officer advised the passengers that safety equipment would be pulling up to the plane to inspect the aircraft for any damage; and that this was completely normal and to remain seatedwith seat belts fastened. ARFF confirmed that everything looked normal. We then contacted Maintenance to ask if it was okay to taxi to the gate in the current condition. We made the decision with Maintenance that it was safe to taxi to the gate. Upon arrival at the gate; the passengers exited the plane normally and seemed to be very calm and relaxed about the situation. The Flight Attendant did an outstanding job keeping the passengers advised and managing the situation in the cabin. Crew communication in cockpit was concise; clear; and efficient. Pilot flying and pilot not flying worked well together through situation. Captain did an excellent job managing the situation we were presented. Upon deployment of landing gear; we received a 'Gear Disagree' red warning CAS message. We also showed a 'Green' nose indication and two white main gear indications. This indicated to us that the nose gear was down and neither of the main landing gear were down. Cause: Gear was selected down; but the main landing gear did not deploy as commanded. Maintenance told the First Officer at gate; after inspection; that it appears the electronic signal was not sent to the main landing gear to deploy. Maintenance told the First Officer that there was a Maintenance code they found that alluded to this preliminary assessment. I believe the fuel situation resulted from our new fuel policy. Landing conditions were VFR and we did not require a landing alternate. Our planned reserve fuel was 1;521 LBS. With such low reserve fuel; and a potential emergency situation on hand; we were left with very little time to troubleshoot the problem. We would have liked to fly by the Tower to confirm the gear indications we were receiving; but we determined that another go-around could result in a critical fuel situation.Response: Tower was advised; QRH procedure was accomplished; Company Maintenance was advised; Flight Attendant was advised; passengers advised.Suggestions: The excellent simulator training I have received on a gear failure left me well-prepared for this situation. The QRH procedure was adequate and helped us successfully resolve the landing gear malfunction. Since it appears to have been a maintenance related malfunction of the landing gear system; I don't have any suggestions for how to avoid the landing gear issue in the future. The fuel situation was most definitely an issue and left us little options or time for running the QRH procedure and taking further precautionary action. Had we continued to have more trouble with the manual extension handle; or could not get the gear successfully deployed after running the QRH procedure on first attempt; an impending fuel emergency could have resulted. I believe the current fuel policy for how we calculate reserve fuel should be reassessed to ensure safety of our flights during an unplanned malfunction or emergency.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.