Narrative:

I was pilot not flying. We elected to get sprayed with both type 1 and type 4 deice and anti fluid. Even though the latest metar was not indicating takeoff in anti-ice conditions we chose to get type 4 in case we encountered any increase in taxi times; and snow begins to fall. As soon as we were all closed up; as usual; the ramp personnel left the aircraft. We had no communication with anyone to clear an engine for engine start.airplane was configured with APU running; and per 'quick reference handbook; de-ice/anti-icing configuration guide.' aircraft was sprayed with both type 1 and type 4 fluids. During push we started engine number 2. We then taxied via 'bravo and echo' to runway 4L; and while taxiing we started engine 1 and continued with the checklist; and were given takeoff clearance. Prior to acceleration height; I would say about 700 ft AGL. We both noticed smoke billowing into cockpit via aircraft ventilation vents. We both began donning oxygen mask and smoke goggles; and the same time; we heard shouting from cabin 'fire; smoke' prior to putting mask on I yelled 'yes we know; we are putting oxygen masks on and returning for landing.' I then declared 'emergency with tower; smoke in cockpit; request immediate return.' we had a little trouble at first communicating with each other due to the fact I did not have my audio panels oxygen button popped out. I quickly remedied that issue and communications were established between the two of us. Tower then handed me of to departure control; and they began vectoring us for a 4R approach.smoke was very thick at this point; and I almost could not see the primary flight display. Per first officer's suggestion; I closed all bleeds and packs. I then noticed my first officer was below assigned altitude; and I saw the reason why: his goggles were not secured to face. His goggles strap had come undone in the process of donning the mask; and he could not reference the gauges but had visual reference out his window. I was concerned with us hitting a building; so I told the pilot flying that I could see the gauges and to give me the aircraft while he fixed goggles. I climbed back to our assigned altitude and then exchanged duties and controls. At this point the pilot flying noticed on the EICAS that the APU had failed. I confirmed this and verified the APU RPM was at approximately 47% and spooling down. I then selected all bleeds and packs closed per the pilot flying's suggestion and turned the APU switch to off; and the smoke immediately began to lesson. I then proceeded to the 'immediate action checklist; cabin fire or smoke'; confirming all steps had been completed; and got the recirculation fans off. The IMC then directed me to the 'quick reference handbook' page 1-187. At the same time ATC is giving us headings; I'm repeating headings to the pilot flying (hard to hear each other in the loud cockpit); and also being queried by ATC of our passenger count and fuel load: I told them to standby. I then went to page 1-187 in the QRH. What I found was a temperature conversion chart and thought I had made an error. So I checked the iac checklist again only to find the same thing page 1-187; a temperature conversion chart. During this time the pilot flying noticed I was over-saturated with ATC communication; crew communication; and most importantly a faulty iac and he announced he was going flaps 9 and he would configure aircraft himself (he'd seen I was over tasked) and I agreed. During this time also there was some miscommunication between ATC and me about the proper localizer frequency (smoke in cockpit; poor lighting; and time concerns made flipping through charts a bad option). I queried ATC again for the frequency and took care of that issue. At this point we were very close to landing. I believed the safest course of action was to stop trying to figure out where the iac was supposed to lead me; and complete other necessary tasks. I next called the flight attendant and asked her if everyone was alright back there. She said yes; and that the smoke was dissipating. I informed her that we were landing immediately; that we are not planning an emergency evacuation at this point but it is a possibility; and I will let you know. At this time we were on the approach and cleared to land. I informed tower that we would like to come to full stop on runway; they approved; and we landed and came to stop. Tower handed me off to the firemen's radio frequency. I informed the firemen that the smoke had dissipated; was not planning an emergency evacuation at this time; but to look for signs that we might need to; and also take a good look at the APU (we suspected it to be source of situation). I then shutdown engine number 1 and opened the cockpit door. I looked back into cabin to assess if there was a need for an emergency evacuation; along with asking the flight attendant if they were ok. She replied everyone was ok; but she had a freeze burn from grabbing the portable oxygen bottle. She also opened the main cabin door. I then began to run the iac 'emergency evacuation checklist' holding short of the passenger announcement evacuate; evacuate' in preparation; if the need arises from incoming information. The firemen communicated to us that no fire or smoke was observed. We then made arrangements for maintenance to bring a tug out; along with operations getting buses out to the runway to take passengers back to the terminal. At this point I turned off the aircraft batteries to prevent draining the voltage below 19v. The firemen connected a metal ramp to the main cabin door. Passengers deplaned aircraft via the ramp and boarded buses. When I left the aircraft with company maintenance personnel; the emergency lights were on; and informed maintenance of this. All three crew members then boarded a buss.smoke in cockpit and cabin was the number one threat; along with difficulties seeing in the cockpit. Difficulties communicating with both ATC and the first officer due to using oxygen masks in loud cockpit. Faulty immediate action checklist leading to improper page in the QRH. Over-saturation of pilot not flying. Errors: me not immediately getting audio panel oxygen button depressed; and pilot flying pulling out strap on smoke goggles.I suggest we need to get deicing procedures standardized at this airport. The de-icers sometimes spray before they even communicate with us. Pilots should always be deiced with engine number 2 running; and have the APU shutdown to avoid using APU as bleed source after de-ice procedures have taken place. Keep in mind though; we are going to end up burning a good amount of fuel with an engine running instead of the APU; which is a major issue when it takes the deice crew so long to show up. We need the deicer to get in communication with us when they do show up; start engine number 2; shutdown the APU; then get sprayed: this needs to be the normal sequence. Lastly; the immediate action checklist needs to not have a major error.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-45 flight crew experienced heavy smoke in the cabin and flight deck during takeoff as well as an APU failure. An emergency was declared and an uneventful landing ensued.

Narrative: I was pilot not flying. We elected to get sprayed with both Type 1 and Type 4 deice and anti fluid. Even though the latest METAR was not indicating takeoff in anti-ice conditions we chose to get Type 4 in case we encountered any increase in taxi times; and snow begins to fall. As soon as we were all closed up; as usual; the ramp personnel left the aircraft. We had no communication with anyone to clear an engine for engine start.Airplane was configured with APU running; and per 'quick reference handbook; de-ice/anti-icing configuration guide.' Aircraft was sprayed with both Type 1 and Type 4 fluids. During push we started Engine Number 2. We then taxied via 'bravo and echo' to Runway 4L; and while taxiing we started engine 1 and continued with the checklist; and were given takeoff clearance. Prior to acceleration height; I would say about 700 FT AGL. We both noticed smoke billowing into cockpit via aircraft ventilation vents. We both began donning oxygen mask and smoke goggles; and the same time; we heard shouting from cabin 'fire; smoke' prior to putting mask on I yelled 'yes we know; we are putting oxygen masks on and returning for landing.' I then declared 'emergency with Tower; smoke in cockpit; request immediate return.' We had a little trouble at first communicating with each other due to the fact I did not have my audio panels oxygen button popped out. I quickly remedied that issue and communications were established between the two of us. Tower then handed me of to Departure Control; and they began vectoring us for a 4R approach.Smoke was very thick at this point; and I almost could not see the Primary Flight Display. Per First Officer's suggestion; I closed all bleeds and packs. I then noticed my First Officer was below assigned altitude; and I saw the reason why: his goggles were not secured to face. His goggles strap had come undone in the process of donning the mask; and he could not reference the gauges but had visual reference out his window. I was concerned with us hitting a building; so I told the pilot flying that I could see the gauges and to give me the aircraft while he fixed goggles. I climbed back to our assigned altitude and then exchanged duties and controls. At this point the pilot flying noticed on the EICAS that the APU had failed. I confirmed this and verified the APU RPM was at approximately 47% and spooling down. I then selected all bleeds and packs closed per the pilot flying's suggestion and turned the APU switch to off; and the smoke immediately began to lesson. I then proceeded to the 'Immediate Action Checklist; Cabin fire or smoke'; confirming all steps had been completed; and got the recirculation fans off. The IMC then directed me to the 'Quick Reference Handbook' page 1-187. At the same time ATC is giving us headings; I'm repeating headings to the pilot flying (hard to hear each other in the loud cockpit); and also being queried by ATC of our passenger count and fuel load: I told them to standby. I then went to page 1-187 in the QRH. What I found was a temperature conversion chart and thought I had made an error. So I checked the IAC checklist again only to find the same thing page 1-187; a temperature conversion chart. During this time the pilot flying noticed I was over-saturated with ATC communication; crew communication; and most importantly a faulty IAC and he announced he was going flaps 9 and he would configure aircraft himself (he'd seen I was over tasked) and I agreed. During this time also there was some miscommunication between ATC and me about the proper localizer frequency (smoke in cockpit; poor lighting; and time concerns made flipping through charts a bad option). I queried ATC again for the frequency and took care of that issue. At this point we were very close to landing. I believed the safest course of action was to stop trying to figure out where the IAC was supposed to lead me; and complete other necessary tasks. I next called the Flight Attendant and asked her if everyone was alright back there. She said yes; and that the smoke was dissipating. I informed her that we were landing immediately; that we are not planning an emergency evacuation at this point but it is a possibility; and I will let you know. At this time we were on the approach and cleared to land. I informed Tower that we would like to come to full stop on runway; they approved; and we landed and came to stop. Tower handed me off to the firemen's radio frequency. I informed the Firemen that the smoke had dissipated; was not planning an emergency evacuation at this time; but to look for signs that we might need to; and also take a good look at the APU (we suspected it to be source of situation). I then shutdown Engine Number 1 and opened the cockpit door. I looked back into cabin to assess if there was a need for an emergency evacuation; along with asking the Flight Attendant if they were OK. She replied everyone was OK; but she had a freeze burn from grabbing the portable oxygen bottle. She also opened the main cabin door. I then began to run the IAC 'Emergency Evacuation Checklist' holding short of the Passenger Announcement Evacuate; Evacuate' in preparation; if the need arises from incoming information. The firemen communicated to us that no fire or smoke was observed. We then made arrangements for Maintenance to bring a tug out; along with operations getting buses out to the runway to take passengers back to the terminal. At this point I turned off the aircraft batteries to prevent draining the voltage below 19v. The firemen connected a metal ramp to the main cabin door. Passengers deplaned aircraft via the ramp and boarded buses. When I left the aircraft with company Maintenance personnel; the emergency lights were on; and informed Maintenance of this. All three crew members then boarded a buss.Smoke in cockpit and cabin was the number one threat; along with difficulties seeing in the cockpit. Difficulties communicating with both ATC and the First officer due to using oxygen masks in loud cockpit. Faulty Immediate Action Checklist leading to improper page in the QRH. Over-saturation of Pilot not flying. Errors: Me not immediately getting Audio panel oxygen button depressed; and pilot flying pulling out strap on smoke goggles.I suggest we need to get deicing procedures standardized at this airport. The de-icers sometimes spray before they even communicate with us. Pilots should always be deiced with Engine Number 2 running; and have the APU shutdown to avoid using APU as bleed source after de-ice procedures have taken place. Keep in mind though; we are going to end up burning a good amount of fuel with an engine running instead of the APU; Which is a major issue when it takes the deice crew so long to show up. We need the Deicer to get in communication with us when they do show up; start Engine Number 2; shutdown the APU; then get sprayed: this needs to be the normal sequence. Lastly; the Immediate Action Checklist needs to not have a major error.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.