Narrative:

It was the last leg of a 4 leg day and the first officer was the pilot flying and I was the pilot not flying. We had departed off of runway xx. As we passed through 12;500 ft we heard a loud bang and subsequently felt a shutter of the aircraft. The first officer and I brought our attention to the engine gauges and saw the right engine slowly rolling back with the egt above 700 degrees celsius. At this point we had climbed up to approximately 13;300 ft at which time the first officer had started a level off and stated he would be descending back to 13;000 ft. I contacted center and declared an emergency stating that we had a right engine failure and that we would be leveling off at 13;000 ft. The controller asked if we could descend down to 11;000 ft and I said; 'no; not at this time; we need to check things out and start running the checklist.' the controller then asked where we needed to go and the first officer and I agreed to turn around and head back to the departure airport. I had pulled out the QRH and opened the engine flameout; failure or shutdown checklist and began to work. Though N1 and N2 were wind milling; it was evident that this was a severe damage situation because of the loud bang; shutter and the egt peaking in the 730's. We agreed that we should not try to restart and just proceed with the severe damage shutdown. I began with N2 in the checklist and verified with the first officer that I had the right throttle. We confirmed it and I pulled it back. The throttle moved; but once it got to approximately 2 inches from the idle stop it started to bind. At the idle stop position I let the throttle go and it slowly worked its way back up to the 2 inch spot. N3 on the checklist stated to turn off the affected engine fuel control lever. Again; I verified with the first officer that I had the right fuel control lever. He confirmed and I pushed in the button and tried to move the lever but it was locked in the on position. I tried again with no success. N4 in the checklist stated that if severe damage was suspected then pull the fire lever but do not discharge the fire bottle. This was also verified and the fire handle was pulled. At this time the engine was fully secured. No fire ever occurred during the flight.eventually we got a call from the lead flight attendant and I explained that we had an engine failure and that we would be heading back to the airport. I also said that we were still running checklist and I would update the flight attendants along with the passengers in a few minutes. I continued where I left off and once I got to a point where I could take a break I updated the flight attendants again and then updated the passengers. On the PA I explained that the right engine has failed and we would be heading back to the departure airport. I asked that everyone stay in their seats with the seatbelts fastened and to adhere to any instructions that the flight attendants may give during the remainder of the flight. My final update to the lead flight attendant was that the engine was secure and that we were landing single engine and that there would be no evacuation plans but we will be stopping on the runway. The lead flight attendant acknowledged and I asked her if there were any questions she had. She said that she did not have any questions and we hung up. I had completed the checklist and the first officer had maneuvered the aircraft on a slightly long downwind to allow for configuring. At this point I took over the radios and verified with the tower that the trucks were ready and informed that we would be stopping on the runway. The first officer landed and we came to a stop. We asked the tower to have the emergency team check for any hot spots. At this time we also updated the passengers and asked that they remain seated with their seatbelts fastened. Once we were given the all clear we taxied to the gate and deplaned.I want to comment on the CRM portion of this flight by stating what a great jobeveryone did. The first officer from the start of the event had control of the aircraft at all times and was able to land the aircraft without incident. Our training and teamwork fell into place after the surprise of the failure was realized. After talking to the lead flight attendant about the occurrence I feel her timing was well planned. The first few minutes for us were busy and she stated that she held off from contacting us for a few minutes. I think she said she waited 3 minutes before making her first call to us so we could take care of the situation. That small time frame was perfect to allow us to asses the condition of the aircraft; communicate with ATC and start working in the checklist. When she did call I had time to quickly update her about what was going on and she remained calm and collected. This in turn gave me the confidence that the flight attendants had everything under control in the back (i.e. One less thing for me to have to think about.) subsequent updates where handled the same way with conversation that was short and to the point. All around I think the communication between the pilots as well as between the pilots and flight attendants made for a smooth and effective outcome for this situation.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MD-80's right engine failed during the climb; so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed and the flight returned to the departure airport.

Narrative: It was the last leg of a 4 leg day and the First Officer was the pilot flying and I was the pilot not flying. We had departed off of Runway XX. As we passed through 12;500 FT we heard a loud bang and subsequently felt a shutter of the aircraft. The First Officer and I brought our attention to the engine gauges and saw the right engine slowly rolling back with the EGT above 700 degrees Celsius. At this point we had climbed up to approximately 13;300 FT at which time the First Officer had started a level off and stated he would be descending back to 13;000 FT. I contacted Center and declared an emergency stating that we had a right engine failure and that we would be leveling off at 13;000 FT. The Controller asked if we could descend down to 11;000 FT and I said; 'No; not at this time; we need to check things out and start running the checklist.' The Controller then asked where we needed to go and the First Officer and I agreed to turn around and head back to the departure airport. I had pulled out the QRH and opened the Engine Flameout; Failure or Shutdown Checklist and began to work. Though N1 and N2 were wind milling; it was evident that this was a severe damage situation because of the loud bang; shutter and the EGT peaking in the 730's. We agreed that we should not try to restart and just proceed with the severe damage shutdown. I began with N2 in the checklist and verified with the First Officer that I had the right throttle. We confirmed it and I pulled it back. The throttle moved; but once it got to approximately 2 inches from the idle stop it started to bind. At the idle stop position I let the throttle go and it slowly worked its way back up to the 2 inch spot. N3 on the checklist stated to turn off the affected engine fuel control lever. Again; I verified with the First Officer that I had the right fuel control lever. He confirmed and I pushed in the button and tried to move the lever but it was locked in the ON position. I tried again with no success. N4 in the checklist stated that if severe damage was suspected then pull the Fire Lever but do not discharge the fire bottle. This was also verified and the Fire Handle was pulled. At this time the engine was fully secured. No fire ever occurred during the flight.Eventually we got a call from the Lead Flight Attendant and I explained that we had an engine failure and that we would be heading back to the airport. I also said that we were still running checklist and I would update the flight attendants along with the passengers in a few minutes. I continued where I left off and once I got to a point where I could take a break I updated the flight attendants again and then updated the passengers. On the PA I explained that the right engine has failed and we would be heading back to the departure airport. I asked that everyone stay in their seats with the seatbelts fastened and to adhere to any instructions that the flight attendants may give during the remainder of the flight. My final update to the Lead Flight Attendant was that the engine was secure and that we were landing single engine and that there would be no evacuation plans but we will be stopping on the runway. The Lead Flight Attendant acknowledged and I asked her if there were any questions she had. She said that she did not have any questions and we hung up. I had completed the checklist and the First Officer had maneuvered the aircraft on a slightly long downwind to allow for configuring. At this point I took over the radios and verified with the Tower that the trucks were ready and informed that we would be stopping on the runway. The First Officer landed and we came to a stop. We asked the Tower to have the emergency team check for any hot spots. At this time we also updated the passengers and asked that they remain seated with their seatbelts fastened. Once we were given the all clear we taxied to the gate and deplaned.I want to comment on the CRM portion of this flight by stating what a great jobeveryone did. The First Officer from the start of the event had control of the aircraft at all times and was able to land the aircraft without incident. Our training and teamwork fell into place after the surprise of the failure was realized. After talking to the Lead Flight Attendant about the occurrence I feel her timing was well planned. The first few minutes for us were busy and she stated that she held off from contacting us for a few minutes. I think she said she waited 3 minutes before making her first call to us so we could take care of the situation. That small time frame was perfect to allow us to asses the condition of the aircraft; communicate with ATC and start working in the checklist. When she did call I had time to quickly update her about what was going on and she remained calm and collected. This in turn gave me the confidence that the flight attendants had everything under control in the back (i.e. one less thing for me to have to think about.) Subsequent updates where handled the same way with conversation that was short and to the point. All around I think the communication between the pilots as well as between the pilots and flight attendants made for a smooth and effective outcome for this situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.