Narrative:

I was working the O'neill handoff position with pacific sector combined. The radar controller took an interphone call from fleet area control and surveillance facility (facsfac, a us navy unit which oversees operations within west 291) while I was answering another interphone call, facsfac requested direct fyter, an approach fix to MCAS el toro, and 5000' for mlt X from 15 mi east of hooke DME fix. The radar controller approved the request and issued a new transponder code. When I completed my interphone call, I was approached by our flight data specialist who advised me that there were 2 flight plans on an aircraft departing sna and he did not know which one to use. I told him that I would take care of the problem. This caused me to miss part of the facsfac interphone call. All I heard (the entire call was loud and clear in my headset) was mlt X and 15 mi east of hooke. I discounted this position because it would have put mlt X in the san diego TCA. I then hand wrote a flight progress strip on mlt X using the data in our ARTS III tab list. Later, facsfac called me to make the handoff on mlt X 15 mi west of sinke DME fix. I did not see a target in that area and advised facsfac to 'keep him coming, he is not on my scope.' (I said this to mean he was beyond the edge of our radar scope.) on the next call facsfac said mlt X position was 5 mi northwest of urosh. I did not see a target, still thinking he was beyond radar coverage. Another facsfac controller interrupted and said mlt X was 12 mi northwest of sinke (this report definitely put him within our airspace and radar coverage). I still did not see a target. As I continued to look around the area of the position report, I found a faint primary target (no transponder) near iland DME fix nebnd. I immediately disconnected the line to facsfac and advised the radar controller about the target on a converging course with an large transport we were working. Both pilots saw each other and took evasive action. Because I did not hear the initial coordination between my radar controller and facsfac, I expected mlt X to exit west 291 in the area of sinke, not urosh. I also expected the radar coverage to be good in the area south of urosh. Contributing factors: 1) poor communication between radar controller and handoff controller. 2) issuing a new transponder code when all that was needed was to force the flight data on mlt X into our ARTS computer. We then would have had a non-ARTS track in the gen'l area of the mlt X. 3) poor radar coverage. 4) facsfac giving direct fyter to an mlt X (needs to be /right). 5) my phrase 'keep him coming' allowed facsfac to enter controled airspace. 6) being distracted by the flight data person re: the 2 flight plans on the aircraft at sna.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLT CROSSED IN CLOSE PROX TO AN LGT AT SAME ALT.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE O'NEILL HDOF POS WITH PACIFIC SECTOR COMBINED. THE RADAR CTLR TOOK AN INTERPHONE CALL FROM FLEET AREA CTL AND SURVEILLANCE FAC (FACSFAC, A U.S. NAVY UNIT WHICH OVERSEES OPS WITHIN W 291) WHILE I WAS ANSWERING ANOTHER INTERPHONE CALL, FACSFAC REQUESTED DIRECT FYTER, AN APCH FIX TO MCAS EL TORO, AND 5000' FOR MLT X FROM 15 MI E OF HOOKE DME FIX. THE RADAR CTLR APPROVED THE REQUEST AND ISSUED A NEW XPONDER CODE. WHEN I COMPLETED MY INTERPHONE CALL, I WAS APCHED BY OUR FLT DATA SPECIALIST WHO ADVISED ME THAT THERE WERE 2 FLT PLANS ON AN ACFT DEPARTING SNA AND HE DID NOT KNOW WHICH ONE TO USE. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD TAKE CARE OF THE PROB. THIS CAUSED ME TO MISS PART OF THE FACSFAC INTERPHONE CALL. ALL I HEARD (THE ENTIRE CALL WAS LOUD AND CLEAR IN MY HEADSET) WAS MLT X AND 15 MI E OF HOOKE. I DISCOUNTED THIS POS BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE PUT MLT X IN THE SAN DIEGO TCA. I THEN HAND WROTE A FLT PROGRESS STRIP ON MLT X USING THE DATA IN OUR ARTS III TAB LIST. LATER, FACSFAC CALLED ME TO MAKE THE HDOF ON MLT X 15 MI W OF SINKE DME FIX. I DID NOT SEE A TARGET IN THAT AREA AND ADVISED FACSFAC TO 'KEEP HIM COMING, HE IS NOT ON MY SCOPE.' (I SAID THIS TO MEAN HE WAS BEYOND THE EDGE OF OUR RADAR SCOPE.) ON THE NEXT CALL FACSFAC SAID MLT X POS WAS 5 MI NW OF UROSH. I DID NOT SEE A TARGET, STILL THINKING HE WAS BEYOND RADAR COVERAGE. ANOTHER FACSFAC CTLR INTERRUPTED AND SAID MLT X WAS 12 MI NW OF SINKE (THIS RPT DEFINITELY PUT HIM WITHIN OUR AIRSPACE AND RADAR COVERAGE). I STILL DID NOT SEE A TARGET. AS I CONTINUED TO LOOK AROUND THE AREA OF THE POS RPT, I FOUND A FAINT PRIMARY TARGET (NO XPONDER) NEAR ILAND DME FIX NEBND. I IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED THE LINE TO FACSFAC AND ADVISED THE RADAR CTLR ABOUT THE TARGET ON A CONVERGING COURSE WITH AN LGT WE WERE WORKING. BOTH PLTS SAW EACH OTHER AND TOOK EVASIVE ACTION. BECAUSE I DID NOT HEAR THE INITIAL COORD BTWN MY RADAR CTLR AND FACSFAC, I EXPECTED MLT X TO EXIT W 291 IN THE AREA OF SINKE, NOT UROSH. I ALSO EXPECTED THE RADAR COVERAGE TO BE GOOD IN THE AREA S OF UROSH. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) POOR COM BTWN RADAR CTLR AND HDOF CTLR. 2) ISSUING A NEW XPONDER CODE WHEN ALL THAT WAS NEEDED WAS TO FORCE THE FLT DATA ON MLT X INTO OUR ARTS COMPUTER. WE THEN WOULD HAVE HAD A NON-ARTS TRACK IN THE GEN'L AREA OF THE MLT X. 3) POOR RADAR COVERAGE. 4) FACSFAC GIVING DIRECT FYTER TO AN MLT X (NEEDS TO BE /R). 5) MY PHRASE 'KEEP HIM COMING' ALLOWED FACSFAC TO ENTER CTLED AIRSPACE. 6) BEING DISTRACTED BY THE FLT DATA PERSON RE: THE 2 FLT PLANS ON THE ACFT AT SNA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.