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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1091300 |
Time | |
Date | 201305 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | BWI.Airport |
State Reference | MD |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B717 (Formerly MD-95) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Engine |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
We landed around midnight after an 11 hour duty day and we were both tired. After exiting the runway I said my normal 'flaps up; after landing checklist; shutdown two;' yet turned off engine number 2 myself but never told my first officer that I did. When the first officer finished his after landing checklist; he proceeded to shut down engine number 2. Unfortunately; he shutdown engine number 1. By shutting one engine down myself I kind of set him up and so we found ourselves with no engines on the taxiway. I immediately started the APU and made an announcement to the passengers and ATC. After the APU came online we started one engine and taxied to the gate. We had a long day and were both tired. I even commented on this during the descent to be extra vigilant. I should have let the first officer do his job like I asked him and not shut down one engine myself. I am aware of what the aom says in regards to who should shutdown engines during the taxi-in; yet being tired; rushing to get things done got the better of me. And the first officer should have looked what start lever he reached for. I assume he was in mindset as I. Needless to say we all learned a big lesson from this.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: During a late night taxi to the gate after landing; the Captain elected to shutdown the Number 2 engine while the First Officer was performing the After Landing checklist. When the First Officer reached to shut down the Number 2 engine; he mistakenly shutdown the Number 1 engine. The crew recovered by stopping the taxi; starting the APU and restarting the Number 1 engine; followed by a successful taxi to the gate.
Narrative: We landed around midnight after an 11 hour duty day and we were both tired. After exiting the runway I said my normal 'Flaps up; After Landing checklist; shutdown two;' yet turned off Engine Number 2 myself but never told my First Officer that I did. When the First Officer finished his After Landing checklist; he proceeded to shut down Engine Number 2. Unfortunately; he shutdown Engine Number 1. By shutting one engine down myself I kind of set him up and so we found ourselves with no engines on the taxiway. I immediately started the APU and made an announcement to the passengers and ATC. After the APU came online we started one engine and taxied to the gate. We had a long day and were both tired. I even commented on this during the descent to be extra vigilant. I should have let the First Officer do his job like I asked him and not shut down one engine myself. I am aware of what the AOM says in regards to who should shutdown engines during the taxi-in; yet being tired; rushing to get things done got the better of me. And the First Officer should have looked what start lever he reached for. I assume he was in mindset as I. Needless to say we all learned a big lesson from this.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.