Narrative:

Cleared for ILS 12R at sjc by ATC (bay approach). Intercepted localizer and proceeded inbound at 120 KIAS. Bay advised of traffic at 7 O'clock, 'aircraft inbound for the right.' reported, 'not in sight.' past sunne (FAF) change to sjc tower at 110 KIAS. Advised of 8 O'clock traffic, 'report in sight.' reported, 'still not in sight.' approximately 2.5 mi from runway 12R on ILS, overheard inbound air carrier call 7 or 8 DME for the right. 8 O'clock traffic is still not in sight. Instructed by sjc tower (124.0) to change to runway 12 and contact tower on 120.7. Started sidestep to line up with 12L. Changed to 120.7 and called sjc tower. Response was, 'change to runway 12R, contact tower on 124.0.' repositioned aircraft back to final for 12R. Changed to 124.0 and called sjc tower. Response was, 'cleared to land runway 12R.' advised tower of our intention to land long in order to clear the runway as fast as possible. Tower approved. Passed over runway threshold at approximately 200' AGL at 110 KIAS. Overheard tower clear another air carrier into 'position and hold.' landed approximately 2/3 way down the runway and proceeded at high speed taxi to taxiway B and turned off. (This couldn't have taken over 30-40 seconds.) during roll out tower requested 'minimum time on runway.' after clearing runway overhead sjc tower advise air carrier on short final to 'go around, aircraft on the runway.' I looked and observed: air carrier aircraft on runway waiting takeoff clearance; air carrier aircraft directly above approach end of runway executing go around. Approximately height: 400-500' AGL. Conclusion: sjc tower allowed saturation of the approach, then placed an aircraft on the runway which resulted in a near miss and a go around while on short final. It is possible that bay approach improperly spaced the aircraft or didn't allow for the speed differences between types of aircraft. This doesn't explain why sjc tower cleared the additional aircraft to position and hold. There was obviously a communication mixup in the sjc tower. The change of runways assigned to us clearly indicates a condition of near overload. I strongly suspect that the additional communication workload imposed by implementation of the arsa was a contributing factor. Recommendations: provide additional training to air traffic controllers re: the landing and taxi speeds of both air carrier and GA equipment. It appears that the controllers expect all aircraft to have the same approach and landing speeds. When there is an aircraft landing and another is on short final, do not clear another aircraft to position and hold, especially an air carrier type (slow engine response).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLOSE PROX ACR ON SHORT FINAL AND ACR IN POSITION FOR TKOF AT SJC RWY 12R.

Narrative: CLRED FOR ILS 12R AT SJC BY ATC (BAY APCH). INTERCEPTED LOC AND PROCEEDED INBND AT 120 KIAS. BAY ADVISED OF TFC AT 7 O'CLOCK, 'ACFT INBND FOR THE RIGHT.' RPTED, 'NOT IN SIGHT.' PAST SUNNE (FAF) CHANGE TO SJC TWR AT 110 KIAS. ADVISED OF 8 O'CLOCK TFC, 'RPT IN SIGHT.' RPTED, 'STILL NOT IN SIGHT.' APPROX 2.5 MI FROM RWY 12R ON ILS, OVERHEARD INBND ACR CALL 7 OR 8 DME FOR THE RIGHT. 8 O'CLOCK TFC IS STILL NOT IN SIGHT. INSTRUCTED BY SJC TWR (124.0) TO CHANGE TO RWY 12 AND CONTACT TWR ON 120.7. STARTED SIDESTEP TO LINE UP WITH 12L. CHANGED TO 120.7 AND CALLED SJC TWR. RESPONSE WAS, 'CHANGE TO RWY 12R, CONTACT TWR ON 124.0.' REPOSITIONED ACFT BACK TO FINAL FOR 12R. CHANGED TO 124.0 AND CALLED SJC TWR. RESPONSE WAS, 'CLRED TO LAND RWY 12R.' ADVISED TWR OF OUR INTENTION TO LAND LONG IN ORDER TO CLR THE RWY AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. TWR APPROVED. PASSED OVER RWY THRESHOLD AT APPROX 200' AGL AT 110 KIAS. OVERHEARD TWR CLR ANOTHER ACR INTO 'POS AND HOLD.' LANDED APPROX 2/3 WAY DOWN THE RWY AND PROCEEDED AT HIGH SPD TAXI TO TXWY B AND TURNED OFF. (THIS COULDN'T HAVE TAKEN OVER 30-40 SECS.) DURING ROLL OUT TWR REQUESTED 'MINIMUM TIME ON RWY.' AFTER CLRING RWY OVERHEAD SJC TWR ADVISE ACR ON SHORT FINAL TO 'GO AROUND, ACFT ON THE RWY.' I LOOKED AND OBSERVED: ACR ACFT ON RWY WAITING TKOF CLRNC; ACR ACFT DIRECTLY ABOVE APCH END OF RWY EXECUTING GAR. APPROX HEIGHT: 400-500' AGL. CONCLUSION: SJC TWR ALLOWED SATURATION OF THE APCH, THEN PLACED AN ACFT ON THE RWY WHICH RESULTED IN A NEAR MISS AND A GAR WHILE ON SHORT FINAL. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BAY APCH IMPROPERLY SPACED THE ACFT OR DIDN'T ALLOW FOR THE SPD DIFFERENCES BTWN TYPES OF ACFT. THIS DOESN'T EXPLAIN WHY SJC TWR CLRED THE ADDITIONAL ACFT TO POS AND HOLD. THERE WAS OBVIOUSLY A COM MIXUP IN THE SJC TWR. THE CHANGE OF RWYS ASSIGNED TO US CLEARLY INDICATES A CONDITION OF NEAR OVERLOAD. I STRONGLY SUSPECT THAT THE ADDITIONAL COM WORKLOAD IMPOSED BY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARSA WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. RECOMMENDATIONS: PROVIDE ADDITIONAL TRNING TO AIR TFC CTLRS RE: THE LNDG AND TAXI SPDS OF BOTH ACR AND GA EQUIP. IT APPEARS THAT THE CTLRS EXPECT ALL ACFT TO HAVE THE SAME APCH AND LNDG SPDS. WHEN THERE IS AN ACFT LNDG AND ANOTHER IS ON SHORT FINAL, DO NOT CLEAR ANOTHER ACFT TO POS AND HOLD, ESPECIALLY AN ACR TYPE (SLOW ENG RESPONSE).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.