Narrative:

The captain was hand-flying the departure and aus departure initially cleared us to climb to 12;000 ft; turn left 030; and to not exceed 280 KIAS in climb. Passing 11;000 ft [the following] events happened simultaneously. I reached up to the fcp and appeared to engage the autopilot and; [while I] grab[bed] for the plastic covered checklist to set on the dash to block the sun; called out '11;000 ft for 12;000 ft' just as departure cleared us direct hookk intersection; contact hou center. I looked down to the mcdu to select direct hookk; called navigation available to hookk and was in the process of changing frequencies when the aural voice warning of bank angle; bank angle [sounded]. I looked up and recognized the aircraft was in a 45+ degree left bank and quickly approaching 12;000 ft. The captain stated the 'autopilot is not engaged'; grabbed the yoke and began to push over and roll out. As the pushover was occurring I stated we are 200 ft above altitude. The captain continued the pushover and the aircraft topped out at 12;410 and began a descent back to 12;000 ft where we leveled the aircraft and engaged the autopilot. The time above 12;000 ft was approximately 3-5 seconds. The rest of the flight was uneventful. Both pilots must confirm that any change via the fcp is verified in the fmas!!!! There was an assumption that the autopilot [had been selected but] was not verified before both pilots began secondary and tertiary tasks. Even though aus seems like a relatively low task environment; the morning departure tends to be busy with restrictions and communication along with the sun being a significant factor. Use of the autopilot is warranted to allow for better monitoring and lower the task saturation by the first officer. Fundamental prioritization of aviate; navigate; [and] communicate was not followed and it must be.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The confluence of multiple flight deck tasks combined with an ATC clearance combined to distract the flight crew of an MD-11 from the aircraft's autoflight status. Only when an excessive bank angle and the realization that they were about to climb through their cleared altitude did the crew realize the autopilot was not engaged.

Narrative: The Captain was hand-flying the departure and AUS Departure initially cleared us to climb to 12;000 FT; turn left 030; and to not exceed 280 KIAS in climb. Passing 11;000 FT [the following] events happened simultaneously. I reached up to the FCP and appeared to engage the autopilot and; [while I] grab[bed] for the plastic covered checklist to set on the dash to block the sun; called out '11;000 FT for 12;000 FT' just as departure cleared us direct HOOKK intersection; contact HOU Center. I looked down to the MCDU to select direct HOOKK; called NAV available to HOOKK and was in the process of changing frequencies when the aural voice warning of BANK ANGLE; BANK ANGLE [sounded]. I looked up and recognized the aircraft was in a 45+ degree left bank and quickly approaching 12;000 FT. The Captain stated the 'autopilot is not engaged'; grabbed the yoke and began to push over and roll out. As the pushover was occurring I stated we are 200 FT above altitude. The Captain continued the pushover and the aircraft topped out at 12;410 and began a descent back to 12;000 FT where we leveled the aircraft and engaged the autopilot. The time above 12;000 FT was approximately 3-5 seconds. The rest of the flight was uneventful. Both pilots must confirm that any change via the FCP is verified in the FMAs!!!! There was an assumption that the autopilot [had been selected but] was not verified before both pilots began secondary and tertiary tasks. Even though AUS seems like a relatively low task environment; the morning departure tends to be busy with restrictions and communication along with the sun being a significant factor. Use of the autopilot is warranted to allow for better monitoring and lower the task saturation by the First Officer. Fundamental prioritization of Aviate; Navigate; [and] Communicate was not followed and it must be.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.