Narrative:

After an uneventful engine start and taxi out we were given position and hold on runway xx in ZZZ. The controller issued us a takeoff clearance along with a wind report. After power application and during the takeoff roll I realized that the wind report constituted a tailwind. I asked the first officer if we had accounted for that and she replied 'yes.' the takeoff was uneventful and as I was still preoccupied with not noticing the tailwind; I forgot to call for flap retraction until prompted by the first officer. Once in cruise; we discussed what had happened and upon further investigation; realized we had not compensated correctly for the tailwind. A takeoff with a benign 5 KT tailwind on a long runway is not really the issue here. Isolated simple mistakes are common and typically caught by the other crew members or checklists. The first officer and I have had an excellent working relationship and I consider both of us to be very thorough; competent and professional. During our 3 hour situation in ZZZ; before this leg we discussed the fact that we were both feeling fatigued. We were both at the end of another 95 hour month and this particular trip was composed of duty days lasting 8; 9; 11 and 11 hours. We both agreed that if anything irregular occurred or if our flight was delayed any further we would pull ourselves off of the trip. During cruise; we discussed the events and agreed that we were not prone to making these mistakes and acknowledged that we were not feeling that sharp. As I briefed the approach into a high terrain and short runway environment; I reiterated the need for vigilance as we were both clearly not at the top of our game. After gear extension I noticed an unusually high descent rate and realized I had left the speed brakes out. I am aware of the fact that most aviation accidents are the result of several sequential errors or lapses in judgement. In retrospect; we should not have been flying that flight. We also should not have been put in that position by the numerous fatigue causing factors brought on by our schedules. I always assumed flying tired and fatigued were the same thing. That is clearly not the case. I had a good night's sleep; I am in excellent physical shape and did not consume alcohol at any time during this trip. I don't believe our current scheduling and the level of safety that is expected of us can coexist.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLT CREW CAME TO THE REALIZATION THAT FATIGUE HAD BEEN THE CAUSE OF THEIR MINOR; BUT VARIED OVERSIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE REPORTED FLT.

Narrative: AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL ENG START AND TAXI OUT WE WERE GIVEN POS AND HOLD ON RWY XX IN ZZZ. THE CTLR ISSUED US A TKOF CLRNC ALONG WITH A WIND RPT. AFTER PWR APPLICATION AND DURING THE TKOF ROLL I REALIZED THAT THE WIND RPT CONSTITUTED A TAILWIND. I ASKED THE FO IF WE HAD ACCOUNTED FOR THAT AND SHE REPLIED 'YES.' THE TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL AND AS I WAS STILL PREOCCUPIED WITH NOT NOTICING THE TAILWIND; I FORGOT TO CALL FOR FLAP RETRACTION UNTIL PROMPTED BY THE FO. ONCE IN CRUISE; WE DISCUSSED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION; REALIZED WE HAD NOT COMPENSATED CORRECTLY FOR THE TAILWIND. A TKOF WITH A BENIGN 5 KT TAILWIND ON A LONG RWY IS NOT REALLY THE ISSUE HERE. ISOLATED SIMPLE MISTAKES ARE COMMON AND TYPICALLY CAUGHT BY THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS OR CHKLISTS. THE FO AND I HAVE HAD AN EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIP AND I CONSIDER BOTH OF US TO BE VERY THOROUGH; COMPETENT AND PROFESSIONAL. DURING OUR 3 HR SIT IN ZZZ; BEFORE THIS LEG WE DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT WE WERE BOTH FEELING FATIGUED. WE WERE BOTH AT THE END OF ANOTHER 95 HR MONTH AND THIS PARTICULAR TRIP WAS COMPOSED OF DUTY DAYS LASTING 8; 9; 11 AND 11 HRS. WE BOTH AGREED THAT IF ANYTHING IRREGULAR OCCURRED OR IF OUR FLT WAS DELAYED ANY FURTHER WE WOULD PULL OURSELVES OFF OF THE TRIP. DURING CRUISE; WE DISCUSSED THE EVENTS AND AGREED THAT WE WERE NOT PRONE TO MAKING THESE MISTAKES AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE WERE NOT FEELING THAT SHARP. AS I BRIEFED THE APCH INTO A HIGH TERRAIN AND SHORT RWY ENVIRONMENT; I REITERATED THE NEED FOR VIGILANCE AS WE WERE BOTH CLRLY NOT AT THE TOP OF OUR GAME. AFTER GEAR EXTENSION I NOTICED AN UNUSUALLY HIGH DSCNT RATE AND REALIZED I HAD LEFT THE SPD BRAKES OUT. I AM AWARE OF THE FACT THAT MOST AVIATION ACCIDENTS ARE THE RESULT OF SEVERAL SEQUENTIAL ERRORS OR LAPSES IN JUDGEMENT. IN RETROSPECT; WE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN FLYING THAT FLT. WE ALSO SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PUT IN THAT POS BY THE NUMEROUS FATIGUE CAUSING FACTORS BROUGHT ON BY OUR SCHEDULES. I ALWAYS ASSUMED FLYING TIRED AND FATIGUED WERE THE SAME THING. THAT IS CLRLY NOT THE CASE. I HAD A GOOD NIGHT'S SLEEP; I AM IN EXCELLENT PHYSICAL SHAPE AND DID NOT CONSUME ALCOHOL AT ANY TIME DURING THIS TRIP. I DON'T BELIEVE OUR CURRENT SCHEDULING AND THE LEVEL OF SAFETY THAT IS EXPECTED OF US CAN COEXIST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.