Narrative:

We were cleared for the royko into ord and set up for runway 28. At some point after briefing the arrival and approach; we were given a new clearance to the watsn for runway 27L. I briefed the new approach and runway we updated the FMS and continued flying. For some reason; even though we thoroughly double checked the FMS for the new arrival; we did not verify the new runway and left 28 in the FMS. We were given the clearance to intercept the final approach course about 30 miles out and to pass grabl at 7;000. Knowing that pilots were having trouble with dipping below the glide slope prior to grabl; I decided to try a new technique for me (I usually fly green needles at this point) and planned to follow the FMS until grabl then switch over to green needles. The pilot not flying backed me up with green needles on his side. I kept looking for grabl; but because my FMS was on 5 miles I did not see the full approach; but just the fix in front of me. The pilot not flying mentioned that his needle was about 1-2 dots to the right; and I said that was strange since my FMS needle was slightly left but mostly right on. I said perhaps it was because we were more than 18 miles out? He contemplated and thought perhaps this was why. At some point ATC asked us if we knew that we were cleared for the approach because we were high. We said yes; we were aware and were coming down. At about the same time ATC called; I was going to ask the pilot not flying to put me on green needles because the approach did not 'feel' right to me and that it seemed I should have hit grabl by now. I requested he change me over and he switched my side to green needles and I was slightly to the left of course and high; but was able to get back on glide slope easily and with; to my knowledge; no disruption to ATC. The problem we discovered was that although I briefed the new runway and entered all the frequencies and course in to the rmu; and I had put in the new arrival correctly; no one had updated the runway on the FMS. Since it was a single FMS; I thought the pilot not flying had entered it in while he was entering data on it. He in fact was getting ATIS; but because he was flipping back and forth he did not notice the wrong runway was in the FMS either. I did not see the runway was wrong on the pfd because I had it to 5 miles and only had the first fix in front of me. The situation was made worse because I had decided to hand fly the approach (to keep in practice since the weather was ok) I was hyper focused on flying perfectly and so worried about going below the 7;000 at grabl. Also ATC had issued several speed changes so I was really worried about that as well. Threats/errors were my hyper focus on flying; losing my situational awareness; not making a complete crosscheck/verify when there was a change to the FMS; and not using the automation available to me (autopilot). The single FMS was also a threat because I could not easily look at the screen and see the wrong runway.I should have used the autopilot when there were so many changes from ATC - the workload was increased and I should have recognized it; I should have briefed and cross checked the FMS more carefully (especially when it's single FMS;) and when things looked/feel incorrect; I should have been more vigilant in figuring out why.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A flight's ORD arrival runway was changed; but the FMS runway was not so the ILS did not update and the aircraft got high on glide slope before correcting to an uneventful landing.

Narrative: We were cleared for the ROYKO into ORD and set up for Runway 28. At some point after briefing the arrival and approach; we were given a new clearance to the WATSN for Runway 27L. I briefed the new approach and runway we updated the FMS and continued flying. For some reason; even though we thoroughly double checked the FMS for the new arrival; we did not verify the new runway and left 28 in the FMS. We were given the clearance to intercept the final approach course about 30 miles out and to pass GRABL at 7;000. Knowing that pilots were having trouble with dipping below the glide slope prior to GRABL; I decided to try a new technique for me (I usually fly green needles at this point) and planned to follow the FMS until GRABL then switch over to green needles. The pilot not flying backed me up with green needles on his side. I kept looking for GRABL; but because my FMS was on 5 miles I did not see the full approach; but just the fix in front of me. The pilot not flying mentioned that his needle was about 1-2 dots to the right; and I said that was strange since my FMS needle was slightly left but mostly right on. I said perhaps it was because we were more than 18 miles out? He contemplated and thought perhaps this was why. At some point ATC asked us if we knew that we were cleared for the approach because we were high. We said yes; we were aware and were coming down. At about the same time ATC called; I was going to ask the pilot not flying to put me on green needles because the approach did not 'feel' right to me and that it seemed I should have hit GRABL by now. I requested he change me over and he switched my side to green needles and I was slightly to the left of course and high; but was able to get back on glide slope easily and with; to my knowledge; no disruption to ATC. The problem we discovered was that although I briefed the new runway and entered all the frequencies and course in to the RMU; and I had put in the new arrival correctly; no one had updated the runway on the FMS. Since it was a single FMS; I thought the pilot not flying had entered it in while he was entering data on it. He in fact was getting ATIS; but because he was flipping back and forth he did not notice the wrong runway was in the FMS either. I did not see the runway was wrong on the PFD because I had it to 5 miles and only had the first fix in front of me. The situation was made worse because I had decided to hand fly the approach (to keep in practice since the weather was OK) I was hyper focused on flying perfectly and so worried about going below the 7;000 at GRABL. Also ATC had issued several speed changes so I was really worried about that as well. Threats/errors were my hyper focus on flying; losing my situational awareness; not making a complete crosscheck/verify when there was a change to the FMS; and not using the automation available to me (autopilot). The single FMS was also a threat because I could not easily look at the screen and see the wrong runway.I should have used the autopilot when there were so many changes from ATC - the workload was increased and I should have recognized it; I should have briefed and cross checked the FMS more carefully (especially when it's single FMS;) and when things looked/feel incorrect; I should have been more vigilant in figuring out why.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.