Narrative:

A normal approach was made by the first officer, with a smooth T/D at target speed. Deceleration appeared to be satisfactory. Approaching the high speed turn-off, at the far end of the runway, the first officer steered the aircraft onto the diagonal runway exit. As the aircraft cleared the runway a loud noise was heard, indicative of ruptured tire(south). Subsequent inspection revealed multiple, burst main-gear tires on one side of the aircraft. There had been no apparent skid condition or locked wheel(south) indication at any prior time. This even may have been caused by a mechanical malfunction. However, there may have been human performance factors involved. During 3 previous lndgs executed by myself, with the same crew, I had elected to use the medium automatic braking selection and maximum power on initial application of reverse thrust in order to achieve early deceleration of the aircraft. However, on both lndgs performed by the first officer, the first officer had been quite vocal and insistent on using the minimum automatic braking selection as a technique to avoid slamming the nose wheel on the ground. The first officer stated several times that one of the company check pilots advocated the use of minimum automatic braking, and that most capts he flew with, used the minimum selection. Additionally, on both lndgs by the first officer, less than maximum power was used by him on initial application of thrust reverse. Obviously, more braking was required in the latter stages of the landing roll. At the time of the first officer elected to steer off the runway my attention was necessarily diverted away from inertial ground speed call-outs to observing the runway exit maneuver. My perception of speed at this time became a visibility perception. It appeared that the aircraft had slowed to about the recommended exit speed of approximately 15 KTS. Although I cannot state with absolute certainty, I may possible have turned the anti-skid off at that point, based on my practice and experience of usually requiring little or no braking exiting the runway. However,I cannot state with absolute certainty if the first officer was still using excessive or differential braking. I do believe a very subtle and insidious factor affected human performance during this event. In the context of a management and resource program (clear) the first officer advocated a procedure with such insistence and persuasiveness the captain's judgement was compromised and the first officer was allowed the latitude that removed all margin for error from the operation. In trying to meet the company's command, leadership and resource management (clear) objectives of accommodating to the sensitivities of the first officer I allowed my judgement ot be compromised. While I accept that clear provides some excellent tools to enhance communication and interpersonal relationships, it has also been described as a 2-EDGED sword. Originally designed to curb the overbearing captain it can give license to the overbearing copilot, with an insidious affect on safety. Supplemental information from acn 111335: ordered by tower to 'hold position.' fire equipment arrived, confirmed blown tires. Passenger deplaned in orderly fashion, company maintenance arrived, tower aircraft clear (tail close to runway) off runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER LNDG FLT CREW HEARD LOUD NOISE WHICH TURNED OUT UPON FURTHER INSPECTION TO BE BURST MAIN LNDG GEAR TIRES.

Narrative: A NORMAL APCH WAS MADE BY THE F/O, WITH A SMOOTH T/D AT TARGET SPD. DECELERATION APPEARED TO BE SATISFACTORY. APCHING THE HIGH SPD TURN-OFF, AT THE FAR END OF THE RWY, THE F/O STEERED THE ACFT ONTO THE DIAGONAL RWY EXIT. AS THE ACFT CLRED THE RWY A LOUD NOISE WAS HEARD, INDICATIVE OF RUPTURED TIRE(S). SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION REVEALED MULTIPLE, BURST MAIN-GEAR TIRES ON ONE SIDE OF THE ACFT. THERE HAD BEEN NO APPARENT SKID CONDITION OR LOCKED WHEEL(S) INDICATION AT ANY PRIOR TIME. THIS EVEN MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY A MECHANICAL MALFUNCTION. HOWEVER, THERE MAY HAVE BEEN HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACTORS INVOLVED. DURING 3 PREVIOUS LNDGS EXECUTED BY MYSELF, WITH THE SAME CREW, I HAD ELECTED TO USE THE MEDIUM AUTOMATIC BRAKING SELECTION AND MAX PWR ON INITIAL APPLICATION OF REVERSE THRUST IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE EARLY DECELERATION OF THE ACFT. HOWEVER, ON BOTH LNDGS PERFORMED BY THE F/O, THE F/O HAD BEEN QUITE VOCAL AND INSISTENT ON USING THE MINIMUM AUTO BRAKING SELECTION AS A TECHNIQUE TO AVOID SLAMMING THE NOSE WHEEL ON THE GND. THE F/O STATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT ONE OF THE COMPANY CHK PLTS ADVOCATED THE USE OF MINIMUM AUTO BRAKING, AND THAT MOST CAPTS HE FLEW WITH, USED THE MINIMUM SELECTION. ADDITIONALLY, ON BOTH LNDGS BY THE F/O, LESS THAN MAX PWR WAS USED BY HIM ON INITIAL APPLICATION OF THRUST REVERSE. OBVIOUSLY, MORE BRAKING WAS REQUIRED IN THE LATTER STAGES OF THE LNDG ROLL. AT THE TIME OF THE F/O ELECTED TO STEER OFF THE RWY MY ATTN WAS NECESSARILY DIVERTED AWAY FROM INERTIAL GND SPD CALL-OUTS TO OBSERVING THE RWY EXIT MANEUVER. MY PERCEPTION OF SPD AT THIS TIME BECAME A VIS PERCEPTION. IT APPEARED THAT THE ACFT HAD SLOWED TO ABOUT THE RECOMMENDED EXIT SPD OF APPROX 15 KTS. ALTHOUGH I CANNOT STATE WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, I MAY POSSIBLE HAVE TURNED THE ANTI-SKID OFF AT THAT POINT, BASED ON MY PRACTICE AND EXPERIENCE OF USUALLY REQUIRING LITTLE OR NO BRAKING EXITING THE RWY. HOWEVER,I CANNOT STATE WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY IF THE F/O WAS STILL USING EXCESSIVE OR DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING. I DO BELIEVE A VERY SUBTLE AND INSIDIOUS FACTOR AFFECTED HUMAN PERFORMANCE DURING THIS EVENT. IN THE CONTEXT OF A MGMNT AND RESOURCE PROGRAM (CLR) THE F/O ADVOCATED A PROC WITH SUCH INSISTENCE AND PERSUASIVENESS THE CAPT'S JUDGEMENT WAS COMPROMISED AND THE F/O WAS ALLOWED THE LATITUDE THAT REMOVED ALL MARGIN FOR ERROR FROM THE OPERATION. IN TRYING TO MEET THE COMPANY'S COMMAND, LEADERSHIP AND RESOURCE MGMNT (CLR) OBJECTIVES OF ACCOMMODATING TO THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE F/O I ALLOWED MY JUDGEMENT OT BE COMPROMISED. WHILE I ACCEPT THAT CLR PROVIDES SOME EXCELLENT TOOLS TO ENHANCE COM AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, IT HAS ALSO BEEN DESCRIBED AS A 2-EDGED SWORD. ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO CURB THE OVERBEARING CAPT IT CAN GIVE LICENSE TO THE OVERBEARING COPLT, WITH AN INSIDIOUS AFFECT ON SAFETY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 111335: ORDERED BY TWR TO 'HOLD POS.' FIRE EQUIP ARRIVED, CONFIRMED BLOWN TIRES. PAX DEPLANED IN ORDERLY FASHION, COMPANY MAINT ARRIVED, TWR ACFT CLR (TAIL CLOSE TO RWY) OFF RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.