Narrative:

This was the start of a three-day trip. It was also the initial takeoff and I was the pilot flying. We departed the gate just over 30 minutes late due to ground operations loading delays. I had been talking to both the agents and one of the ground operations guys trying to determine why we were so late when notified that the ramp had called maintenance to check a tire on the aircraft. We had no knowledge of this call. Maintenance looked at the tire and said it was fine and we rushed to start the push. Because so much coordinating between the agent; ground operations and maintenance occurred nearly simultaneously; I was rushed and subsequently rushed the departure briefs. Ground operations then had head set issues which further delayed our push. Once off the gate; the engine start and taxi were normal. During taxi out; the autobrake light came on and the first officer re-cycled the switch and the light extinguished. I believe he verbalized this as he did it. Arriving at the end we were cleared takeoff. All checklists were completed and I elected to use the HUD. We were flying an older model aircraft and power was set manually. Spool up was uneven and I focused on getting symmetrical power. The takeoff roll was on centerline and uneventful until approximately 80 KTS when the first officer called out; 'you have an autobrake light on.' I did not state 'continue' as required and instead looked at the light to verify. The first officer then reached towards the autobrake switch and said something like; 'you want me to re-set this.' he told me later he did cycle the switch. I'm not sure if I responded verbally to the first officer or not. I then decided to reject the takeoff and started to abort and the first officer made the call to tower as we decelerated. As soon as I initiated the reject; I realized I had done so in error; but I was committed at that point and completed the stop. Once off the runway; we evaluated brake energy and determined that 62 minutes of cooling was required. We requested maintenance and a gate. Operations assigned us a gate number and we taxied in and I put in two logbook write-ups; one for the autobrake inoperative and one for the rejected takeoff. Proper briefs and proper callouts would have likely prevented this chain of mistakes. I've also heard the advice to not rush; and it is the good advice I didn't take today and it's now my new golden rule. Also; don't ever let circumstances dictate the pace.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reports a rejected takeoff for an autobrake disarm light above 80 KTS.

Narrative: This was the start of a three-day trip. It was also the initial takeoff and I was the Pilot Flying. We departed the gate just over 30 minutes late due to ground operations loading delays. I had been talking to both the agents and one of the Ground Operations guys trying to determine why we were so late when notified that the Ramp had called Maintenance to check a tire on the aircraft. We had no knowledge of this call. Maintenance looked at the tire and said it was fine and we rushed to start the push. Because so much coordinating between the Agent; Ground Operations and Maintenance occurred nearly simultaneously; I was rushed and subsequently rushed the departure briefs. Ground Operations then had head set issues which further delayed our push. Once off the gate; the engine start and taxi were normal. During taxi out; the autobrake light came on and the First Officer re-cycled the switch and the light extinguished. I believe he verbalized this as he did it. Arriving at the end we were cleared takeoff. All checklists were completed and I elected to use the HUD. We were flying an older model aircraft and power was set manually. Spool up was uneven and I focused on getting symmetrical power. The takeoff roll was on centerline and uneventful until approximately 80 KTS when the First Officer called out; 'You have an autobrake light on.' I did not state 'continue' as required and instead looked at the light to verify. The First Officer then reached towards the autobrake switch and said something like; 'You want me to re-set this.' He told me later he did cycle the switch. I'm not sure if I responded verbally to the First Officer or not. I then decided to reject the takeoff and started to abort and the First Officer made the call to Tower as we decelerated. As soon as I initiated the reject; I realized I had done so in error; but I was committed at that point and completed the stop. Once off the runway; we evaluated brake energy and determined that 62 minutes of cooling was required. We requested Maintenance and a gate. Operations assigned us a gate number and we taxied in and I put in two logbook write-ups; one for the autobrake inoperative and one for the rejected takeoff. Proper briefs and proper callouts would have likely prevented this chain of mistakes. I've also heard the advice to not rush; and it is the good advice I didn't take today and it's now my new Golden Rule. Also; don't ever let circumstances dictate the pace.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.