Narrative:

Flight on this date departed detroit, bound for pit, in aircraft medium large transport. Approximately midway en route, the oil quantity on the right engine began to slowly but steadily diminish. We reduced power on the right engine to see if this would retard the rate of depletion, it didn't. First officer and I reviewed the appropriate procedures of the pilot's handbook and agreed that we could eventually expect a decrease in oil pressure accompanied by an increase in oil temperature as the quantity neared zero. Observing all engine limitations and parameters, we started the APU and discussed related factors in anticipation of a precautionary engine shutdown. A position F/a was briefed on the situation. She advised F/a's of the situation. The passenger were first notified of a possible problem by a cockpit PA and the F/a's then rebriefed the passenger on the emergency procedures relative to the situation. Approximately 30 mi from pit, the engine oil pressure was lost and we proceeded with engine shutdown, executed the engine failure, single engine landing checklists, and preliminary landing checklists. The F/a's were notified and updated. Attempts were made to contact the company but ATC frequency congestion and pilot cockpit workload placed this item low on the priority list of duties at hand. Pit approach had already given us runway 32 (winds calm), we requested runway 28R and crash, fire and rescue equipment positioning. I elected to waive the '250 KTS below 10,000'' rule in the interest of time and safety. We declared an emergency, accepted a visual approach clearance to 28R, entered a right downwind, avoided some VFR traffic in the pattern, and landed without incident. Ground crash fire rescue equipment crews immediately inspected the right engine area after we cleared the runway. We were well accommodated by all ATC entities. We taxied under our own power to gate, terminated the flight, secured the aircraft and called systems control immediately. The F/a's reported no incidents of demonstrated passenger anxiety or panic. My cabin-crew should be commended for making this emergency an almost-routine affair. Their professional behavior proved a thorough knowledge of their responsibilities and the ability to perform in unusual circumstances. First officer was an asset. He maintained an effective line of communication with all the important entities in addition to providing me with the support required to operate the aircraft. Even though we anticipated the engine shutdown, we experienced a high-workload from the time the problem was detected.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PRECAUTIONARY ENGINE SHUTDOWN AS OIL PRESSURE LOST.

Narrative: FLT ON THIS DATE DEPARTED DETROIT, BOUND FOR PIT, IN ACFT MLG. APPROX MIDWAY ENRTE, THE OIL QUANTITY ON THE RIGHT ENGINE BEGAN TO SLOWLY BUT STEADILY DIMINISH. WE REDUCED POWER ON THE RIGHT ENGINE TO SEE IF THIS WOULD RETARD THE RATE OF DEPLETION, IT DIDN'T. F/O AND I REVIEWED THE APPROPRIATE PROCS OF THE PLT'S HANDBOOK AND AGREED THAT WE COULD EVENTUALLY EXPECT A DECREASE IN OIL PRESSURE ACCOMPANIED BY AN INCREASE IN OIL TEMPERATURE AS THE QUANTITY NEARED ZERO. OBSERVING ALL ENGINE LIMITATIONS AND PARAMETERS, WE STARTED THE APU AND DISCUSSED RELATED FACTORS IN ANTICIPATION OF A PRECAUTIONARY ENGINE SHUTDOWN. A POSITION F/A WAS BRIEFED ON THE SITUATION. SHE ADVISED F/A'S OF THE SITUATION. THE PAX WERE FIRST NOTIFIED OF A POSSIBLE PROBLEM BY A COCKPIT PA AND THE F/A'S THEN REBRIEFED THE PAX ON THE EMER PROCS RELATIVE TO THE SITUATION. APPROX 30 MI FROM PIT, THE ENGINE OIL PRESSURE WAS LOST AND WE PROCEEDED WITH ENGINE SHUTDOWN, EXECUTED THE ENGINE FAILURE, SINGLE ENGINE LNDG CHECKLISTS, AND PRELIMINARY LNDG CHECKLISTS. THE F/A'S WERE NOTIFIED AND UPDATED. ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO CONTACT THE COMPANY BUT ATC FREQ CONGESTION AND PLT COCKPIT WORKLOAD PLACED THIS ITEM LOW ON THE PRIORITY LIST OF DUTIES AT HAND. PIT APCH HAD ALREADY GIVEN US RWY 32 (WINDS CALM), WE REQUESTED RWY 28R AND CRASH, FIRE AND RESCUE EQUIPMENT POSITIONING. I ELECTED TO WAIVE THE '250 KTS BELOW 10,000'' RULE IN THE INTEREST OF TIME AND SAFETY. WE DECLARED AN EMER, ACCEPTED A VISUAL APCH CLRNC TO 28R, ENTERED A RIGHT DOWNWIND, AVOIDED SOME VFR TFC IN THE PATTERN, AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. GND CFR CREWS IMMEDIATELY INSPECTED THE RIGHT ENGINE AREA AFTER WE CLRED THE RWY. WE WERE WELL ACCOMMODATED BY ALL ATC ENTITIES. WE TAXIED UNDER OUR OWN POWER TO GATE, TERMINATED THE FLT, SECURED THE ACFT AND CALLED SYSTEMS CONTROL IMMEDIATELY. THE F/A'S REPORTED NO INCIDENTS OF DEMONSTRATED PASSENGER ANXIETY OR PANIC. MY CABIN-CREW SHOULD BE COMMENDED FOR MAKING THIS EMER AN ALMOST-ROUTINE AFFAIR. THEIR PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR PROVED A THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE ABILITY TO PERFORM IN UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES. F/O WAS AN ASSET. HE MAINTAINED AN EFFECTIVE LINE OF COM WITH ALL THE IMPORTANT ENTITIES IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING ME WITH THE SUPPORT REQUIRED TO OPERATE THE ACFT. EVEN THOUGH WE ANTICIPATED THE ENGINE SHUTDOWN, WE EXPERIENCED A HIGH-WORKLOAD FROM THE TIME THE PROBLEM WAS DETECTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.