Narrative:

While beginning the takeoff roll at approximately 90 KIAS the captain noticed the takeoff data speeds had not been entered. The decision was then made to abort the takeoff. We taxied off the runway to complete the QRH for aborted takeoff. The captain then informed maintenance; dispatch; and the on-call chief pilot that a high speed abort had occurred. Even though we completed a takeoff briefing and before takeoff checklist; we missed the fact the speeds had not been entered. After complying with the QRH checklist and waiting the required 15 minutes we re-briefed the takeoff and completed a before takeoff checklist; taking extra care to ensure all takeoff data was entered correctly. The flight continued without incident.multiple threats led to the significant error that the captain and I failed to recognize and manage appropriately. After this event the captain and I had many questions about how we could have missed this error even though we completed a before takeoff checklist. We expected and were assigned runway 24L in cle for departure. From our gate this was a very short taxi. Additionally the entire ramp area was covered in about an inch of ice with poor braking action reported. Most of our attention during the taxi-out from the ramp was devoted to the poor surface conditions. This was time we normally would have begun briefing the takeoff due to such a short taxi to the runway. Upon leaving the ramp there was question about our taxi instructions. We clarified the instructions with ground control and continued taxiing toward the end of the runway. This took even more time away from us as we neared the runway. I then began briefing the approach. To the best of my knowledge I briefed the airspeeds; but it is evident I did not follow my usual habit of cross checking the set speeds with the tdm I was briefing from. We were nearing the runway at this point and I made the PA instructing the flight attendants (flight attendant) to be seated. We promptly heard back from them and I began to run the before takeoff checklist very quickly. I did not follow the proper checklist procedure in making sure all the speeds were set when I replied 'verified ' to the flight instruments and speed bugs checklist item. We were then immediately cleared for takeoff and we took the runway to begin the takeoff roll. While at the time I did not feel rushed; looking back on it; I was. The captain and I failed to recognize that the time constraint caused by all of the before mentioned threats was impacting the quality of our briefings and the usage of our checklists. It was our job to manage these threats and we didn't. Informing ground or tower before takeoff that we needed a few minutes to run some checklists would have given us plenty of time to brief and properly complete the before takeoff checklist. We also could have briefed before aircraft movement on the ramp. I normally would enter the speeds myself as soon as the tdm arrives; but I was in the bathroom when this occurred and I did not verify they were entered during the post tdm briefing. I should have been more vigilant at that point as well. The captain and I had been flying together for three days and we had become confident in each other's abilities and perhaps we let our guard down due to how much we trusted each other.in the future I will be more aware of the threats associated with a short taxi to the runway and make sure all briefings and checklists are completed correctly; even if this means briefing before taxi-out or informing ATC we are not ready for takeoff and need a few minutes to complete our checklists.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL600 First Officer reported rejecting the takeoff at 90 knots when the flight crew realized takeoff speeds had not been set.

Narrative: While beginning the takeoff roll at approximately 90 KIAS the captain noticed the takeoff data speeds had not been entered. The decision was then made to abort the takeoff. We taxied off the runway to complete the QRH for aborted takeoff. The captain then informed maintenance; dispatch; and the on-call chief pilot that a high speed abort had occurred. Even though we completed a takeoff briefing and before takeoff checklist; we missed the fact the speeds had not been entered. After complying with the QRH checklist and waiting the required 15 minutes we re-briefed the takeoff and completed a before takeoff checklist; taking extra care to ensure all takeoff data was entered correctly. The flight continued without incident.Multiple threats led to the significant error that the captain and I failed to recognize and manage appropriately. After this event the captain and I had many questions about how we could have missed this error even though we completed a before takeoff checklist. We expected and were assigned runway 24L in CLE for departure. From our gate this was a very short taxi. Additionally the entire ramp area was covered in about an inch of ice with poor braking action reported. Most of our attention during the taxi-out from the ramp was devoted to the poor surface conditions. This was time we normally would have begun briefing the takeoff due to such a short taxi to the runway. Upon leaving the ramp there was question about our taxi instructions. We clarified the instructions with ground control and continued taxiing toward the end of the runway. This took even more time away from us as we neared the runway. I then began briefing the approach. To the best of my knowledge I briefed the airspeeds; but it is evident I did not follow my usual habit of cross checking the set speeds with the TDM I was briefing from. We were nearing the runway at this point and I made the PA instructing the Flight Attendants (FA) to be seated. We promptly heard back from them and I began to run the before takeoff checklist very quickly. I did not follow the proper checklist procedure in making sure all the speeds were set when I replied 'verified ' to the flight instruments and speed bugs checklist item. We were then immediately cleared for takeoff and we took the runway to begin the takeoff roll. While at the time I did not feel rushed; looking back on it; I was. The Captain and I failed to recognize that the time constraint caused by all of the before mentioned threats was impacting the quality of our briefings and the usage of our checklists. It was our job to manage these threats and we didn't. Informing ground or tower before takeoff that we needed a few minutes to run some checklists would have given us plenty of time to brief and properly complete the before takeoff checklist. We also could have briefed before aircraft movement on the ramp. I normally would enter the speeds myself as soon as the TDM arrives; but I was in the bathroom when this occurred and I did not verify they were entered during the post TDM briefing. I should have been more vigilant at that point as well. The captain and I had been flying together for three days and we had become confident in each other's abilities and perhaps we let our guard down due to how much we trusted each other.In the future I will be more aware of the threats associated with a short taxi to the runway and make sure all briefings and checklists are completed correctly; even if this means briefing before taxi-out or informing ATC we are not ready for takeoff and need a few minutes to complete our checklists.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.