Narrative:

The captain and I discussed an issue on the aircraft [in] that it had insufficient thrust with the number one engine on takeoff; it was written up twice that we could identify (unknown if they rejected). Additionally; we noted that the number one engine eec had been replaced the day before.we spoke with the inbound crew on flight conditions enroute and specifically asked about the takeoff thrust on both engines. They both replied ops normal (nothing of significance noted).we did normal procedures for everything up to the takeoff phase. I was the pilot flying and the captain gave me the aircraft with it lined up on runway and the parking brake set. Once cleared for takeoff; I accomplished normal takeoff procedures. I engaged to/GA; paused to ensure the autothrottles were engaged; and called 'check thrust.' at that time; I removed my hand from the throttles and the captain put his hand on the throttles. At this point; most of my focus was outside the aircraft with occasional glances inside on my instruments. The captain did mention insufficient thrust on the number one engine (by 5%...90% instead of 95% as determined by takeoff data) and pushed that throttle forward; all the way to the stop. It increased the thrust by only 2%; (92% instead of 95% as determined by takeoff data). At this time; [the] captain stated he has the aircraft and performed a rejected takeoff based on insufficient takeoff thrust in the number on engine. (Bear in mind; my recollection of the exact takeoff percentage is rounded but accurate. I don't remember the number down to the decimal). Rejected takeoff procedures were accomplished at this point (nothing of significance noted); and we taxied back to the same gate we departed from earlier. Maintenance met us at the aircraft and we kept the people on board in case this was going to be a quick fix. Maintenance did note that the internal fault logs were empty (nothing for that day or any previous day). Maintenance said they were unsure how long it was going to take to fix; but it was going to take some significant time. Maintenance determined an engine run was going to be required; so we had the passenger and crew deplane (everyone took their belongings). An hour later; we saw the maintenance team and they still had no idea what the problem might be.operations got us another aircraft; we had no further issues and departed approximately 5 hours after the original planned departure time.on a side note; the captain did an outstanding job informing both the crew and more importantly the customers of what is going on with the aircraft and what to expect. Finally; many customers said thank you and made mention of the information provided by the captain.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737NG First Officer reported rejecting the takeoff when the Number 1 engine failed to produce rated thrust.

Narrative: The Captain and I discussed an issue on the aircraft [in] that it had insufficient thrust with the number one engine on takeoff; it was written up twice that we could identify (unknown if they rejected). Additionally; we noted that the number one engine EEC had been replaced the day before.We spoke with the inbound crew on flight conditions enroute and specifically asked about the takeoff thrust on both engines. They both replied ops normal (nothing of significance noted).We did normal procedures for everything up to the takeoff phase. I was the pilot flying and the Captain gave me the aircraft with it lined up on runway and the parking brake set. Once cleared for takeoff; I accomplished normal takeoff procedures. I engaged TO/GA; paused to ensure the autothrottles were engaged; and called 'check thrust.' At that time; I removed my hand from the throttles and the Captain put his hand on the throttles. At this point; most of my focus was outside the aircraft with occasional glances inside on my instruments. The Captain did mention insufficient thrust on the number one engine (by 5%...90% instead of 95% as determined by Takeoff data) and pushed that throttle forward; all the way to the stop. It increased the thrust by only 2%; (92% instead of 95% as determined by Takeoff data). At this time; [the] Captain stated he has the aircraft and performed a rejected takeoff based on insufficient takeoff thrust in the number on engine. (Bear in mind; my recollection of the exact takeoff percentage is rounded but accurate. I don't remember the number down to the decimal). Rejected takeoff procedures were accomplished at this point (nothing of significance noted); and we taxied back to the same gate we departed from earlier. Maintenance met us at the aircraft and we kept the people on board in case this was going to be a quick fix. Maintenance did note that the internal fault logs were empty (nothing for that day or any previous day). Maintenance said they were unsure how long it was going to take to fix; but it was going to take some significant time. Maintenance determined an engine run was going to be required; so we had the passenger and crew deplane (everyone took their belongings). An hour later; we saw the Maintenance team and they still had no idea what the problem might be.Operations got us another aircraft; we had no further issues and departed approximately 5 hours after the original planned departure time.On a side note; the Captain did an outstanding job informing both the crew and more importantly the customers of what is going on with the aircraft and what to expect. Finally; many customers said thank you and made mention of the information provided by the Captain.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.