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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 124279 |
Time | |
Date | 198910 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : bos |
State Reference | MA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff ground : preflight ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 4950 flight time type : 230 |
ASRS Report | 124279 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 14000 flight time type : 6000 |
ASRS Report | 125154 |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
The captain's first trip back in this type aircraft (medium large transport) after being on strike, dual qualified also in large transport which he had flown for the past 2 months. First officer relatively new with company, first flight after being off 4 days, about 230 hours in turbojet aircraft. After pushback, we began to taxi and the captain elected to shut down 1 engine to conserve fuel. It turned out to be a short taxi so he instructed me to restart the engine. There was not much time between checklist, taxi instructions, and watching for traffic and txwys at this busy airport. The flap and power setting for our calculated takeoff weight are printed on the awab (automated weight and balance) that the computer generates. I selected and informed the captain of the flap setting and power required but failed to notice that the performance criteria was designated for runway 4R and we were cleared for takeoff on 4L which was considerably shorter. It was somewhat evident on takeoff roll that the end of the runway was coming up fast. We departed without incident and realized the mistake en route to atlanta. We discussed openly the mistake and I decided that I would implement a new procedure for me that would help avoid this potentially hazardous mistake in the future. The agent normally hands the awab to the first officer to set up the takeoff confign required. My new procedure is to take my pen and circle the pertinent items (about 5). This will help me remain safe and legal. Good habit patterns are necessary in-flight operations, especially when scheduled passenger operations tend to become routine. Supplemental information from acn 125154: neither the first officer nor myself checked the runway that the takeoff weights were predicated on. We were 10,000 pounds overweight on our departure.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR MLG USED WRONG FLAP SETTING AND TKOF POWER FOR ACFT GROSS WEIGHT AND RWY IN USE.
Narrative: THE CAPT'S FIRST TRIP BACK IN THIS TYPE ACFT (MLG) AFTER BEING ON STRIKE, DUAL QUALIFIED ALSO IN LGT WHICH HE HAD FLOWN FOR THE PAST 2 MONTHS. F/O RELATIVELY NEW WITH COMPANY, FIRST FLT AFTER BEING OFF 4 DAYS, ABOUT 230 HRS IN TURBOJET ACFT. AFTER PUSHBACK, WE BEGAN TO TAXI AND THE CAPT ELECTED TO SHUT DOWN 1 ENGINE TO CONSERVE FUEL. IT TURNED OUT TO BE A SHORT TAXI SO HE INSTRUCTED ME TO RESTART THE ENGINE. THERE WAS NOT MUCH TIME BETWEEN CHECKLIST, TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, AND WATCHING FOR TFC AND TXWYS AT THIS BUSY ARPT. THE FLAP AND POWER SETTING FOR OUR CALCULATED TKOF WEIGHT ARE PRINTED ON THE AWAB (AUTOMATED WEIGHT AND BALANCE) THAT THE COMPUTER GENERATES. I SELECTED AND INFORMED THE CAPT OF THE FLAP SETTING AND POWER REQUIRED BUT FAILED TO NOTICE THAT THE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA WAS DESIGNATED FOR RWY 4R AND WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON 4L WHICH WAS CONSIDERABLY SHORTER. IT WAS SOMEWHAT EVIDENT ON TKOF ROLL THAT THE END OF THE RWY WAS COMING UP FAST. WE DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND REALIZED THE MISTAKE ENRTE TO ATLANTA. WE DISCUSSED OPENLY THE MISTAKE AND I DECIDED THAT I WOULD IMPLEMENT A NEW PROC FOR ME THAT WOULD HELP AVOID THIS POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS MISTAKE IN THE FUTURE. THE AGENT NORMALLY HANDS THE AWAB TO THE F/O TO SET UP THE TKOF CONFIGN REQUIRED. MY NEW PROC IS TO TAKE MY PEN AND CIRCLE THE PERTINENT ITEMS (ABOUT 5). THIS WILL HELP ME REMAIN SAFE AND LEGAL. GOOD HABIT PATTERNS ARE NECESSARY INFLT OPERATIONS, ESPECIALLY WHEN SCHEDULED PAX OPERATIONS TEND TO BECOME ROUTINE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 125154: NEITHER THE F/O NOR MYSELF CHECKED THE RWY THAT THE TKOF WEIGHTS WERE PREDICATED ON. WE WERE 10,000 LBS OVERWEIGHT ON OUR DEP.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.