Narrative:

A gear-up landing resulted from multiple in-flight distrs, inadequate monitoring of all student actions, and lack of awareness of the symptoms of overload. The student had completed the prelndg check on base leg before intercepting the localizer, and I had confirmed '3 in the green.' apparently the student raised the gear west/O stating so and west/O my noticing, and I was too preoccupied with traffic, maintaining a safe airspeed, a rapid altitude loss, fear of FAA sanctions for our 300' altitude deviation, and keeping the 'failed' left engine warm for a possible go around to double- and triple-check for 3 greens on final. The student responded more slowly than usual to my simulated left engine failure upon localizer intercept. I had never seen the small aircraft drop out of 2500' MSL so rapidly in previous engine-out exercises. The student initially attempted to hold altitude with nose-up pitch, but seemed unaware of the effect on airspeed. During the approach I became concerned several times about deviations above and below G/south. The student's technique was not very stable and I felt I had to watch him very carefully. My student was less inclined than most to share cockpit duties, so I frequently found myself mentally searching for non-threatening ways of getting all the necessary things done, line demos, radio calls, etc. Supplemental information from acn 125659: approximately 1 mi from TDZ instrument said 'let's land it.' another aircraft called right base landing opp direction. Instrument was very apprehensive about traffic. Both pilots had been stressed on previous approach/balked landing. Conflicting VFR traffic added workload to a single-engine approach/landing. We ignored prelndg checklist. We should have recognized workload/stress increase and backed off on our approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA SMA LANDED GEAR UP AT PWT FOLLOWING A SIMULATED IAP ILS APCH AND SIMULATED SINGLE ENGINE LNDG.

Narrative: A GEAR-UP LNDG RESULTED FROM MULTIPLE INFLT DISTRS, INADEQUATE MONITORING OF ALL STUDENT ACTIONS, AND LACK OF AWARENESS OF THE SYMPTOMS OF OVERLOAD. THE STUDENT HAD COMPLETED THE PRELNDG CHK ON BASE LEG BEFORE INTERCEPTING THE LOC, AND I HAD CONFIRMED '3 IN THE GREEN.' APPARENTLY THE STUDENT RAISED THE GEAR W/O STATING SO AND W/O MY NOTICING, AND I WAS TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH TFC, MAINTAINING A SAFE AIRSPD, A RAPID ALT LOSS, FEAR OF FAA SANCTIONS FOR OUR 300' ALT DEVIATION, AND KEEPING THE 'FAILED' LEFT ENG WARM FOR A POSSIBLE GAR TO DOUBLE- AND TRIPLE-CHK FOR 3 GREENS ON FINAL. THE STUDENT RESPONDED MORE SLOWLY THAN USUAL TO MY SIMULATED LEFT ENG FAILURE UPON LOC INTERCEPT. I HAD NEVER SEEN THE SMA DROP OUT OF 2500' MSL SO RAPIDLY IN PREVIOUS ENG-OUT EXERCISES. THE STUDENT INITIALLY ATTEMPTED TO HOLD ALT WITH NOSE-UP PITCH, BUT SEEMED UNAWARE OF THE EFFECT ON AIRSPD. DURING THE APCH I BECAME CONCERNED SEVERAL TIMES ABOUT DEVIATIONS ABOVE AND BELOW G/S. THE STUDENT'S TECHNIQUE WAS NOT VERY STABLE AND I FELT I HAD TO WATCH HIM VERY CAREFULLY. MY STUDENT WAS LESS INCLINED THAN MOST TO SHARE COCKPIT DUTIES, SO I FREQUENTLY FOUND MYSELF MENTALLY SEARCHING FOR NON-THREATENING WAYS OF GETTING ALL THE NECESSARY THINGS DONE, LINE DEMOS, RADIO CALLS, ETC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 125659: APPROX 1 MI FROM TDZ INSTR SAID 'LET'S LAND IT.' ANOTHER ACFT CALLED RIGHT BASE LNDG OPP DIRECTION. INSTR WAS VERY APPREHENSIVE ABOUT TFC. BOTH PLTS HAD BEEN STRESSED ON PREVIOUS APCH/BALKED LNDG. CONFLICTING VFR TFC ADDED WORKLOAD TO A SINGLE-ENG APCH/LNDG. WE IGNORED PRELNDG CHKLIST. WE SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED WORKLOAD/STRESS INCREASE AND BACKED OFF ON OUR APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.