Narrative:

I was working radar and was the controller in charge. Aircraft X was on a VOR 3 runway 14L approach IFR. Aircraft Y was doing some noise testing and was in the VFR pattern; and had already completed two passes. I heard the local controller tell aircraft Y to extend downwind for aircraft X on an opposite direction approach. I told aircraft X to keep their speed up and contact tower. Tower decided to try and get aircraft Y in front of aircraft X when they were on about a 9 mile final. Aircraft Y departed runway 32R when aircraft X was on about a 7 mile final for runway 14L. The tower controller did not prep aircraft Y to expect an early crosswind; and in the previous two patterns they had flown a 5 to 6 mile upwind. Traffic was issued and the local controller told aircraft Y to turn crosswind when they were about 3 miles apart; opposite direction; with aircraft X descending and aircraft Y climbing. Aircraft Y did not respond to the first instruction. The local controller issued it again and aircraft Y appeared to descend to avoid aircraft X and turned right into the crosswind. It appeared on the radar that aircraft Y and aircraft X were less than a mile apart and 100 feet. This is very similar to a recent incident involving the same local controller. This person has been reported to management multiple times for dangerous situations. No supervisor was present in the operational area at the time of this incident.my recommendation is that we have a supervisor in the operational area; and have them ensure traffic is being run safely. Controllers should be held accountable as well as supervisors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MWH TRACON Controller reports of an airborne conflict attributed to the Local Controller not preparing the aircraft for what was intended. The Local Controller has been known to run a similar operation where nothing was done by management to correct the issue.

Narrative: I was working radar and was the CIC. Aircraft X was on a VOR 3 Runway 14L approach IFR. Aircraft Y was doing some noise testing and was in the VFR pattern; and had already completed two passes. I heard the local controller tell aircraft Y to extend downwind for aircraft X on an opposite direction approach. I told aircraft X to keep their speed up and contact tower. Tower decided to try and get aircraft Y in front of aircraft X when they were on about a 9 mile final. Aircraft Y departed runway 32R when aircraft X was on about a 7 mile final for runway 14L. The tower controller did not prep aircraft Y to expect an early crosswind; and in the previous two patterns they had flown a 5 to 6 mile upwind. Traffic was issued and the local controller told aircraft Y to turn crosswind when they were about 3 miles apart; opposite direction; with aircraft X descending and aircraft Y climbing. Aircraft Y did not respond to the first instruction. The local controller issued it again and aircraft Y appeared to descend to avoid aircraft X and turned right into the crosswind. It appeared on the radar that aircraft Y and aircraft X were less than a mile apart and 100 feet. This is very similar to a recent incident involving the same local controller. This person has been reported to management multiple times for dangerous situations. No supervisor was present in the operational area at the time of this incident.My recommendation is that we have a supervisor in the operational area; and have them ensure traffic is being run safely. Controllers should be held accountable as well as supervisors.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.