Narrative:

[Aircraft X] inbound to saf from the northwest at 14;000 feet. I took over the position as the aircraft was asking for lower and the controller being relieved advised the pilot that it would be a couple minutes due to the MEA. After taking the position; I waited for that aircraft to clear the high terrain and descended him to 12;000 feet; and again to 10;000 feet when able. I told him to report the saf airport in sight and he mentioned that there was a haze. I informed him that if he were not able to get the airport in sight; I would have to climb him to put him on an IFR approach. While I was working with him; my d-side trainee and instructor had released [aircraft Y] to the southeast via the TAFOY2 departure climbing to 12;000 feet using visual separation (syd; subject your discretion) with [aircraft X]. When I saw that [aircraft X] was directly over the airport and did not yet have it in sight; I gave him a right turn direct poake intersection to set up for the RNAV runway 20 approach. I even gave him an initial heading of FL350 but he did not turn. I had to re-issue the 350 heading before the pilot actually started his turn. I then climbed him to 110 for terrain and noticed a discrete beacon code departing saf. The d-side instructor stepped in and called saf tower directly and told them that [aircraft X] couldn't get the field in sight and was turning direct poake. He also found out that saf tower had already departed [aircraft Y] and that he was climbing to 120 and he said that we would stop him. The d-side instructor thought that meant that saf tower had already shipped the aircraft to me and so he did not give an instruction for the tower controller to stop the climb. After pulling the tapes; 50 seconds went by before [aircraft Y] checked in and he was already through 8;800 feet. I amended his altitude immediately to 9;000 feet as [aircraft X] was barely out of 10;100 feet; but it was too late. [Aircraft Y] stated that he was already through 9;000 feet and and would start descending back down. The closest I think they got is about a mile and 800 feet. [Aircraft X's] altitude indicated 10;200 feet and [aircraft Y's] indicated 9;400 feet.in my opinion; saf tower was completely at fault. An syd clearance allows them to depart an aircraft subject their discretion so long as they have the inbound in sight; but they should never depart an aircraft when the inbound hasn't even been cleared for the approach. Even the book says they must be talking to one aircraft and have they ability to immediately communicate with the other; which they did not. Personally; I think the book should be changed to say that the inbound must; at a minimum; be cleared for the approach and both aircraft must be in direct communications with the tower. As seen from this incident; syd can be dangerous if the tower controller departs an aircraft without the inbound even being cleared for the approach. How is separation affected if the tower controller has no idea what the inbound is doing and no way to communicate with him? When the OM [operations manager] called saf tower; the controller said he was in communication with both aircraft; but he was not. This is a pretty clear violation of the 7110.65 and an extremely unsafe situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Two ZAB Controllers report of an aircraft inbound to the airport that could not see it. During this time another aircraft at the airport was departed. Both aircraft were known to the Tower and Center. Tower departed the aircraft and a loss of separation ensued.

Narrative: [Aircraft X] inbound to SAF from the northwest at 14;000 feet. I took over the position as the aircraft was asking for lower and the controller being relieved advised the pilot that it would be a couple minutes due to the MEA. After taking the position; I waited for that aircraft to clear the high terrain and descended him to 12;000 feet; and again to 10;000 feet when able. I told him to report the SAF airport in sight and he mentioned that there was a haze. I informed him that if he were not able to get the airport in sight; I would have to climb him to put him on an IFR approach. While I was working with him; my D-Side trainee and instructor had released [Aircraft Y] to the southeast via the TAFOY2 departure climbing to 12;000 feet using visual separation (SYD; Subject Your Discretion) with [Aircraft X]. When I saw that [Aircraft X] was directly over the airport and did not yet have it in sight; I gave him a right turn direct POAKE intersection to set up for the RNAV Runway 20 approach. I even gave him an initial heading of FL350 but he did not turn. I had to re-issue the 350 heading before the pilot actually started his turn. I then climbed him to 110 for terrain and noticed a discrete beacon code departing SAF. The D-Side instructor stepped in and called SAF Tower directly and told them that [Aircraft X] couldn't get the field in sight and was turning direct POAKE. He also found out that SAF Tower had already departed [Aircraft Y] and that he was climbing to 120 and he said that we would stop him. The D-side instructor thought that meant that SAF Tower had already shipped the aircraft to me and so he did not give an instruction for the tower controller to stop the climb. After pulling the tapes; 50 seconds went by before [Aircraft Y] checked in and he was already through 8;800 feet. I amended his altitude immediately to 9;000 feet as [Aircraft X] was barely out of 10;100 feet; but it was too late. [Aircraft Y] stated that he was already through 9;000 feet and and would start descending back down. The closest I think they got is about a mile and 800 feet. [Aircraft X's] altitude indicated 10;200 feet and [Aircraft Y's] indicated 9;400 feet.In my opinion; SAF Tower was completely at fault. An SYD clearance allows them to depart an aircraft subject their discretion so long as they have the inbound in sight; but they should never depart an aircraft when the inbound hasn't even been cleared for the approach. Even the book says they must be talking to one aircraft and have they ability to immediately communicate with the other; which they did not. Personally; I think the book should be changed to say that the inbound must; at a minimum; be cleared for the approach and both aircraft must be in direct communications with the tower. As seen from this incident; SYD can be dangerous if the tower controller departs an aircraft without the inbound even being cleared for the approach. How is separation affected if the tower controller has no idea what the inbound is doing and no way to communicate with him? When the OM [Operations Manager] called SAF Tower; the controller said he was in communication with both aircraft; but he was not. This is a pretty clear violation of the 7110.65 and an extremely unsafe situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.