Narrative:

At the time of the event there was an A320 departing 3 NM west of the airport heading 270 starting a turn to the northwest out the dta. Also; a BE58 was 2 miles northwest of the airport heading 310 climbing out of 2;200 ft. At this time the B737 went around at fll. Tower issued a 300 heading and climb to 2;000 ft and switched to departure. No coordination was done with the departure controller; however; the arrival controller was informed about the go around but did not tell the departure controller. The data was not flashed to the departure scope. The headings were issued by fll tower at the time of loss of separation. By the time the B737 was radar identified the controller climbed and turned the aircraft to 5;000 and right to heading 360 in an attempt to create course divergence and out climb the departing traffic as well as to clear airspace and VFR traffic just north of the airport and vector the aircraft back to fll for another approach. The B737 was issued traffic and passed about 2 miles behind about 500 ft vertical [from] the BE58 during the turn. Separation was already lost at the time the turn was issued and was an attempt to create separation that did not exist. Due to the slow speed of the BE58 and the A320 departing to the west; the safest option in the controller's opinion at the time was to turn behind the BE58 and out of the way of the other departing aircraft. Also; likely due to wind; the BE58 appeared to be tracking 300 directly in front of the B737 and the ten degree difference appeared to put both aircraft on the same track even though the baron was issued 310. Recommend coordination with the departure controller; not the arrival controller; regarding go around aircraft. Predetermined headings for go arounds that miss any possible departures and adjacent airspace in the letter of agreement would make the operation less complex especially when there is a break down in communication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MIA and FLL Controllers described a loss of separation event when go around instructions placed an aircraft in conflict with a previous departure at approximately 2;000 FT.

Narrative: At the time of the event there was an A320 departing 3 NM west of the airport heading 270 starting a turn to the northwest out the DTA. Also; a BE58 was 2 miles northwest of the airport heading 310 climbing out of 2;200 FT. At this time the B737 went around at FLL. Tower issued a 300 heading and climb to 2;000 FT and switched to Departure. No coordination was done with the Departure Controller; however; the Arrival Controller was informed about the go around but did not tell the Departure Controller. The data was not flashed to the departure scope. The headings were issued by FLL Tower at the time of loss of separation. By the time the B737 was RADAR identified the Controller climbed and turned the aircraft to 5;000 and right to heading 360 in an attempt to create course divergence and out climb the departing traffic as well as to clear airspace and VFR traffic just north of the airport and vector the aircraft back to FLL for another approach. The B737 was issued traffic and passed about 2 miles behind about 500 FT vertical [from] the BE58 during the turn. Separation was already lost at the time the turn was issued and was an attempt to create separation that did not exist. Due to the slow speed of the BE58 and the A320 departing to the west; the safest option in the Controller's opinion at the time was to turn behind the BE58 and out of the way of the other departing aircraft. Also; likely due to wind; the BE58 appeared to be tracking 300 directly in front of the B737 and the ten degree difference appeared to put both aircraft on the same track even though the Baron was issued 310. Recommend coordination with the Departure Controller; not the Arrival Controller; regarding go around aircraft. Predetermined headings for go arounds that miss any possible departures and adjacent airspace in the Letter Of Agreement would make the operation less complex especially when there is a break down in communication.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.