37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1063071 |
Time | |
Date | 201301 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Approach Departure |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Person 2 | |
Function | Approach |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
I had just plugged in to the final monitor position to get the brief when only seconds into the brief I heard an air carrier on about a 7 mile final to runway xxl declare an emergency. I took the position and heard the local controller send another air carrier in front of the emergency air carrier around; the local controller also cancelled the approach clearance on the air carrier behind the emergency air carrier and had him track the localizer; I believe he was issued 2;000 ft. I advised the supervisor of the emergency and asked if we wanted to run the aircraft down the final and over the airport or pull them out; and we agreed to the pull outs. I coordinated with local that I would pull the remaining aircraft off the final; the first two aircraft that I pulled out eastbound. There was traffic behind him inbound to runway xxc and I decided to turn him 30 degrees left at 5;000 ft to maintain separation but putting him over the 4;000 ft traffic I just pulled out. At this time I started to get the feeling there was a communication breakdown. I believe a final controller and a feeder controller were not aware that runway xxl would close after the emergency landed. There were low IMC conditions at the time and very strong winds aloft making control even more difficult. I vectored the three aircraft to the downwind and changed them to the arrival controller's frequency for re-sequence. I had limited time to talk since I was on the local frequency and they also had the emergency going. The feeder controller; not aware or not sure why the aircraft were coming off the final; continued to vector towards a normal approach point which overwhelmed the arrival controller. The aircraft all appeared to be vertically separated but one of them handed off from the feeder was slow in the descent. By the time the arrival controller realized he was not level at 6;000 ft; it was too late. The supervisor in charge was competent. I have respect for the supervisor. That said there was a complete meltdown with communication; coordination and guidance. When a runway closes in the middle of a rush; someone needs to make all the players aware; plan a suitable solution and voice this to all concerned. The pullouts were a major factor in this scenario but had they gone thru the airport and had an error on the departure side; the obvious cause would have been because they weren't pulled out. Another factor conducive to this event was all the runway changes the feeder had to issue. Initially they were going to [runway] xxl with overflow only to [runway] xxc. The feeder controller; who had some going to [runway] xxc changed them back to [runway] xxl. When he found out [runway] xxl was closed he had to change them back to [runway] xxc. For a long time now I've witnessed stressful situations on the finals with regard to coordination. We have at least two controllers and three during busier times. Often we'll have a medical emergency or someone that requires priority. During visual conditions it is not too difficult to find room to fit them in the flow. Instrument conditions are entirely different and to aid in the coordination between three controllers and possible trainees is an absolute must. Many controllers at this facility have low time without experiencing the complete myriad of off the wall occurrences that can happen very quickly. Pair that with inexperienced supervisors who understandably want to let controllers do their job; but need to know when to take the helm. Too often one arrival controller isn't sure what the other one is doing with the emergency and the operation becomes inefficient or worse; dangerous. I would like to see supervisors/controller in charge's help out/coordinate more when these situations occur.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: TRACON Controllers described a loss of separation event during a very busy and complex traffic period involving an emergency aircraft when coordination within the facility and needed direct supervisory intervention was lacking.
Narrative: I had just plugged in to the Final Monitor position to get the brief when only seconds into the brief I heard an Air Carrier on about a 7 mile final to Runway XXL declare an emergency. I took the position and heard the Local Controller send another Air Carrier in front of the emergency Air Carrier around; the Local Controller also cancelled the approach clearance on the Air Carrier behind the emergency Air Carrier and had him track the localizer; I believe he was issued 2;000 FT. I advised the Supervisor of the emergency and asked if we wanted to run the aircraft down the final and over the airport or pull them out; and we agreed to the pull outs. I coordinated with Local that I would pull the remaining aircraft off the final; the first two aircraft that I pulled out eastbound. There was traffic behind him inbound to Runway XXC and I decided to turn him 30 degrees left at 5;000 FT to maintain separation but putting him over the 4;000 FT traffic I just pulled out. At this time I started to get the feeling there was a communication breakdown. I believe a Final Controller and a Feeder Controller were not aware that Runway XXL would close after the emergency landed. There were low IMC conditions at the time and very strong winds aloft making control even more difficult. I vectored the three aircraft to the downwind and changed them to the Arrival Controller's frequency for re-sequence. I had limited time to talk since I was on the Local frequency and they also had the emergency going. The Feeder Controller; not aware or not sure why the aircraft were coming off the final; continued to vector towards a normal approach point which overwhelmed the Arrival Controller. The aircraft all appeared to be vertically separated but one of them handed off from the Feeder was slow in the descent. By the time the Arrival Controller realized he was not level at 6;000 FT; it was too late. The Supervisor in charge was competent. I have respect for the Supervisor. That said there was a complete meltdown with communication; coordination and guidance. When a runway closes in the middle of a rush; someone needs to make all the players aware; plan a suitable solution and voice this to all concerned. The pullouts were a major factor in this scenario but had they gone thru the airport and had an error on the Departure side; the obvious cause would have been because they weren't pulled out. Another factor conducive to this event was all the runway changes the Feeder had to issue. Initially they were going to [Runway] XXL with overflow only to [Runway] XXC. The Feeder Controller; who had some going to [Runway] XXC changed them back to [Runway] XXL. When he found out [Runway] XXL was closed he had to change them back to [Runway] XXC. For a long time now I've witnessed stressful situations on the finals with regard to coordination. We have at least two controllers and three during busier times. Often we'll have a medical emergency or someone that requires priority. During visual conditions it is not too difficult to find room to fit them in the flow. Instrument conditions are entirely different and to aid in the coordination between three controllers and possible trainees is an absolute must. Many controllers at this facility have low time without experiencing the complete myriad of off the wall occurrences that can happen very quickly. Pair that with inexperienced supervisors who understandably want to let controllers do their job; but need to know when to take the helm. Too often one Arrival Controller isn't sure what the other one is doing with the emergency and the operation becomes inefficient or worse; dangerous. I would like to see supervisors/CIC's help out/coordinate more when these situations occur.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.