Narrative:

Day three of a four day. Up at (time). Three approaches down to [minimums] two missed approaches. Third approach HUD IMC to [minimums]; land.ZZZ arrival briefed and flown uneventfully until left downwind runway xy; 250 knots. Assigned; required and 10;000 ft two miles above the runway. Mid-field; downwind; 10;000 ft; approach controller commanded '210 knots descend to 7;000 ft'. Speedbrakes extended; 210 knots assigned; descent to 7;000 ft. Not knowing our sequence; abeam the numbers; landing gear down; speedbrakes extended; in preparation for possible close-in base vector. Between 10;000 ft and 7;000 ft; landing gear down; speedbrakes extended; approach controller commanded; descend to 3;000 ft. Controller commanded 'left turn 360 degrees; do you have the field?'before completion of the turn; field in sight; approach controller commanded left turn 310; intercept localizer runway xy cleared for the visual approach; maintain either 180 knots or 170 knots to the final approach fix. We are required to be 170 by the final approach fix. We were descending to 3;000 ft; landing gear down; speedbrakes extended and slowing to the commanded airspeed; while retracting the speedbrakes and selecting flaps 15; because we cannot select flaps with the speed brakes extended. Knowing; of course; that we have to be configured for landing; in the slot; on speed and stabilized at 1;000 ft; we slowed to 165 just outside the final approach fix; still slightly high but manageable; and selected flaps 30; so as to be stable at 1;000 ft. At this point; the approach controller; asked us of our speed; and in the middle of doing everything he commanded; while configuring for a stable approach; and while at the same time complying with his speed command to the final approach fix; we responded '170 knots.' he then said; 'you must be slower'. Well; we were 165 knots for selection of flaps 30; just atop the final approach fix so as to be both stable at 1;000 ft and 170 at the final approach fix and I key the microphone and said; 'it's difficult when we begin abeam the numbers at 10;000 ft.'he then replies; very excitedly; 'possible pilot violation; possible pilot violation; you will receive phone number upon landing' and forgot to hand us off to tower. At this point the stress level is increased because we are doing everything he asked of us and he appeared to be mostly concerned about informing us about a possible pilot violation; telling us to expect a phone number; while we are traveling at 165 knots; configuring flaps 30 for landing and getting stabilized for 1;000 ft. Nevertheless; we were configured for landing; checklist completed and stable at 1;000 ft; never overspeeding the flaps.we switched to tower; at which point we are cleared to land.we landed in the zone; on speed on runway xy and turned off [on taxiway.]we cleared the runway; expecting detailed taxi instructions. Instead we were told again; twice; 'possible pilot violation; possible pilot violation; contact this phone number XXX-XXX-XXXX'. We were then given taxi instructions.we are normally 10;000 ft 30 miles from the airport. When we are working overtime; as usual; to give controllers everything they command; the last thing we need is zero respect and threats of certificate action while we are inside the final approach fix configuring for landing and getting stabilized; which does nothing but raise the stress level in the aircraft. It is not safe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 flight crew reported they were distracted on short final by an ATC admonishment to call regarding a possible violation.

Narrative: Day three of a four day. Up at (time). Three approaches down to [minimums] Two missed approaches. Third approach HUD IMC to [minimums]; land.ZZZ arrival briefed and flown uneventfully until left downwind Runway XY; 250 knots. Assigned; required and 10;000 ft two miles above the runway. Mid-field; downwind; 10;000 ft; Approach Controller commanded '210 knots descend to 7;000 ft'. Speedbrakes extended; 210 knots assigned; descent to 7;000 ft. Not knowing our sequence; abeam the numbers; landing gear down; speedbrakes extended; in preparation for possible close-in base vector. Between 10;000 ft and 7;000 ft; landing gear down; speedbrakes extended; Approach Controller commanded; descend to 3;000 ft. Controller commanded 'left turn 360 degrees; do you have the field?'Before completion of the turn; field in sight; Approach Controller commanded left turn 310; intercept Localizer Runway XY cleared for the visual approach; maintain either 180 knots or 170 knots to the final approach fix. We are required to be 170 by the final approach fix. We were descending to 3;000 ft; landing gear down; speedbrakes extended and slowing to the commanded airspeed; while retracting the speedbrakes and selecting flaps 15; because we cannot select flaps with the speed brakes extended. Knowing; of course; that we have to be configured for landing; in the slot; on speed and stabilized at 1;000 ft; we slowed to 165 just outside the final approach fix; still slightly high but manageable; and selected flaps 30; so as to be stable at 1;000 ft. At this point; the Approach Controller; asked us of our speed; and in the middle of doing everything he commanded; while configuring for a stable approach; and while at the same time complying with his speed command to the final approach fix; we responded '170 knots.' He then said; 'You must be slower'. Well; we were 165 knots for selection of flaps 30; just atop the final approach fix so as to be both stable at 1;000 ft and 170 at the final approach fix and I key the MIC and said; 'it's difficult when we begin abeam the numbers at 10;000 ft.'He then replies; very excitedly; 'Possible Pilot violation; possible Pilot violation; you will receive phone number upon landing' and forgot to hand us off to Tower. At this point the stress level is increased because we are doing everything he asked of us and he appeared to be mostly concerned about informing us about a possible Pilot violation; telling us to expect a phone number; while we are traveling at 165 knots; configuring flaps 30 for landing and getting stabilized for 1;000 ft. Nevertheless; we were configured for landing; checklist completed and stable at 1;000 ft; never overspeeding the flaps.We switched to Tower; at which point we are cleared to land.We landed in the zone; on speed on Runway XY and turned off [on taxiway.]We cleared the runway; expecting detailed taxi instructions. Instead we were told again; twice; 'possible Pilot violation; possible Pilot violation; contact this phone number XXX-XXX-XXXX'. We were then given taxi instructions.We are normally 10;000 ft 30 miles from the airport. When we are working overtime; as usual; to give Controllers everything they command; the last thing we need is zero respect and threats of certificate action while we are inside the final approach fix configuring for landing and getting stabilized; which does nothing but raise the stress level in the aircraft. It is not safe.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.