Narrative:

During approach to runway 17 at myr, radios were tuned as necessary--#1 to runway 17 localizer, #2 to grandstand VOR to identify final approach. After being cleared to 1600' and cleared for approach, I continued along final for 1 min. At that time I perceived that we were crossing the radial to identify the FAF and started time and began descent. At approximately 850' AGL we made visibility contact with the ground and the airport, which appeared to still be approximately 4.5-5 mi ahead. At this point I began to question our position on the approach. Rechking the #1 RMI I found #2 indicator parked at the 90 degree left position, and #2 radio turned to frequency 110.4, which was not giving any information relevant to the approach. Having good visibility with the ground and the airport, I remained at approximately 800' MSL until in position for landing. Discussing this with the first officer on the ground, I found that he was in doubt as to our position at the time that I first left 1600' to descend to MDA, but did not say anything to bring this to my attention. He had attempted to tune his radio to 110.2 for DME information, but had tuned in error to 110.4. On a previous approach to runway 35, the copilot was flying and was too high upon sighting the runway to land. We executed the missed approach and I took control of the aircraft. We then began a very extended series of radar vectors which began to irritate me and distract me to a degree of carelessness or perhaps complacency because we had already had a look at conditions below the clouds. I failed to brief the approach properly and believe now that I misread the bearing of the radial identing the FAF. I had flown with the copilot for 2 days prior and found him to be competent in every way. I feel I had given him no reason to be hesitant or reluctant to question my actions. My failure to put him at ease again after his muffed approach and my failure to fully brief the approach (which may have clued us both to my mistake beforehand) may have confused/intimidated him. I do believe that the fact that he also was aware of the height of the clouds and visibility underneath may have made him less afraid about the early descent and less apt to insist that I reassess our position. I stressed to him after the landing that I was most certainly at fault for not strictly adhering to approach briefing procedures, but that communication was essential and imperative in any situation where safety is in question.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG ALT DEVIATION STARTED DESCENT TO MDA BEFORE REACHING THE FAF.

Narrative: DURING APCH TO RWY 17 AT MYR, RADIOS WERE TUNED AS NECESSARY--#1 TO RWY 17 LOC, #2 TO grandstand VOR TO IDENT FINAL APCH. AFTER BEING CLRED TO 1600' AND CLRED FOR APCH, I CONTINUED ALONG FINAL FOR 1 MIN. AT THAT TIME I PERCEIVED THAT WE WERE XING THE RADIAL TO IDENT THE FAF AND STARTED TIME AND BEGAN DSCNT. AT APPROX 850' AGL WE MADE VIS CONTACT WITH THE GND AND THE ARPT, WHICH APPEARED TO STILL BE APPROX 4.5-5 MI AHEAD. AT THIS POINT I BEGAN TO QUESTION OUR POS ON THE APCH. RECHKING THE #1 RMI I FOUND #2 INDICATOR PARKED AT THE 90 DEG LEFT POS, AND #2 RADIO TURNED TO FREQ 110.4, WHICH WAS NOT GIVING ANY INFO RELEVANT TO THE APCH. HAVING GOOD VIS WITH THE GND AND THE ARPT, I REMAINED AT APPROX 800' MSL UNTIL IN POS FOR LNDG. DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE F/O ON THE GND, I FOUND THAT HE WAS IN DOUBT AS TO OUR POS AT THE TIME THAT I FIRST LEFT 1600' TO DSND TO MDA, BUT DID NOT SAY ANYTHING TO BRING THIS TO MY ATTN. HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO TUNE HIS RADIO TO 110.2 FOR DME INFO, BUT HAD TUNED IN ERROR TO 110.4. ON A PREVIOUS APCH TO RWY 35, THE COPLT WAS FLYING AND WAS TOO HIGH UPON SIGHTING THE RWY TO LAND. WE EXECUTED THE MISSED APCH AND I TOOK CONTROL OF THE ACFT. WE THEN BEGAN A VERY EXTENDED SERIES OF RADAR VECTORS WHICH BEGAN TO IRRITATE ME AND DISTRACT ME TO A DEG OF CARELESSNESS OR PERHAPS COMPLACENCY BECAUSE WE HAD ALREADY HAD A LOOK AT CONDITIONS BELOW THE CLOUDS. I FAILED TO BRIEF THE APCH PROPERLY AND BELIEVE NOW THAT I MISREAD THE BEARING OF THE RADIAL IDENTING THE FAF. I HAD FLOWN WITH THE COPLT FOR 2 DAYS PRIOR AND FOUND HIM TO BE COMPETENT IN EVERY WAY. I FEEL I HAD GIVEN HIM NO REASON TO BE HESITANT OR RELUCTANT TO QUESTION MY ACTIONS. MY FAILURE TO PUT HIM AT EASE AGAIN AFTER HIS MUFFED APCH AND MY FAILURE TO FULLY BRIEF THE APCH (WHICH MAY HAVE CLUED US BOTH TO MY MISTAKE BEFOREHAND) MAY HAVE CONFUSED/INTIMIDATED HIM. I DO BELIEVE THAT THE FACT THAT HE ALSO WAS AWARE OF THE HEIGHT OF THE CLOUDS AND VISIBILITY UNDERNEATH MAY HAVE MADE HIM LESS AFRAID ABOUT THE EARLY DSCNT AND LESS APT TO INSIST THAT I REASSESS OUR POS. I STRESSED TO HIM AFTER THE LNDG THAT I WAS MOST CERTAINLY AT FAULT FOR NOT STRICTLY ADHERING TO APCH BRIEFING PROCS, BUT THAT COM WAS ESSENTIAL AND IMPERATIVE IN ANY SITUATION WHERE SAFETY IS IN QUESTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.