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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1273694 |
Time | |
Date | 201506 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Citation Excel (C560XL) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Fuselage Skin |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural FAR |
Narrative:
June 2015; we found numerous corroded fasteners on numerous areas of the aircraft during the preflight of the assigned aircraft. We submitted 14 associated logbook maintenance discrepancy forms to maintenance control. It turns out that a grand total of 920 fasteners on the aircraft were found to be corroded -- to include fasteners on the wing structure. Later on in the afternoon; the company wanted us to fly the aircraft on a special ferry permit (sfp) from airport ZZZ to ZZZ1. An aircraft maintenance technician (amt) employed by a regional operator inspected and released the aircraft for a sfp flight. However; the company was not able to provide us with a valid sfp prior to the end of our duty day. It seems the first sfp was not a valid one.the following day; we were again assigned to fly the aircraft on a special ferry permit from airport ZZZ to ZZZ1. However; the company had to provide us with a grand total of three amendments to the provided sfp prior to receiving a valid one. The first sfp of that day did not have reference to all the open maintenance discrepancy items; the second sfp had the wrong destination airport; and the third finally was a valid sfp.especially with the 'self-release' authority the company has -- i.e. The authority to create sfps without FAA involvement -- the quality control (qc) for this case was severely lacking. What kind of qc structure does our operator employ to ensure regulatory compliance? What kind of training do company flight crews receive in order to ascertain a valid sfp is received? How many company crews would have accepted the first sfp provided without knowing they have not been in regulatory compliance? Airline transport pilot.upon further inspection by a qualified amt it seems that a grand total of 920 corroded fasteners were found on the aircraft -- to include fasteners on the wing structure. How does an aircraft pass routine and so-called preventative maintenance inspections with a grand total of 920 corroded fasteners?what kind of guidance does the company plan provide flight crews and maintenance personnel in putting emphasis on corrosion detection; and even more important; reporting?
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A Captain files two reports about maintenance discrepancies he found during a walk around on a company Cessna CE-560XL. The aircraft had a grand total of 920 corroded fasteners on the lower surface of both wings; wing leading edges; lower fuselage skin of the wing center box section; and around the cabin windows. Pilot questions how that much corrosion could be missed after Heavy C-Checks and numerous A-Checks had been accomplished. Aircraft required Special Ferry Permit (SFP) to a repair facility.
Narrative: June 2015; we found numerous corroded fasteners on numerous areas of the aircraft during the preflight of the assigned aircraft. We submitted 14 associated Logbook Maintenance Discrepancy forms to Maintenance Control. It turns out that a grand total of 920 fasteners on the aircraft were found to be corroded -- to include fasteners on the wing structure. Later on in the afternoon; the Company wanted us to fly the aircraft on a Special Ferry Permit (SFP) from Airport ZZZ to ZZZ1. An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) employed by a Regional Operator inspected and released the aircraft for a SFP flight. However; the Company was not able to provide us with a valid SFP prior to the end of our duty day. It seems the first SFP was not a valid one.The following day; we were again assigned to fly the aircraft on a Special Ferry Permit from Airport ZZZ to ZZZ1. However; the Company had to provide us with a grand total of three amendments to the provided SFP prior to receiving a valid one. The first SFP of that day did not have reference to all the open maintenance discrepancy items; the second SFP had the wrong destination airport; and the third finally was a valid SFP.Especially with the 'self-release' authority the Company has -- i.e. the authority to create SFPs without FAA involvement -- the Quality Control (QC) for this case was severely lacking. What kind of QC structure does our Operator employ to ensure regulatory compliance? What kind of training do company flight crews receive in order to ascertain a valid SFP is received? How many company crews would have accepted the first SFP provided without knowing they have not been in regulatory compliance? Airline Transport Pilot.Upon further inspection by a qualified AMT it seems that a grand total of 920 corroded fasteners were found on the aircraft -- to include fasteners on the wing structure. How does an aircraft pass routine and so-called Preventative Maintenance Inspections with a grand total of 920 corroded fasteners?What kind of guidance does the Company plan provide flight crews and Maintenance personnel in putting emphasis on corrosion detection; and even more important; reporting?
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.