37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 128968 |
Time | |
Date | 198911 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : bna |
State Reference | TN |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : cle |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 250 flight time total : 4600 flight time type : 1000 |
ASRS Report | 128968 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | other other : other pilot : cfi pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 133 flight time total : 1790 flight time type : 202 |
ASRS Report | 129290 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical non adherence other other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Having started both engines and completing the 'after start' checklist, I signaled for chock removal. I will emphasize that I was applying pressure on the brakes during the start and at all times following the start. I watched the ramper acknowledge my signal and move towards the airplane to remove the chocks. My attention was divided between the inside of the cockpit and looking outside. It was apparent that the ramper was having difficulty removing the chocks. It felt as though he were kicking them to dislodge them. I felt 3 bumps. When I looked toward the ramper to ensure that he had removed the chocks, he signaled to shut down the engines. I did so, using normal procedures. I then opened the door to let myself out of the airplane. At that time, I saw one of our ramp pickups under the nose of our aircraft. The airplane had rolled a few (4) feet when the lodged chock was removed. It was not noticeable in the cockpit. The pick-up had been driven in front of the airplane after I signaled for chock removal. Neither my first officer nor I saw it. When it stopped in front of the aircraft it was so close it could not be seen from the cockpit. When we bumped into the pick-up, it felt like the third kick on the chock. Our company policy is to not set the parking brake. Application of the brakes did not prevent the aircraft from moving forward. Supplemental information from acn 129290: the signalman should always be visible to the captain with someone else pulling the chocks and a signal should be given to the captain to reconfirm that the brakes are set before the chocks are removed.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AFTER START UP AND CHOCK REMOVAL, SMT ROLLS FORWARD AND HITS TRUCK.
Narrative: HAVING STARTED BOTH ENGINES AND COMPLETING THE 'AFTER START' CHECKLIST, I SIGNALED FOR CHOCK REMOVAL. I WILL EMPHASIZE THAT I WAS APPLYING PRESSURE ON THE BRAKES DURING THE START AND AT ALL TIMES FOLLOWING THE START. I WATCHED THE RAMPER ACKNOWLEDGE MY SIGNAL AND MOVE TOWARDS THE AIRPLANE TO REMOVE THE CHOCKS. MY ATTN WAS DIVIDED BETWEEN THE INSIDE OF THE COCKPIT AND LOOKING OUTSIDE. IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE RAMPER WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY REMOVING THE CHOCKS. IT FELT AS THOUGH HE WERE KICKING THEM TO DISLODGE THEM. I FELT 3 BUMPS. WHEN I LOOKED TOWARD THE RAMPER TO ENSURE THAT HE HAD REMOVED THE CHOCKS, HE SIGNALED TO SHUT DOWN THE ENGINES. I DID SO, USING NORMAL PROCS. I THEN OPENED THE DOOR TO LET MYSELF OUT OF THE AIRPLANE. AT THAT TIME, I SAW ONE OF OUR RAMP PICKUPS UNDER THE NOSE OF OUR ACFT. THE AIRPLANE HAD ROLLED A FEW (4) FEET WHEN THE LODGED CHOCK WAS REMOVED. IT WAS NOT NOTICEABLE IN THE COCKPIT. THE PICK-UP HAD BEEN DRIVEN IN FRONT OF THE AIRPLANE AFTER I SIGNALED FOR CHOCK REMOVAL. NEITHER MY F/O NOR I SAW IT. WHEN IT STOPPED IN FRONT OF THE ACFT IT WAS SO CLOSE IT COULD NOT BE SEEN FROM THE COCKPIT. WHEN WE BUMPED INTO THE PICK-UP, IT FELT LIKE THE THIRD KICK ON THE CHOCK. OUR COMPANY POLICY IS TO NOT SET THE PARKING BRAKE. APPLICATION OF THE BRAKES DID NOT PREVENT THE ACFT FROM MOVING FORWARD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 129290: THE SIGNALMAN SHOULD ALWAYS BE VISIBLE TO THE CAPT WITH SOMEONE ELSE PULLING THE CHOCKS AND A SIGNAL SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE CAPT TO RECONFIRM THAT THE BRAKES ARE SET BEFORE THE CHOCKS ARE REMOVED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.