Narrative:

Departing quito ecuador early afternoon; the winds were from the south necessitating a runway 18 departure. As we taxied into position our view of the volcano cotopaxi was unobstructed and there was an obvious cloud emanating from its peak. Ash emanating from cotopaxi is pretty much a permanent fixture and a never ending consideration for operating in and out of quito. This active volcano lies only 33 miles almost due south of quito airport. From our vantage point the cloud was grayish white and expanding as it flowed northward in a conical fashion. Quito airport was in full operation with aircraft landing and departing; from our position the surmised ash cloud although encroaching closer than usual to our departure route posed no threat. A 747 departed ahead of us with no negative reports. After a short delay we were cleared for takeoff. As we observed the departure route while lined up for takeoff it became obvious that the cloud could be avoided should it be closer than all indications seemed to confirm. The conditions were VFR; winds were strong from the south and cotopaxi lay in the distance as clear as a post card. During climb out on departure we were surprised to find that we needed to turn tighter than the runway 18 qit north flow departure lateral overlay depicted in order to maintain a safe proximity from the ash cloud. Subsequent to departure we had the opportunity to discuss what we had just witnessed and agreed that we would unequivocally refuse a night flight into quito given the conditions we had just operated in. Our primary concern was for the arriving flights whose safety would be compromised by not having the advantage of daytime visual as they descended for an arrival or executed a missed approach. At this time we were communicating with guayaquil control. My experience with guayaquil has been that the english lexicon of the majority of controllers is not only severely limited but my ability to understand one controller several flights ago led to a query to repeat a frequency some four times even though the bogota frequency was one both pilots were anticipating. I determined that the most expedition way to make this information available would be to immediately pass it on to dispatch.upon reaching cruise altitude I contacted dispatch on satcom to inform him of the situation during which time I reiterated our evasive maneuvering to avoid what appeared to be an ash cloud. I advised dispatch that by virtue of what we had seen neither I nor the first officer would wave accepted a flight into quito that night. A small shift in the wind would make the existing ash-cloud problematic for any arrival or departure. I make this statement considering all arrivals for runway 36 contain route structures to the west of the field and all arrivals to runway 18 have missed approach and engine failure procedures whose route structures are also to the west due to rising terrain to the east. The ash cloud we observed lay to the west and would not have taken a significant change in wind direction to where penetration would be unavoidable referencing the afore mentioned route structures. At the first officers recommendation I also asked for a phone patch to the chief pilot on duty to whom we reiterated our experience and concerns. An item of concern worth mentioning is that during my initial communication with dispatch I was informed by dispatch that their observation of volcanic ash showed it some 35 miles away. The implication was that the 'threat' would be 35 miles away. Upon further discussion I discovered that the dispatcher was evaluating cotopaxi's distance from qit VOR which is northwest of the airport in addition the route of flight on a runway 36 arrival will continue more than 20 miles south directly towards cotopaxi as you decent on the arrival. In representing d stances and purporting them as measures of safety though perhaps slightly outside of the domain of the dispatcher; mandatory approach procedures need to be considered as they may place the aircraft much closer to the threat. The second and more significant concern I had during my exchange with dispatch was why their information differed so significantly from our direct experience concerning the location of volcanic ash.after my satcom exchange of information with dispatch and my chief pilot I felt that the most appropriate entities had been notified and that my direct communication with whom I felt would be the most pro-active authorities would not necessitate any further action except for a p2 or perhaps an asap report. I felt that the individuals now involved would handle the situation as expected. Two days later; the night before I was scheduled to depart for my next trip 'quito' I called the captain who had evidently flown the trip to quito the same night of our experience. His scheduled departure time was around XA00 miami time our time of dispatch/chief pilot notification was close to [3 hours prior] local miami time. The captain who flew the flight informed me that he had been contacted by the chief pilot and informed of the volcanic activity and been informed that the ash according to dispatch was some 35 miles away. No mention was made of our pilot report. Or our recommendation.the briefing concerning cotopaxi and its emissions is inadequate for our operations. Wsi utilizes winds aloft from bogota and a satellite over two hours old. There are renderings of cloud and emissions flow from cotopaxi that show a significant shift in wind subsequent to the last satellite photo. This wind shift corroborates our claim that the ash cloud was much closer to the departure and arrival routes of seqm than dispatch was aware. Given the significant delay in satellite photos and inherent errors in the conjecture of winds aloft; pilot reports should be decimated immediately especially in conjunction with an active volcano that lies only 15 miles from the potential arrival path of an inbound flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier Captain reported difficulty avoiding Cotopaxi volcanic ash departing on the SEQM/UIO CONDOCOCHA NORTH FLOW DEPARTURE Runway 18. Avoiding ash on a night departure may not be possible.

Narrative: Departing Quito Ecuador early afternoon; the winds were from the south necessitating a Runway 18 departure. As we taxied into position our view of the volcano Cotopaxi was unobstructed and there was an obvious cloud emanating from its peak. Ash emanating from Cotopaxi is pretty much a permanent fixture and a never ending consideration for operating in and out of Quito. This active volcano lies only 33 miles almost due south of Quito airport. From our vantage point the cloud was grayish white and expanding as it flowed northward in a conical fashion. Quito airport was in full operation with aircraft landing and departing; from our position the surmised ash cloud although encroaching closer than usual to our departure route posed no threat. A 747 departed ahead of us with no negative reports. After a short delay we were cleared for takeoff. As we observed the departure route while lined up for takeoff it became obvious that the cloud could be avoided should it be closer than all indications seemed to confirm. The conditions were VFR; winds were strong from the south and Cotopaxi lay in the distance as clear as a post card. During climb out on departure we were surprised to find that we needed to turn tighter than the RWY 18 QIT North flow departure lateral overlay depicted in order to maintain a safe proximity from the ash cloud. Subsequent to departure we had the opportunity to discuss what we had just witnessed and agreed that we would unequivocally refuse a night flight into Quito given the conditions we had just operated in. Our primary concern was for the arriving flights whose safety would be compromised by not having the advantage of daytime visual as they descended for an arrival or executed a missed approach. At this time we were communicating with Guayaquil control. My experience with Guayaquil has been that the English lexicon of the majority of controllers is not only severely limited but my ability to understand one controller several flights ago led to a query to repeat a frequency some four times even though the Bogota frequency was one both pilots were anticipating. I determined that the most expedition way to make this information available would be to immediately pass it on to dispatch.Upon reaching cruise altitude I contacted Dispatch on SATCOM to inform him of the situation during which time I reiterated our evasive maneuvering to avoid what appeared to be an ash cloud. I advised Dispatch that by virtue of what we had seen neither I nor the first officer would wave accepted a flight into Quito that night. A small shift in the wind would make the existing ash-cloud problematic for any arrival or departure. I make this statement considering all arrivals for runway 36 contain route structures to the west of the field and all arrivals to runway 18 have missed approach and engine failure procedures whose route structures are also to the west due to rising terrain to the east. The ash cloud we observed lay to the west and would not have taken a significant change in wind direction to where penetration would be unavoidable referencing the afore mentioned route structures. At the first officers recommendation I also asked for a phone patch to the chief pilot on duty to whom we reiterated our experience and concerns. An item of concern worth mentioning is that during my initial communication with dispatch I was informed by dispatch that their observation of volcanic ash showed it some 35 miles away. The implication was that the 'threat' would be 35 miles away. Upon further discussion I discovered that the dispatcher was evaluating Cotopaxi's distance from QIT VOR which is northwest of the airport in addition the route of flight on a runway 36 arrival will continue more than 20 miles south directly towards Cotopaxi as you decent on the arrival. In representing d stances and purporting them as measures of safety though perhaps slightly outside of the domain of the dispatcher; mandatory approach procedures need to be considered as they may place the aircraft much closer to the threat. The second and more significant concern I had during my exchange with dispatch was why their information differed so significantly from our direct experience concerning the location of volcanic ash.After my satcom exchange of information with Dispatch and my Chief Pilot I felt that the most appropriate entities had been notified and that my direct communication with whom I felt would be the most pro-active authorities would not necessitate any further action except for a p2 or perhaps an asap report. I felt that the individuals now involved would handle the situation as expected. Two days later; the night before I was scheduled to depart for my next trip 'Quito' I called the Captain who had evidently flown the trip to Quito the same night of our experience. His scheduled departure time was around XA00 Miami time our time of Dispatch/Chief Pilot notification was close to [3 hours prior] local Miami time. The captain who flew the flight informed me that He had been contacted by the chief pilot and informed of the volcanic activity and been informed that the ash according to dispatch was some 35 miles away. No mention was made of our pilot report. or our recommendation.The briefing concerning Cotopaxi and its emissions is inadequate for our operations. WSI utilizes winds aloft from Bogota and a satellite over two hours old. There are renderings of cloud and emissions flow from Cotopaxi that show a significant shift in wind subsequent to the last satellite photo. This wind shift corroborates our claim that the ash cloud was much closer to the departure and arrival routes of SEQM than Dispatch was aware. Given the significant delay in satellite photos and inherent errors in the conjecture of winds aloft; pilot reports should be decimated immediately especially in conjunction with an active volcano that lies only 15 miles from the potential arrival path of an inbound flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.