Narrative:

The following report is submitted to 1): underscore a reoccurring safety of flight issue; and 2): bring to light an operational issue which is directly related to the first item. 1): I was scheduled to fly [a long-range international flight]. The normal push time was XK25 with a XH00 wake; and XI00 go. While asleep; my phone rang at XA58. It was scheduling calling to reset my duty time as the inbound flight was delayed 3 hours. As a result of this call; which interrupted my deep sleep rem; I was unable to get fully back to sleep. I showed up for work tired and not fully rested as a direct impact of this unnecessary phone call. Simply stated; it is insane to call someone up in the middle of their sleep cycle to inform them they do not have to get up! Leaving the fractured merits of part 117 out of the discussion; I specifically would highly encourage that a more pragmatic process of implementation of crew contact be explored. The current process is flawed and directly contravenes the entire intent of what the sanctity of crew rest is all about. It is a classic example of the tail wagging the dog with respect to 'blind' enforcement of bureaucratic regulatory stupidity. Without this issue being pragmatically addressed; the current method of implementation will require the pilot to either potentially call in fatigued or insure that his rest is not interrupted by intentionally placing himself incommunicado...refusing to answer or disabling his hotel phone; which I think everyone agrees is not an acceptable solution.2): we received three different wake and van times directly attributed to company miscommunication. This resulted in confusion; and a late departure from the hotel. After investigation the problem appears to be this...the local duty station is supposed to manage departure delays and the subsequent schedule changes that affect wake up and hotel pick up van times. When this process is ignored and [company] bypasses this critical trickle down of information; thereby trumping local command and control; the result is confusion; further delay and mis-communication. It is imperative that any communication to the hotel or ground transport be coordinated by the local station personnel. Case in point...on the same flight as described above; again; after receiving three different wake up and transport times; the final wake up and supposed hotel van times (communicated directly from [company] according to hotel personnel) was completely off base by 30 minutes. When trying to track down the problem locally; I was told by hotel and station personnel that [company] had directly reset wake times without coordinating local transport van times; or informing local station staff. The local station personnel had it right and [company] had it wrong. Therefore; as outlined above; clear command and control needs to be with local station staff as they have a better 'pulse' as to what the situation and its ramifications for the crew are. The communication process; command and control; and subsequent confusion brings to light directly underscore a company problem which needs immediate attention and correction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 Captain reported the company procedures at international stations needs to improve to prevent fatigue and safety issues.

Narrative: The following report is submitted to 1): underscore a reoccurring safety of flight issue; and 2): bring to light an operational issue which is directly related to the first item. 1): I was scheduled to fly [a long-range international flight]. The normal push time was XK25 with a XH00 wake; and XI00 go. While asleep; my phone rang at XA58. It was scheduling calling to reset my duty time as the inbound flight was delayed 3 hours. As a result of this call; which interrupted my deep sleep REM; I was unable to get fully back to sleep. I showed up for work tired and not fully rested as a direct impact of this unnecessary phone call. Simply stated; it is insane to call someone up in the middle of their sleep cycle to inform them they do not have to get up! Leaving the fractured merits of Part 117 out of the discussion; I specifically would highly encourage that a more pragmatic process of implementation of crew contact be explored. The current process is flawed and directly contravenes the entire intent of what the sanctity of crew rest is all about. It is a classic example of the tail wagging the dog with respect to 'blind' enforcement of bureaucratic regulatory stupidity. Without this issue being pragmatically addressed; the current method of implementation will require the pilot to either potentially call in fatigued or insure that his rest is not interrupted by intentionally placing himself incommunicado...refusing to answer or disabling his hotel phone; which I think everyone agrees is not an acceptable solution.2): We received three different wake and van times directly attributed to company miscommunication. This resulted in confusion; and a late departure from the hotel. After investigation the problem appears to be this...the local duty station is supposed to manage departure delays and the subsequent schedule changes that affect wake up and hotel pick up van times. When this process is ignored and [Company] bypasses this critical trickle down of information; thereby trumping local command and control; the result is confusion; further delay and mis-communication. It is imperative that ANY communication to the hotel or ground transport be coordinated by the local station personnel. Case in point...on the same flight as described above; again; after receiving three different wake up and transport times; the final wake up and supposed hotel van times (communicated directly from [Company] according to hotel personnel) was completely off base by 30 minutes. When trying to track down the problem locally; I was told by hotel and station personnel that [Company] had directly reset wake times WITHOUT coordinating local transport van times; or informing local station staff. The local station personnel had it right and [Company] had it wrong. Therefore; as outlined above; clear command and control needs to be with local station staff as they have a better 'pulse' as to what the situation and its ramifications for the crew are. The communication process; command and control; and subsequent confusion brings to light directly underscore a company problem which needs immediate attention and correction.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.