Narrative:

Over an hour after departing a check weights message appeared in the mcdu scratchpad. A check revealed that the computed weight was approximately 20;000 heavier than ECAM displayed weight. We then discovered that the load closeout indicated a zero fuel weight (ZFW) of 103;130 and total souls on board (tsob) of 29. The actual tsob was 137.prior to gate departure; we discussed the takeoff performance. ACARS indicated a proposed takeoff weight (ptow) of 155.5; runway xx; conf 3; APU on; and 12 knot tailwind. V speeds based on this message were inserted into the mcdu.we pushed off the gate and taxied to a holding point to wait for the load closeout. When it arrived; the first officer inserted the required data into the mcdu. He noticed that the weight was different than planned and pointed this out to me; but it was a performance advantage and the ACARS message was valid. We took off on runway xx using conf 3; APU on; and calculated V speeds.the event occurred due to an error in finalizing the load closeout. Flight crews no longer verify the actual passenger count against the load closeout as a matter of procedure. The inherent flaw in this policy is that a barrier is removed that in all likelihood would have trapped this error. Since the takeoff was accomplished using this performance data; the potential risk involved was mainly in setting the stab trim from the erroneous data in the load closeout.the company should consider adopting a policy that specified a limitation on a discrepancy between the passenger count reported by the gate agent and the load closeout.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported responding to a 'Check Weights' message in flight and discovered that there was a discrepancy in the weight and balance information. They were approximately 20;000 pounds heavier because of a mistake in the total souls on board.

Narrative: Over an hour after departing a check weights message appeared in the MCDU scratchpad. A check revealed that the computed weight was approximately 20;000 heavier than ECAM displayed weight. We then discovered that the load closeout indicated a Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) of 103;130 and Total Souls on Board (TSOB) of 29. The actual TSOB was 137.Prior to gate departure; we discussed the takeoff performance. ACARS indicated a Proposed Takeoff Weight (PTOW) of 155.5; RWY XX; CONF 3; APU ON; and 12 knot tailwind. V speeds based on this message were inserted into the MCDU.We pushed off the gate and taxied to a holding point to wait for the load closeout. When it arrived; the First Officer inserted the required data into the MCDU. He noticed that the weight was different than planned and pointed this out to me; but it was a performance advantage and the ACARS message was valid. We took off on Runway XX using CONF 3; APU ON; and calculated V speeds.The event occurred due to an error in finalizing the load closeout. Flight crews no longer verify the actual passenger count against the load closeout as a matter of procedure. The inherent flaw in this policy is that a barrier is removed that in all likelihood would have trapped this error. Since the takeoff was accomplished using this performance data; the potential risk involved was mainly in setting the stab trim from the erroneous data in the load closeout.The company should consider adopting a policy that specified a limitation on a discrepancy between the passenger count reported by the gate agent and the load closeout.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.