Narrative:

I would like to entitle the following narrative: 'painted into a corner.' my cocapt and I departed a north central us airport for sea. Computer flight plan called for 3:27 ete to sea. Fuel required for the flight was 4500#. Due to forecast headwind and some soggy WX at destination, we elected to fuel our aircraft to 6500 pounds, leaving us a 2000# reserve, vs the 1000 pounds reserve required by company policy. Headwinds were a little stronger and temperature at altitude a little warmer than forecast and as a result our 2000# reserve slipped to 1800#. WX at destination still remained windy and overcast which found us in a holding pattern over spokane for approximately 20 mins. This chopped into our reserve by another 300 pounds giving us 1500 pounds remaining as we came out of the holding pattern heading for ephrata. Our aircraft normally consumes 250-300 pounds from top of descent to landing. This also includes some maneuvering at traffic pattern altitude, so we were still very comfortable as we began our descent on the way to ephrata approximately 150 mi from the airport. We were then cleared to FL350 and asked for an additional 360 degree turn for spacing as we crossed ephrata. As we rolled out of the turn, the controller advised us we would be going straight in. Our fuel over ephrata was 1300 pounds, 300 pounds for descent and 1000 pounds for reserve--perfect. We knew once we descended west of the cascades we were committed to land at sea. There would be no turning back. Our FMS fuel management page confirmed our fuel calculations, so feeling comfortable with our fuel situation, we pressed on. Shortly after passing ephrata we were cleared to FL190. We asked to remain at altitude, but were ordered to descend immediately. As we arrived at FL190, 70 mi from the airport, we were cleared to 12000'. As we arrived at 12000' 50 mi from the airport, our FMS reminded us that we were now digging into our 1000 pounds reserve. The early descent cost us 300 pounds of fuel. At 25 mi northeast of the airport we were advised to turn to a heading of 190 degrees for a downwind. We were expecting straight ahead on a 270 degree heading to a left turn on final. We questioned the downwind and were advised it was for spacing. We proceeded 10-15 mi south on the 190 degree heading and were then turned back to 340 degree heading. We proceeded on 340 degrees back north to approximately abeam the approach end of 16L and right. Our fuel reserve had now chopped to 600 pounds. We again asked their intentions and we were advised we were going to be vectored another 7 mi north to a 25 mi final, and we were #7 for landing and slow to 170 KTS. We had now been vectored for approximately 40 mi at 4000', 12 mi from the airport, and were looking at another 32 mi at 170 KTS before landing. We had 600 pounds of fuel at this point. We advised we were getting low on fuel and could they work us to boeing field? We received no answer. The controller then asked us if we were declaring an emergency. We replied in the affirmative. We were then turned on the vector we expected in the first place and landed with 400# of fuel. Our elapsed time showed us under power for 4:10. A great deal of unspoken communication and understanding goes on between pilots and controllers. In this case we made some assumptions on what was done and what was said and got led down the primrose path. Fuel requirements under part 91 require enough fuel for flight to the destination, plus alternate, plus 45 mins at cruising speed. The regulation does not call for extra fuel for 65 mi of vectoring at 4000' within 10 mi of the airport. We as pilots cannot possibly put on enough fuel in a small aircraft jet to cover a completely unreasonable vectoring system put on by approach control at the other end. We played it by the book, took extra precautions with extra fuel, believed what they said about straight in and got snookered.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CORP LTT ENCOUNTERS HEAVY TRAFFIC DELAYS AT SEA, EXPERIENCES CRITICAL FUEL SITUATION REQUIRING DECLARATOIN OF EMERGENCY AND LNDG AT BFI.

Narrative: I WOULD LIKE TO ENTITLE THE FOLLOWING NARRATIVE: 'PAINTED INTO A CORNER.' MY COCAPT AND I DEPARTED A N CENTRAL U.S. ARPT FOR SEA. COMPUTER FLT PLAN CALLED FOR 3:27 ETE TO SEA. FUEL REQUIRED FOR THE FLT WAS 4500#. DUE TO FORECAST HEADWIND AND SOME SOGGY WX AT DEST, WE ELECTED TO FUEL OUR ACFT TO 6500 LBS, LEAVING US A 2000# RESERVE, VS THE 1000 LBS RESERVE REQUIRED BY COMPANY POLICY. HEADWINDS WERE A LITTLE STRONGER AND TEMP AT ALT A LITTLE WARMER THAN FORECAST AND AS A RESULT OUR 2000# RESERVE SLIPPED TO 1800#. WX AT DEST STILL REMAINED WINDY AND OVCST WHICH FOUND US IN A HOLDING PATTERN OVER SPOKANE FOR APPROX 20 MINS. THIS CHOPPED INTO OUR RESERVE BY ANOTHER 300 LBS GIVING US 1500 LBS REMAINING AS WE CAME OUT OF THE HOLDING PATTERN HDG FOR EPHRATA. OUR ACFT NORMALLY CONSUMES 250-300 LBS FROM TOP OF DSCNT TO LNDG. THIS ALSO INCLUDES SOME MANEUVERING AT TFC PATTERN ALT, SO WE WERE STILL VERY COMFORTABLE AS WE BEGAN OUR DSCNT ON THE WAY TO EPHRATA APPROX 150 MI FROM THE ARPT. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO FL350 AND ASKED FOR AN ADDITIONAL 360 DEG TURN FOR SPACING AS WE CROSSED EPHRATA. AS WE ROLLED OUT OF THE TURN, THE CTLR ADVISED US WE WOULD BE GOING STRAIGHT IN. OUR FUEL OVER EPHRATA WAS 1300 LBS, 300 LBS FOR DSCNT AND 1000 LBS FOR RESERVE--PERFECT. WE KNEW ONCE WE DSNDED W OF THE CASCADES WE WERE COMMITTED TO LAND AT SEA. THERE WOULD BE NO TURNING BACK. OUR FMS FUEL MGMNT PAGE CONFIRMED OUR FUEL CALCULATIONS, SO FEELING COMFORTABLE WITH OUR FUEL SITUATION, WE PRESSED ON. SHORTLY AFTER PASSING EPHRATA WE WERE CLRED TO FL190. WE ASKED TO REMAIN AT ALT, BUT WERE ORDERED TO DSND IMMEDIATELY. AS WE ARRIVED AT FL190, 70 MI FROM THE ARPT, WE WERE CLRED TO 12000'. AS WE ARRIVED AT 12000' 50 MI FROM THE ARPT, OUR FMS REMINDED US THAT WE WERE NOW DIGGING INTO OUR 1000 LBS RESERVE. THE EARLY DSCNT COST US 300 LBS OF FUEL. AT 25 MI NE OF THE ARPT WE WERE ADVISED TO TURN TO A HDG OF 190 DEGS FOR A DOWNWIND. WE WERE EXPECTING STRAIGHT AHEAD ON A 270 DEG HDG TO A LEFT TURN ON FINAL. WE QUESTIONED THE DOWNWIND AND WERE ADVISED IT WAS FOR SPACING. WE PROCEEDED 10-15 MI S ON THE 190 DEG HDG AND WERE THEN TURNED BACK TO 340 DEG HDG. WE PROCEEDED ON 340 DEGS BACK N TO APPROX ABEAM THE APCH END OF 16L AND R. OUR FUEL RESERVE HAD NOW CHOPPED TO 600 LBS. WE AGAIN ASKED THEIR INTENTIONS AND WE WERE ADVISED WE WERE GOING TO BE VECTORED ANOTHER 7 MI N TO A 25 MI FINAL, AND WE WERE #7 FOR LNDG AND SLOW TO 170 KTS. WE HAD NOW BEEN VECTORED FOR APPROX 40 MI AT 4000', 12 MI FROM THE ARPT, AND WERE LOOKING AT ANOTHER 32 MI AT 170 KTS BEFORE LNDG. WE HAD 600 LBS OF FUEL AT THIS POINT. WE ADVISED WE WERE GETTING LOW ON FUEL AND COULD THEY WORK US TO BOEING FIELD? WE RECEIVED NO ANSWER. THE CTLR THEN ASKED US IF WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER. WE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. WE WERE THEN TURNED ON THE VECTOR WE EXPECTED IN THE FIRST PLACE AND LANDED WITH 400# OF FUEL. OUR ELAPSED TIME SHOWED US UNDER PWR FOR 4:10. A GREAT DEAL OF UNSPOKEN COM AND UNDERSTANDING GOES ON BTWN PLTS AND CTLRS. IN THIS CASE WE MADE SOME ASSUMPTIONS ON WHAT WAS DONE AND WHAT WAS SAID AND GOT LED DOWN THE PRIMROSE PATH. FUEL REQUIREMENTS UNDER PART 91 REQUIRE ENOUGH FUEL FOR FLT TO THE DEST, PLUS ALTERNATE, PLUS 45 MINS AT CRUISING SPD. THE REG DOES NOT CALL FOR EXTRA FUEL FOR 65 MI OF VECTORING AT 4000' WITHIN 10 MI OF THE ARPT. WE AS PLTS CANNOT POSSIBLY PUT ON ENOUGH FUEL IN A SMA JET TO COVER A COMPLETELY UNREASONABLE VECTORING SYS PUT ON BY APCH CTL AT THE OTHER END. WE PLAYED IT BY THE BOOK, TOOK EXTRA PRECAUTIONS WITH EXTRA FUEL, BELIEVED WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT STRAIGHT IN AND GOT SNOOKERED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.