Flight crew of atx-light transport taxies across runway they were told to hold short of due to high ...

Attributes
ACN	137296
Time
Date	199002
Day	Mon
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
Locale Reference	airport : den
State Reference	CO
Altitude	agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air taxi
Make Model Name	Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Phase	ground other : taxi
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air taxi
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 157 flight time total : 6266 flight time type : 600
ASRS Report	137296
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air taxi
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : instrument pilot : commercial
Events
Anomaly	incursion : runway non adherence : clearance
Independent Detector	other controllera
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	other

Narrative:

Taxiing from south ramp to 35L told to hold short of 26L. This was our second attempt at departure we had multiple mechanic problems with our first aircraft - an light transport. This was a new copilot and his first trip. We were now being redispatched in an light transport as a backup airplane. The copilot was totally unfamiliar with the layout of the plane. We now were distraction by electrical problems. He was working the radios and I was trying to troubleshoot. We were cleared (he said) across 26L and cross 26R follow a widebody transport and taxi to 35L. I had not heard this call. Looking I saw an aircraft out on final and no one on the runway. We crossed I heard ATC say something about 'acknowledge' and we called ground on the other side of 26R and were told to go back to tower. They told us that we were to have held short of the right also and that that was acknowledged. The copilot did not acknowledge that call but thought that someone else on the frequency, due to confusion had. The basic problem was my priority of the problems I was dealing with. I had a copilot was very unsure of himself on the radios. An airplane that was having electrical problems plus a copilot who was also new to jets, high density operations and unschooled in the specific airplane we were in. My mistake was trying to handle all of those things simultaneously. In retrospect, instead of relying on him I should have handled all radio calls and just taxied the aircraft to an area where I could work out the mechanicals and checklists. I had personally trained this man on ground school subjects and knew his system knowledge to be adequate (in the classroom). Another airman had given him a flight check and said he was satisfactory, but when it was all put together 'under fire' he was not adequate. I misjudged by assigning priorities the way I would with a 'usual' copilot and not the way I should have.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF ATX-LTT TAXIES ACROSS RWY THEY WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF DUE TO HIGH COCKPIT WORKLOAD. SCHEDULE PRESSURE, AND CONFUSION ON THE FREQ THAT CAUSED ANOTHER ACFT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE HOLD SHORT CLRNC.

Narrative: TAXIING FROM S RAMP TO 35L TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF 26L. THIS WAS OUR SECOND ATTEMPT AT DEP WE HAD MULTIPLE MECH PROBS WITH OUR FIRST ACFT - AN LTT. THIS WAS A NEW COPLT AND HIS FIRST TRIP. WE WERE NOW BEING REDISPATCHED IN AN LTT AS A BACKUP AIRPLANE. THE COPLT WAS TOTALLY UNFAMILIAR WITH THE LAYOUT OF THE PLANE. WE NOW WERE DISTR BY ELECTRICAL PROBS. HE WAS WORKING THE RADIOS AND I WAS TRYING TO TROUBLESHOOT. WE WERE CLRED (HE SAID) ACROSS 26L AND CROSS 26R FOLLOW A WDB AND TAXI TO 35L. I HAD NOT HEARD THIS CALL. LOOKING I SAW AN ACFT OUT ON FINAL AND NO ONE ON THE RWY. WE CROSSED I HEARD ATC SAY SOMETHING ABOUT 'ACKNOWLEDGE' AND WE CALLED GND ON THE OTHER SIDE OF 26R AND WERE TOLD TO GO BACK TO TWR. THEY TOLD US THAT WE WERE TO HAVE HELD SHORT OF THE R ALSO AND THAT THAT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED. THE COPLT DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT CALL BUT THOUGHT THAT SOMEONE ELSE ON THE FREQ, DUE TO CONFUSION HAD. THE BASIC PROB WAS MY PRIORITY OF THE PROBS I WAS DEALING WITH. I HAD A COPLT WAS VERY UNSURE OF HIMSELF ON THE RADIOS. AN AIRPLANE THAT WAS HAVING ELECTRICAL PROBS PLUS A COPLT WHO WAS ALSO NEW TO JETS, HIGH DENSITY OPERATIONS AND UNSCHOOLED IN THE SPECIFIC AIRPLANE WE WERE IN. MY MISTAKE WAS TRYING TO HANDLE ALL OF THOSE THINGS SIMULTANEOUSLY. IN RETROSPECT, INSTEAD OF RELYING ON HIM I SHOULD HAVE HANDLED ALL RADIO CALLS AND JUST TAXIED THE ACFT TO AN AREA WHERE I COULD WORK OUT THE MECHANICALS AND CHKLISTS. I HAD PERSONALLY TRAINED THIS MAN ON GND SCHOOL SUBJECTS AND KNEW HIS SYS KNOWLEDGE TO BE ADEQUATE (IN THE CLASSROOM). ANOTHER AIRMAN HAD GIVEN HIM A FLT CHK AND SAID HE WAS SATISFACTORY, BUT WHEN IT WAS ALL PUT TOGETHER 'UNDER FIRE' HE WAS NOT ADEQUATE. I MISJUDGED BY ASSIGNING PRIORITIES THE WAY I WOULD WITH A 'USUAL' COPLT AND NOT THE WAY I SHOULD HAVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Flight crew of atx-light transport taxies across runway they were told to hold short of due to high cockpit workload. Schedule pressure, and confusion on the frequency that caused another aircraft to acknowledge the hold short clearance.