Narrative:

Aircraft X was conducting a practice ILS approach to Rwy15 at skf. Aircraft Y was in the skf VFR traffic pattern. Skf initiated an automated handoff of aircraft Y to us in the downwind with a scratchpad entry indicating runway heading and then they called us to extend his downwind leg to follow aircraft X; however; it was unclear if the extension was issued. Aircraft X was radar identified a half mile from the departure end of rwy 15 leaving 1;700. Radar contact with aircraft Y was lost. Prior to commencing the ILS approach; aircraft X was issued a climbout instruction to turn right to 240 and to climb and maintain 3;000. After radar identifying aircraft X; the trainee cleared aircraft X direct to sheol; the IAF to cvb airport leaving 2;500. I asked the trainee; why leaving 2;500 and he admitted it wasn't necessary. This may have delayed aircraft X's turn to 240 however; when aircraft X read the clearance back to us is when aircraft Y's data tag was observed off the departure end of RY15; at 1;500 and less than 1/2 mile in trail of aircraft X's who was barely climbing through 2;100 and had yet turned to 240. A conflict alert began as the trainee issued instructions to another IFR departure from sat airport. I noticed aircraft Y in a right turn off the departure end of the runway and less than 200 feet separating these two aircraft. I suspected that skf tower was keeping aircraft Y in their VFR pattern because IFR separation between these departures did not exist and was not ensured and because aircraft Y did not call us on departure. Then I noticed aircraft Y make a second turn back towards aircraft X. I instructed the trainee to issue traffic and vector aircraft X; who was climbing through 2;300; to turn left to a 120 heading in attempt to establish divergence and/or visual separation. Aircraft X called the traffic in sight and was told to maintain visual separation which he acknowledged. I estimate these two aircraft were within 1-mile and less than 300-feet vertically. Aircraft Y out climbed and passed aircraft X like a car passing slower traffic on a highway without establishing communication with us. I don't know if skf tower advised aircraft Y to maintain visual separation form aircraft X. We initiated a call to skf tower to advise them we had no communication with aircraft Y. Communication and radar contact was not obtained until aircraft Y was 6-miles from the airport. I immediately informed the flm (front line manager) of the situation. At the time I was unsure of all the details as to how this happened. I questioned the operation and while the traffic was slow; I found myself going over the details of the scenario and missed a situation shortly afterwards involving the same two aircraft. The trainee had issued a climb-out to aircraft Y of 240 and an altitude of 3;000 from skf but forgot to vector him into the radar downwind in a timely manner as aircraft X was on a vector from cvb airport to ssf airport also at 3;000. I'm not sure we had adequate IFR separation. The conflict alert alerted us to that issue. We may have had divergence but I can't be sure. I instructed the trainee to vector aircraft Y which he did. Skf tower is a VFR tower. They aren't qualified to perform any radar/approach functions. Using the automated handoff procedure to effectively coordinate an IFR release may be legal however; they should still be responsible to ensure the appropriate separation between successive IFR departures exists. If they were using visual separation or if they instructed aircraft Y to maintain visual separation from aircraft X they did not coordinate this with us. I am not sure that even if aircraft X had turned to 240 degrees within a mile of the departure end of the runway that aircraft Y's aircraft characteristics wouldn't have been a factor because of the proximity of these aircraft and the wake turbulence factors. In retrospect; I should have recognized the potential conflicts building up to this scenario sooner and I should've taken over the position too. I thought extending aircraft Y's downwind leg was the correct thing for skf tower to do but I guess I relaxed a bit when they called to extend his downwind. The extension was not enough as aircraft Y practically ran over aircraft X within a mile of the airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SAT TRACON Controller reported of a loss of separation due to poor communication between the departing airport's Tower controllers and the TRACON controllers.

Narrative: Aircraft X was conducting a practice ILS approach to Rwy15 at SKF. Aircraft Y was in the SKF VFR traffic pattern. SKF initiated an automated handoff of Aircraft Y to us in the downwind with a scratchpad entry indicating runway heading and then they called us to extend his downwind leg to follow Aircraft X; however; it was unclear if the extension was issued. Aircraft X was radar identified a half mile from the departure end of Rwy 15 leaving 1;700. Radar contact with Aircraft Y was lost. Prior to commencing the ILS approach; Aircraft X was issued a climbout instruction to turn right to 240 and to climb and maintain 3;000. After radar identifying Aircraft X; the trainee cleared Aircraft X direct to SHEOL; the IAF to CVB airport leaving 2;500. I asked the trainee; why leaving 2;500 and he admitted it wasn't necessary. This may have delayed Aircraft X's turn to 240 however; when Aircraft X read the clearance back to us is when Aircraft Y's data tag was observed off the departure end of RY15; at 1;500 and less than 1/2 mile in trail of Aircraft X's who was barely climbing through 2;100 and had yet turned to 240. A conflict alert began as the trainee issued instructions to another IFR departure from SAT airport. I noticed Aircraft Y in a right turn off the departure end of the runway and less than 200 feet separating these two aircraft. I suspected that SKF tower was keeping Aircraft Y in their VFR pattern because IFR separation between these departures did not exist and was not ensured and because Aircraft Y did not call us on departure. Then I noticed Aircraft Y make a second turn back towards Aircraft X. I instructed the trainee to issue traffic and vector Aircraft X; who was climbing through 2;300; to turn left to a 120 heading in attempt to establish divergence and/or visual separation. Aircraft X called the traffic in sight and was told to maintain visual separation which he acknowledged. I estimate these two aircraft were within 1-mile and less than 300-feet vertically. Aircraft Y out climbed and passed Aircraft X like a car passing slower traffic on a highway without establishing communication with us. I don't know if SKF tower advised Aircraft Y to maintain visual separation form Aircraft X. We initiated a call to SKF tower to advise them we had no communication with Aircraft Y. Communication and radar contact was not obtained until Aircraft Y was 6-miles from the airport. I immediately informed the FLM (Front Line Manager) of the situation. At the time I was unsure of all the details as to how this happened. I questioned the operation and while the traffic was slow; I found myself going over the details of the scenario and missed a situation shortly afterwards involving the same two aircraft. The trainee had issued a climb-out to Aircraft Y of 240 and an altitude of 3;000 from SKF but forgot to vector him into the radar downwind in a timely manner as Aircraft X was on a vector from CVB airport to SSF airport also at 3;000. I'm not sure we had adequate IFR separation. The conflict alert alerted us to that issue. We may have had divergence but I can't be sure. I instructed the trainee to vector Aircraft Y which he did. SKF tower is a VFR tower. They aren't qualified to perform any radar/approach functions. Using the automated handoff procedure to effectively coordinate an IFR release may be legal however; they should still be responsible to ensure the appropriate separation between successive IFR departures exists. If they were using visual separation or if they instructed Aircraft Y to maintain visual separation from Aircraft X they did not coordinate this with us. I am not sure that even if Aircraft X had turned to 240 degrees within a mile of the departure end of the runway that Aircraft Y's aircraft characteristics wouldn't have been a factor because of the proximity of these aircraft and the wake turbulence factors. In retrospect; I should have recognized the potential conflicts building up to this scenario sooner and I should've taken over the position too. I thought extending Aircraft Y's downwind leg was the correct thing for SKF tower to do but I guess I relaxed a bit when they called to extend his downwind. The extension was not enough as Aircraft Y practically ran over Aircraft X within a mile of the airport.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.