Narrative:

A supervisor was working traffic that was too busy. There was complex weather that had reports of extreme turbulence where the pilot had lost control of their aircraft briefly in the next sector. The traffic was moderate and starting to back up because of the delays and holding in the sector. In the beginning the sectors were combined. The controller in charge (controller in charge) came over and asked the supervisor radar controller if he wanted to split the sectors and he replied yes. The de-combining of the sectors was not a factor of the incident in my opinion.there were two aircraft holding at an intersection at the time; one at 7000 feet and one at 8000 feet. There was a VFR target that had no code indicating 7500 feet heading on a northwest track for the holding pattern. This same aircraft I had noticed had initially been at 9500 feet. I told the supervisor to 'watch out for that 095 ...'. This target was in conflict with an arrival leaving 10000 feet for 7000 feet. The supervisor turned the arrival to the east and it was not a factor. The report of extreme turbulence had been reported by a PC12 from 3000-6000 feet and the weather had now moved becoming a problem for the arrival aircraft. All of the arrivals required 2-3 point outs and I suggested to the supervisor to hold the aircraft north of the weather so it would create less safety hazards; work and no one would go anywhere near the extreme turbulence that was moving in. He did not take my suggestion and I kept doing the point outs and coordination. Poor judgment was used in this situation.after getting off the line with one center sector on a point out I noticed the 7500 foot target 5 miles from the 7000 foot IFR traffic in holding. I asked my supervisor 'did you call that traffic'; the supervisor responded 'no; I didn't see it'. The aircraft holding then turned into the VFR aircraft because he was starting his turn in the hold. The supervisor issued a traffic alert and the targets merged; but the VFR target had climbed up to 7900 feet. After the target (not in communications with air traffic) passed the IFR aircraft in our sector the target started descending below 6500 feet but was no longer a factor. The 8000 foot IFR aircraft that was originally in holding had been cleared out of holding and handed off to the next sector. During this same session a msv departure departed. The supervisor instructed me not to take the handoff because 'we shouldn't be working these guys.' center sector that was working the airplane had to call for a handoff and the supervisor was reluctant to take it even though there was no traffic or complexity with the aircraft in this situation. He finally took radar contact on the aircraft and climbed him to 17000 feet. This contributed to the complexity of the assist-side duties because now a point out to approach was required and a call on a handoff to a center. During this time I was also calling other center sectors for point outs. I do not recall if this was after or before the situation with the traffic alert.the workload was too great for the supervisor to be working and his judgment was poor creating safety hazards; a safety event (traffic alert); and increased workload. The first recommendation would be to not allow supervisors to work busy traffic. Controlling airplanes is not their primary job and they should work light traffic ('green'). If staffing is an issue there should be more traffic management initiatives instead of a supervisor working busy traffic.the second recommendation is to have the msv departures worked by center again. If they were flight planned on a different route it would take off a few miles on their route and additional center sectors would not have to work the aircraft. The reason it is complicated for center is because their sector has minimal time to climb the aircraft; possibly do a point out to approach and call on a handoff since the aircraft handoff is initiated after the 'two minutes from theboundary' rule. It is also complex because the center sector gets aircraft from approach; an adjacent center; and ewr satellite traffic all in the area of msv.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZBW Center Controller observed that the traffic complexity was too much for a Supervisor that was working the radar position for proficiency time. Also the Controller recommended a new procedure for departures from MSV.

Narrative: A supervisor was working traffic that was too busy. There was complex weather that had reports of extreme turbulence where the pilot had lost control of their aircraft briefly in the next sector. The traffic was moderate and starting to back up because of the delays and holding in the sector. In the beginning the sectors were combined. The Controller In Charge (CIC) came over and asked the Supervisor Radar Controller if he wanted to split the sectors and he replied yes. The de-combining of the sectors was not a factor of the incident in my opinion.There were two aircraft holding at an intersection at the time; one at 7000 feet and one at 8000 feet. There was a VFR target that had no code indicating 7500 feet heading on a northwest track for the holding pattern. This same aircraft I had noticed had initially been at 9500 feet. I told the supervisor to 'Watch out for that 095 ...'. This target was in conflict with an arrival leaving 10000 feet for 7000 feet. The supervisor turned the arrival to the east and it was not a factor. The report of extreme turbulence had been reported by a PC12 from 3000-6000 feet and the weather had now moved becoming a problem for the Arrival aircraft. All of the arrivals required 2-3 point outs and I suggested to the supervisor to hold the aircraft north of the weather so it would create less safety hazards; work and no one would go anywhere near the extreme turbulence that was moving in. He did not take my suggestion and I kept doing the point outs and coordination. Poor judgment was used in this situation.After getting off the line with one Center sector on a point out I noticed the 7500 foot target 5 miles from the 7000 foot IFR traffic in holding. I asked my supervisor 'did you call that traffic'; the supervisor responded 'no; I didn't see it'. The aircraft holding then turned into the VFR aircraft because he was starting his turn in the hold. The supervisor issued a Traffic Alert and the targets merged; but the VFR target had climbed up to 7900 feet. After the target (not in communications with Air Traffic) passed the IFR aircraft in our sector the target started descending below 6500 feet but was no longer a factor. The 8000 foot IFR aircraft that was originally in holding had been cleared out of holding and handed off to the next sector. During this same session a MSV departure departed. The supervisor instructed me not to take the handoff because 'We shouldn't be working these guys.' Center sector that was working the airplane had to call for a handoff and the supervisor was reluctant to take it even though there was no traffic or complexity with the aircraft in this situation. He finally took radar contact on the aircraft and climbed him to 17000 feet. This contributed to the complexity of the Assist-side duties because now a point out to Approach was required and a call on a handoff to a Center. During this time I was also calling other Center sectors for point outs. I do not recall if this was after or before the situation with the Traffic Alert.The workload was too great for the supervisor to be working and his judgment was poor creating safety hazards; a safety event (Traffic Alert); and increased workload. The first recommendation would be to not allow supervisors to work busy traffic. Controlling airplanes is not their primary job and they should work light traffic ('Green'). If staffing is an issue there should be more Traffic Management initiatives instead of a supervisor working busy traffic.The second recommendation is to have the MSV departures worked by Center again. If they were flight planned on a different route it would take off a few miles on their route and additional Center sectors would not have to work the aircraft. The reason it is complicated for Center is because their sector has minimal time to climb the aircraft; possibly do a point out to Approach and call on a handoff since the aircraft handoff is initiated after the 'two minutes from theboundary' rule. It is also complex because the Center Sector gets aircraft from Approach; an adjacent center; and EWR Satellite traffic all in the area of MSV.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.