Narrative:

We departed on time and taxied to runway xxl. During the takeoff around 100 kts there was a 'speed brake do not arm' light that came on in my view of sight. After thinking of the potential consequences I made the command decision to reject. In my thought process I know from experience that the 'speed brake do not arm' light is a no-go item and I deemed this as an unsafe condition. In the last year I have had this 'speed brake do not arm' light come on at least 2 times and have had to taxi back to the gate to have the system reset/fixed. I believe that I made the best decision in the interest of safety. We think the reject was around 120 to 130 kts. We easily made the last taxiway and cleared the runway with no issues. The first officer made all of the calls that were required and our CRM was great. The first officer started the rejected takeoff QRH. After clearing the runway and making sure everyone was okay we taxied and then finished the rejected takeoff checklist.after the QRH check list was completed we made a PA to reassure passengers and crew that all was well and that we would need to return to the gate for maintenance. I had my first officer shutdown engine number 2 as I wanted to limit the amount of thrust so we could just hold the left and right brakes in an alternate way as to limit the heat on the brakes. I called my dispatcher and through him maintenance control to let them know what happened and that we would be coming back to the gate. As I was calling dispatch/maintenance control my first officer was taking to operations to find us a gate. Slowly and with very limited braking we were able to get the aircraft back to the gate safely. As soon as we get to the gate; my phone rings and the chief pilot called to check on us. At that time; I told him that the jetway was not up the aircraft yet. He apologized and said he'd talk to us later. Once the jetway connected to the aircraft; we ran the parking checklist and I said goodbye to the passengers as they deplaned.I talked to maintenance; who told me that all the tires were all still inflated. I asked about cooling fans for the brakes; they said they didn't have those. I added the write up to the logbook and handed it to a mechanic. The maintenance supervisor said the aircraft would probably be down for a while for the inspection. He didn't have a specific time frame for us. Then I went back and debriefed my flight attendants. Hearing their perspective was very helpful. I felt like we used CRM well and truly functioned as a team. The in-flight supervisors were already there; as was the gate supervisor. The first officer and I proceeded up to the gate to speak with the agents. We heard that zone control was working on getting us a new aircraft. But as I was talking to the gate agents; I was made aware of efforts to put us back on the same aircraft once it cleared maintenance. I went to talk it over with my first officer and discussed the situation with him. We came to an agreement that we did not feel comfortable getting on the same aircraft with the same passengers to ZZZZ. I called the chief pilot and discussed it with him. I said I didn't think it was a good idea to take the same plane out. He said the aircraft from ZZZ was the 'wrong configuration' for us to take to ZZZZ. He also said there was a possibility that the flight might cancel if we didn't take the same aircraft back out but he said he would see what he could do.after that; I received a phone call from [an assistant chief pilot] who asked how he could help. I told him he could help us get a new airplane. He said that might not be possible and asked if I was willing to take the aircraft that we just brought back to the gate. I told him that I understood the big picture of the effects on our operation of taking a different aircraft to ZZZZ; but I thought our passenger's comfort was also important. The passengers were already unnerved and on edge - I felt that several of them would stay behind if we told them to get back on the sameaircraft. I told the [assistant chief pilot] that the company should reconsider finding us a new airplane. He said that if we wait for a new airplane; this flight might cancel. He said he needed to know if I was going to refuse the airplane and I told him yes. The [assistant chief pilot] called me back 5 minutes later to say that he had found us a new airplane. He asked if he could be of any further assistance. I told him no. Even though both the chief pilot and the [assistant chief pilot] said that they weren't pressuring me into a particular decision; it certainly felt to me like I was being pressured into taking the same aircraft back out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff due to a 'SPEED BRAKE DO NOT ARM' light.

Narrative: We departed on time and taxied to runway XXL. During the takeoff around 100 kts there was a 'speed brake do not arm' light that came on in my view of sight. After thinking of the potential consequences I made the command decision to reject. In my thought process I know from experience that the 'speed brake do not arm' light is a no-go item and I deemed this as an unsafe condition. In the last year I have had this 'speed brake do not arm' light come on at least 2 times and have had to taxi back to the gate to have the system reset/fixed. I believe that I made the best decision in the interest of safety. We think the reject was around 120 to 130 kts. We easily made the last taxiway and cleared the runway with no issues. The first officer made all of the calls that were required and our CRM was great. The FO started the RTO QRH. After clearing the runway and making sure everyone was okay we taxied and then finished the RTO checklist.After the QRH check list was completed we made a PA to reassure passengers and crew that all was well and that we would need to return to the gate for maintenance. I had my first officer shutdown engine number 2 as I wanted to limit the amount of thrust so we could just hold the left and right brakes in an alternate way as to limit the heat on the brakes. I called my dispatcher and through him Maintenance Control to let them know what happened and that we would be coming back to the gate. As I was calling dispatch/Maintenance Control my first officer was taking to operations to find us a gate. Slowly and with very limited braking we were able to get the aircraft back to the gate safely. As soon as we get to the gate; my phone rings and the Chief Pilot called to check on us. At that time; I told him that the jetway was not up the aircraft yet. He apologized and said he'd talk to us later. Once the jetway connected to the aircraft; we ran the parking checklist and I said goodbye to the passengers as they deplaned.I talked to maintenance; who told me that all the tires were all still inflated. I asked about cooling fans for the brakes; they said they didn't have those. I added the write up to the logbook and handed it to a mechanic. The maintenance supervisor said the aircraft would probably be down for a while for the inspection. He didn't have a specific time frame for us. Then I went back and debriefed my flight attendants. Hearing their perspective was very helpful. I felt like we used CRM well and truly functioned as a team. The in-flight supervisors were already there; as was the gate supervisor. The first officer and I proceeded up to the gate to speak with the agents. We heard that zone control was working on getting us a new aircraft. But as I was talking to the gate agents; I was made aware of efforts to put us back on the same aircraft once it cleared maintenance. I went to talk it over with my first officer and discussed the situation with him. We came to an agreement that we did NOT feel comfortable getting on the same aircraft with the same passengers to ZZZZ. I called the Chief Pilot and discussed it with him. I said I didn't think it was a good idea to take the same plane out. He said the aircraft from ZZZ was the 'wrong configuration' for us to take to ZZZZ. He also said there was a possibility that the flight might cancel if we didn't take the same aircraft back out but he said he would see what he could do.After that; I received a phone call from [an Assistant Chief Pilot] who asked how he could help. I told him he could help us get a new airplane. He said that might not be possible and asked if I was willing to take the aircraft that we just brought back to the gate. I told him that I understood the big picture of the effects on our operation of taking a different aircraft to ZZZZ; but I thought our passenger's comfort was also important. The passengers were already unnerved and on edge - I felt that several of them would stay behind if we told them to get back on the sameaircraft. I told the [Assistant Chief Pilot] that the company should reconsider finding us a new airplane. He said that if we wait for a new airplane; this flight might cancel. He said he needed to know if I was going to refuse the airplane and I told him yes. The [Assistant Chief Pilot] called me back 5 minutes later to say that he had found us a new airplane. He asked if he could be of any further assistance. I told him no. Even though both the Chief Pilot and the [Assistant Chief Pilot] said that they weren't pressuring me into a particular decision; it certainly felt to me like I was being pressured into taking the same aircraft back out.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.