Narrative:

Captain landed and exited high speed of 36L at dfw. I had left my personal headset on the previous aircraft and was using a company model which was not as good a fit in the earpiece. Ground told us to taxi north on echo, then to hold short of 36R to 18. I missed their initial call, but had them repeat it when the captain said, 'that's for us.' I read back the taxi instructions aloud for both the captain and ground. I then monitored the taxi, while I cleaned up the aircraft and stored my publications. Was finished with all that by the time the incident occurred. Captain was taxiing at a rather slow speed, and I thought he was going to stop but he didn't. By the time I blurted out in surprise, 'weren't we supposed to stop?', a runway incursion had already occurred. Captain added power to quickly cross. Aircraft in position for takeoff had landing lights on, but we were clear before I could discern movement. Tower never said a word. How do you prepare for a routine taxi in which someone gives every indication of doing what you expect, but then doesn't? If I had had my own headset, I might have been quicker on the call because my initial reaction was that I had missed a crossing clearance due to hearing difficulties with the company headset. Moral: there is no routine operation!! Supplemental information from acn 139861: this was the end of long third day of trip, and I was apparently not fully alert.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF ACR WDB TAIXING IN AFTER LNDG AT DFW INADVERTENTLY CROSSES A RWY HE WAS TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF.

Narrative: CAPT LANDED AND EXITED HIGH SPD OF 36L AT DFW. I HAD LEFT MY PERSONAL HEADSET ON THE PREVIOUS ACFT AND WAS USING A COMPANY MODEL WHICH WAS NOT AS GOOD A FIT IN THE EARPIECE. GND TOLD US TO TAXI N ON ECHO, THEN TO HOLD SHORT OF 36R TO 18. I MISSED THEIR INITIAL CALL, BUT HAD THEM REPEAT IT WHEN THE CAPT SAID, 'THAT'S FOR US.' I READ BACK THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS ALOUD FOR BOTH THE CAPT AND GND. I THEN MONITORED THE TAXI, WHILE I CLEANED UP THE ACFT AND STORED MY PUBLICATIONS. WAS FINISHED WITH ALL THAT BY THE TIME THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. CAPT WAS TAXIING AT A RATHER SLOW SPD, AND I THOUGHT HE WAS GOING TO STOP BUT HE DIDN'T. BY THE TIME I BLURTED OUT IN SURPRISE, 'WEREN'T WE SUPPOSED TO STOP?', A RWY INCURSION HAD ALREADY OCCURRED. CAPT ADDED PWR TO QUICKLY CROSS. ACFT IN POS FOR TKOF HAD LNDG LIGHTS ON, BUT WE WERE CLR BEFORE I COULD DISCERN MOVEMENT. TWR NEVER SAID A WORD. HOW DO YOU PREPARE FOR A ROUTINE TAXI IN WHICH SOMEONE GIVES EVERY INDICATION OF DOING WHAT YOU EXPECT, BUT THEN DOESN'T? IF I HAD HAD MY OWN HEADSET, I MIGHT HAVE BEEN QUICKER ON THE CALL BECAUSE MY INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT I HAD MISSED A XING CLRNC DUE TO HEARING DIFFICULTIES WITH THE COMPANY HEADSET. MORAL: THERE IS NO ROUTINE OP!! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 139861: THIS WAS THE END OF LONG THIRD DAY OF TRIP, AND I WAS APPARENTLY NOT FULLY ALERT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.