Narrative:

During cruise flight; we received a hydraulic Y rsvr lo lvl ECAM. As pilot flying; I kept aircraft controls and ATC communications and directed first officer (first officer) to accomplish the ECAM and then QRH procedure. Yellow hydraulic quantity was confirmed low and ECAM actions expeditiously accomplished. Resulting system status after procedural completion was Y engine 2 pump lo press; Y system lo pr; and brk Y accu pr monitor. Crew duties were assigned and first officer was given aircraft control and ATC duties while utilizing our dead head (DH) first officer in jump seat as backup eyes and ears while I initiated a dispatch call me for coordination with dispatch and [maintenance]. Radio communications via arinc were problematic (spotty reception; dropped calls; bad audio quality) during the entire coordination exercise. While radio patch was ongoing; we received another ECAM. This time it was hydraulic Y rsvr ovht. We discussed; as a crew; whether the new flight manual bulletin applied as we were faced with ECAM screen showing Y hydraulic engine pump lo pr followed by hydraulic rsvr ovht (special). We decided that bulletin did not apply as the low press ECAM was a subsequent result of the initial rsvr lo action items and did not occur on opposite systems. We completed the appropriate hydraulic Y rsvr ovht ECAM action items and QRH.we finally received an acceptable radio patch and coordinated with [maintenance] and dispatch regarding the applicability of the new bulletin procedure. Both dispatch and [maintenance] seemed unfamiliar with the new bulletin; but once they researched the reference provided; agreed that the new FM (special) procedure didn't apply. Power transfer unit (ptu); engine pump and electric pump were confirmed to be off by multiple means and determination was made that the continued overheat indication resulted from delayed heat transfer on the low yellow system reservoir occurring after the ptu was turned off per the initial ECAM procedure. In concluding the coordination call; it was determined that [advising ATC of emergency condition] was not necessary. With information from both dispatch and [maintenance]; it was determined that the dispatcher's calculated landing distance matched that calculated by our DH pilot (in jump seat) and the supplied weather and field conditions posed no significant issues. In conjunction with the remaining hydraulic system redundancies (and 3 member crew); it was determined safe to continue to [destination] for an uneventful; non-emergency; landing.however; this entire exercise illuminated some problems of note: 1. The placement of bulletin (special) outside the QRH made it difficult to find.2. Lack of familiarity with / confusion with the new procedure at crew; [maintenance] and dispatch levels led to a delay in determining procedural applicability.3. Lack of adequate clarifying / descriptive notes in two procedures (QRH and FM procedure (special)).recommendations:1. Expeditiously place FM special procedure in the QRH where it should properly reside.2. Add clarifying notes.i.e. A note in hydraulic Y rsvr lo lvl QRH indicating that a hydraulic overheat may result after procedure completion and include a reference to the proper ovht QRH.i.e. A new note; or a remark in condition language of the special procedure; that clarifies/emphasizes/highlights the procedure is only to be run for a condition of hydraulic pressure loss followed by overheat on opposite systems.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A320 Captain reported a loss of the 'yellow' hydraulic system followed by confusion with a new bulletin that had not been incorporated in the QRH procedure.

Narrative: During cruise flight; we received a HYD Y RSVR LO LVL ECAM. As Pilot Flying; I kept aircraft controls and ATC communications and directed First Officer (FO) to accomplish the ECAM and then QRH procedure. Yellow hydraulic quantity was confirmed low and ECAM actions expeditiously accomplished. Resulting System Status after procedural completion was Y ENG 2 PUMP LO PRESS; Y SYS LO PR; and BRK Y ACCU PR MONITOR. Crew duties were assigned and FO was given aircraft control and ATC duties while utilizing our Dead Head (DH) FO in jump seat as backup eyes and ears while I initiated a Dispatch Call Me for coordination with dispatch and [maintenance]. Radio communications via ARINC were problematic (spotty reception; dropped calls; bad audio quality) during the entire coordination exercise. While radio patch was ongoing; we received another ECAM. This time it was HYD Y RSVR OVHT. We discussed; as a crew; whether the new flight manual bulletin applied as we were faced with ECAM screen showing Y HYD ENG PUMP LO PR followed by HYD RSVR OVHT (Special). We decided that bulletin did not apply as the LOW PRESS ECAM was a subsequent result of the initial RSVR LO action items and did not occur on opposite systems. We completed the appropriate HYD Y RSVR OVHT ECAM action items and QRH.We finally received an acceptable radio patch and coordinated with [maintenance] and Dispatch regarding the applicability of the new bulletin procedure. Both dispatch and [maintenance] seemed unfamiliar with the new bulletin; but once they researched the reference provided; agreed that the new FM (special) procedure didn't apply. Power Transfer Unit (PTU); Engine Pump and Electric Pump were confirmed to be off by multiple means and determination was made that the continued overheat indication resulted from delayed heat transfer on the low yellow system reservoir occurring after the PTU was turned off per the initial ECAM procedure. In concluding the coordination call; it was determined that [advising ATC of emergency condition] was not necessary. With information from both Dispatch and [maintenance]; it was determined that the Dispatcher's calculated landing distance matched that calculated by our DH pilot (in jump seat) and the supplied weather and field conditions posed no significant issues. In conjunction with the remaining hydraulic system redundancies (and 3 member crew); it was determined safe to continue to [destination] for an uneventful; non-emergency; landing.However; this entire exercise illuminated some Problems of Note: 1. The placement of Bulletin (special) outside the QRH made it difficult to find.2. Lack of familiarity with / confusion with the new procedure at crew; [maintenance] and Dispatch levels led to a delay in determining procedural applicability.3. Lack of adequate clarifying / descriptive notes in two procedures (QRH and FM Procedure (special)).Recommendations:1. Expeditiously place FM special procedure in the QRH where it should properly reside.2. Add clarifying Notes.i.e. A Note in HYD Y RSVR LO LVL QRH indicating that a Hydraulic Overheat may result after procedure completion and include a reference to the proper OVHT QRH.i.e. A new Note; or a remark in Condition language of the special procedure; that clarifies/emphasizes/highlights the procedure is only to be run for a condition of Hydraulic Pressure loss followed by Overheat on OPPOSITE systems.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.