Narrative:

I was riding as an observer in the cockpit of an air carrier flight under the sf-160 program for air traffic controllers. This was a short flight of about 15 mins en route. The aircraft was inbound for atl which was using simultaneous visual apches to runway 26R/27L. Although a short flight such as this is busy for the crew, I was surprised at some of the actions. Although there was virtually no conversation with me due to the short flight, communications were extremely sloppy. On initial contact with the destination approach control, the controller advised what runway to expect. After being turned on downwind, the captain and first officer started to discuss that they didn't know what runway to use. We were already descending to 7000 ft when they realized that they had never listened to the ATIS. They then missed the call for a frequency change twice while discussing the ATIS. After being cleared for the approach, they realized that they had not checked in with the company operations. This was accomplished at 400 AGL on about 2 mi final. Then they realized that they had never switched to the tower and gotten landing clearance. There did not appear to be any clear reason for all of this communications foul-up other than inattn. There was not much extraneous conversation or other distrs -- just not thinking ahead.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR REPORTER RIDING IN JUMP SEAT COMMENTS THAT FLT CREW WAS BEHIND THE POWER CURVE DURING LNDG.

Narrative: I WAS RIDING AS AN OBSERVER IN THE COCKPIT OF AN ACR FLT UNDER THE SF-160 PROGRAM FOR AIR TFC CTLRS. THIS WAS A SHORT FLT OF ABOUT 15 MINS ENRTE. THE ACFT WAS INBND FOR ATL WHICH WAS USING SIMULTANEOUS VISUAL APCHES TO RWY 26R/27L. ALTHOUGH A SHORT FLT SUCH AS THIS IS BUSY FOR THE CREW, I WAS SURPRISED AT SOME OF THE ACTIONS. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO CONVERSATION WITH ME DUE TO THE SHORT FLT, COMS WERE EXTREMELY SLOPPY. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE DEST APCH CTL, THE CTLR ADVISED WHAT RWY TO EXPECT. AFTER BEING TURNED ON DOWNWIND, THE CAPT AND FO STARTED TO DISCUSS THAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW WHAT RWY TO USE. WE WERE ALREADY DESCENDING TO 7000 FT WHEN THEY REALIZED THAT THEY HAD NEVER LISTENED TO THE ATIS. THEY THEN MISSED THE CALL FOR A FREQ CHANGE TWICE WHILE DISCUSSING THE ATIS. AFTER BEING CLRED FOR THE APCH, THEY REALIZED THAT THEY HAD NOT CHECKED IN WITH THE COMPANY OPERATIONS. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT 400 AGL ON ABOUT 2 MI FINAL. THEN THEY REALIZED THAT THEY HAD NEVER SWITCHED TO THE TWR AND GOTTEN LNDG CLRNC. THERE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY CLEAR REASON FOR ALL OF THIS COMS FOUL-UP OTHER THAN INATTN. THERE WAS NOT MUCH EXTRANEOUS CONVERSATION OR OTHER DISTRS -- JUST NOT THINKING AHEAD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.