Narrative:

We received a clearance to descend via the VYPPR1 RNAV arrival; landing east into atl. The first officer was the PF and we planned and briefed the arrival to atl's runway 9R. Upon receiving our descent clearance; we were given 'descend via the vyppr 1 RNAV arrival; except cross redtl intersection at 250 knots; expect runway 10.' the first officer reprogrammed; and we verified as a crew; the FMC with the new speed assignment and runway. At the top of descent; we began the arrival and descent uneventfully. The descent was progressing normally all the way through 10;000 feet and we were given a frequency change in which the controller confirmed the landing runway was runway 10. Since we had originally planned on landing on runway 9R I wanted to take another look at the performance computer landing data for the new runway assignment. The performance was already programmed for all atl east runways. I just wanted to take another look at the landing margin. While I was concentrating on the performance data the atl approach controller states; 'aircraft X; you're high at swchm; descend and maintain 5000; and fly heading XXX.' I look up; acknowledge the controller's instructions; and ask the first officer; 'were we high?' he then states yes; we were about 400-500 feet high. Since we were in an [older model B737]; when I looked up from the computer; I did not receive immediate situational awareness of our vertical deviation due to the lack of a navigation display (nd). My FMC was on the legs page and by the time I glanced at the FMA the first officer had already selected level change for our new descent to 5000 feet. Additionally; my visual attention was on the MCP panel to confirm with the first officer the selection of the new altitude and mode level change. However; I did ask the first officer if the aircraft had transferred to VNAV speed during the descent and he seemed a little unsure; but then stated 'he thought it had.' I never saw anything other than VNAV path on the FMA; however; like I've described my focus was not on the FMA or descent page at all times but was on the performance computer when the deviation occurred. Another factor during this event was strong westerly winds encountered (tailwind) until the aircraft was well below 1000 feet. I did observe the first officer using full speed brakes during the descent and VNAV seemed to be having difficulty maintaining the programmed speed or 250 knots. After the controller stated we were high I observed an approximately 35-40 knot tailwind. The landing phase was uneventful and we were given a phone number to call by the atl tower due to a 'pilot deviation.' at the gate; I spoke with a supervisor in the atl TRACON. We had a very pleasant conversation and he stated that his paperwork indicated we were 800 feet high at swchm. I told him that we were definitely high at swchm; but our estimate was 400-500 feet high (based upon the first officer's remark). I told him about the strong tailwinds and that I had observed the first officer using full idle power and speed brakes in order to keep the aircraft on profile during the arrival. I stated that we should have informed the controller that we needed relief from the crossing restriction; but I was unaware that we had needed to do so. Also; I explained that my assessment was that the aircraft was being flown at its performance limits of full speed brakes and idle power. He stated altitude deviations were occurring hundreds of times on several of the atl stars and the procedures were being re-evaluated. He explained that they knew that several atl stars were placing aircraft right up to the performance limits in order to accomplish the crossing restrictions. He encouraged me to include this discussion in my report. The main action that should have occurred was the pilot flying should have communicated in a timely manner that an altitude crossing might not be met. This would have allowed me to prioritize my attention on something other than performance landing data review. Additionally; I could have obtained relief from ATC on the restriction. Additionally; flying complex RNAV arrivals with 'descend via' clearances in [an old model B737] is very challenging. The strong tailwinds set us up for having to fly at the performance limits of the aircraft. The normal automation cues of performance deviation are not as obvious in [this model of the B737] when you do not have a navigation display (nd). For example; the altitude arc displayed on the nd is an early method of determining whether a crossing altitude will be met. Lastly; as I discussed with the atl TRACON supervisor; the runway change increased our workload in the cockpit at a critical juncture. I realize it is very difficult to create a procedure with no runway changes. However; when atl is landing east; I have a 50/50 guess at the landing runway; 9R or 10. We assumed runway 9R; but this was changed to runway 10. Since I could not remember the landing data for runway 10 (even though it had been calculated) I needed a brief moment of additional performance review. I attempted to mitigate the risk of distraction by waiting until after the FMC had been reprogrammed and the arrival re-briefed. As a result; I was 'heads down' in the performance computer for a brief moment late in the arrival. I thought this was appropriate with only one more crossing restrictions to make and no difficulty up to that point; but; in hindsight; I should have waited to review the performance computer after all crossing altitudes had been accomplished.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reported they did not meet the SWCHM crossing restriction on the ATL VYPPR 1 Arrival.

Narrative: We received a clearance to descend via the VYPPR1 RNAV Arrival; landing east into ATL. The First Officer was the PF and we planned and briefed the arrival to ATL's Runway 9R. Upon receiving our descent clearance; we were given 'Descend via the VYPPR 1 RNAV Arrival; except cross REDTL intersection at 250 knots; expect Runway 10.' The First Officer reprogrammed; and we verified as a crew; the FMC with the new speed assignment and runway. At the top of descent; we began the arrival and descent uneventfully. The descent was progressing normally all the way through 10;000 feet and we were given a frequency change in which the Controller confirmed the landing runway was Runway 10. Since we had originally planned on landing on Runway 9R I wanted to take another look at the performance computer landing data for the new runway assignment. The performance was already programmed for all ATL east runways. I just wanted to take another look at the landing margin. While I was concentrating on the performance data the ATL Approach Controller states; 'Aircraft X; you're high at SWCHM; descend and maintain 5000; and fly heading XXX.' I look up; acknowledge the Controller's instructions; and ask the First Officer; 'Were we high?' He then states yes; we were about 400-500 feet high. Since we were in an [older model B737]; when I looked up from the computer; I did not receive immediate situational awareness of our vertical deviation due to the lack of a Navigation Display (ND). My FMC was on the LEGS page and by the time I glanced at the FMA the First Officer had already selected Level Change for our new descent to 5000 feet. Additionally; my visual attention was on the MCP panel to confirm with the First Officer the selection of the new altitude and mode Level Change. However; I did ask the First Officer if the aircraft had transferred to VNAV Speed during the descent and he seemed a little unsure; but then stated 'he thought it had.' I never saw anything other than VNAV PATH on the FMA; however; like I've described my focus was not on the FMA or Descent page at all times but was on the performance computer when the deviation occurred. Another factor during this event was strong westerly winds encountered (tailwind) until the aircraft was well below 1000 feet. I did observe the First Officer using full speed brakes during the descent and VNAV seemed to be having difficulty maintaining the programmed speed or 250 knots. After the Controller stated we were high I observed an approximately 35-40 knot tailwind. The landing phase was uneventful and we were given a phone number to call by the ATL Tower due to a 'Pilot Deviation.' At the gate; I spoke with a Supervisor in the ATL TRACON. We had a very pleasant conversation and he stated that his paperwork indicated we were 800 feet high at SWCHM. I told him that we were definitely high at SWCHM; but our estimate was 400-500 feet high (based upon the First Officer's remark). I told him about the strong tailwinds and that I had observed the First Officer using full idle power and speed brakes in order to keep the aircraft on profile during the arrival. I stated that we should have informed the Controller that we needed relief from the crossing restriction; but I was unaware that we had needed to do so. Also; I explained that my assessment was that the aircraft was being flown at its performance limits of full speed brakes and idle power. He stated altitude deviations were occurring hundreds of times on several of the ATL STARS and the procedures were being re-evaluated. He explained that they knew that several ATL STARS were placing aircraft right up to the performance limits in order to accomplish the crossing restrictions. He encouraged me to include this discussion in my report. The main action that should have occurred was the Pilot Flying should have communicated in a timely manner that an altitude crossing might not be met. This would have allowed me to prioritize my attention on something other than performance landing data review. Additionally; I could have obtained relief from ATC on the restriction. Additionally; flying complex RNAV arrivals with 'descend via' clearances in [an old model B737] is VERY challenging. The strong tailwinds set us up for having to fly at the performance limits of the aircraft. The normal automation cues of performance deviation are not as obvious in [this model of the B737] when you do not have a Navigation Display (ND). For example; the altitude arc displayed on the ND is an early method of determining whether a crossing altitude will be met. Lastly; as I discussed with the ATL TRACON Supervisor; the runway change increased our workload in the cockpit at a critical juncture. I realize it is very difficult to create a procedure with no runway changes. However; when ATL is landing east; I have a 50/50 guess at the landing runway; 9R or 10. We assumed Runway 9R; but this was changed to Runway 10. Since I could not remember the landing data for Runway 10 (even though it had been calculated) I needed a brief moment of additional performance review. I attempted to mitigate the risk of distraction by waiting until after the FMC had been reprogrammed and the arrival re-briefed. As a result; I was 'heads down' in the performance computer for a brief moment late in the arrival. I thought this was appropriate with only one more crossing restrictions to make and no difficulty up to that point; but; in hindsight; I should have waited to review the performance computer after all crossing altitudes had been accomplished.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.