Narrative:

The incident occurred on a flight to mdw. I was the PF and captain/PIC. With less than 100 hours PIC in type, I was still on 'high minimums'. WX at time of departure was MVFR, but well above my minimums. En route my first officer listened to the ATIS. It was indefinite 700 obscured and 1 mi light rain, fog, and haze, with a wide temperature/dew point spread of 40/33. This posed no problem for ceiling, but the visibility minimum for the approach in use was 1 mi, meaning my high minimum was 1 1/2 mi. The ATIS was 20 mins old and would be 45 mins old by the time we were to land. My first officer (PNF) asked if I would like him to contact the tower to get an update on the WX. I told him we would monitor the tower on our second radio to hear what they were telling other aircraft. We heard the tower tell at least 2 aircraft that they were 'cleared to land, field is at minimums' (assumed to mean normal minimums - 1 mi). I told my first officer that since no RVR was reported, the controling visibility was in-flight visibility (determined by us pilots). He was to contact tower prior to the FAF, and if tower did not say anything about WX, we would continue with the approach. We would increase decision height by 100'. But if tower advised us that 'field is at minimums', he was to advise tower that the captain is high minimums and that we need to abandon the approach and wish to divert to sbn (south bend, in). I reasoned that the tower had advised at least 2 aircraft prior to us, and that they would advise us also. Tower was contacted prior to reaching FAF and we were cleared to land, no mention of WX. We continued with the approach, had the runway lights in sight prior to reaching our revised decision height, and landed. I had felt a little uneasy about this decision and decided to talk to some senior capts about it afterward. I wish to point out that I never felt uneasy from a safety point of view, but rather from a legal point of view. These capts assured me that I was correct in my thinking that the ATIS was not controling. But, I was at fault for not advising ATC of my high minimum status and asking for WX prior to initiating the approach. The fact that we heard tower inform other aircraft that 'field is at minimums' did not mean that the tower was responsible for telling us. Since the last WX we heard was below my minimums, I should not have shot the approach. The corrective action for me is simple -- I learned my lesson and won't do it again. Even though I never had doubts about the safety of the flight, I do wish I had made a better decision.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BELOW MINIMUMS APCH AND LNDG FOR HIGH MINIMUMS COMMUTER CAPT.

Narrative: THE INCIDENT OCCURRED ON A FLT TO MDW. I WAS THE PF AND CAPT/PIC. WITH LESS THAN 100 HRS PIC IN TYPE, I WAS STILL ON 'HIGH MINIMUMS'. WX AT TIME OF DEP WAS MVFR, BUT WELL ABOVE MY MINIMUMS. ENRTE MY F/O LISTENED TO THE ATIS. IT WAS INDEFINITE 700 OBSCURED AND 1 MI LIGHT RAIN, FOG, AND HAZE, WITH A WIDE TEMP/DEW POINT SPREAD OF 40/33. THIS POSED NO PROBLEM FOR CEILING, BUT THE VISIBILITY MINIMUM FOR THE APCH IN USE WAS 1 MI, MEANING MY HIGH MINIMUM WAS 1 1/2 MI. THE ATIS WAS 20 MINS OLD AND WOULD BE 45 MINS OLD BY THE TIME WE WERE TO LAND. MY F/O (PNF) ASKED IF I WOULD LIKE HIM TO CONTACT THE TWR TO GET AN UPDATE ON THE WX. I TOLD HIM WE WOULD MONITOR THE TWR ON OUR SECOND RADIO TO HEAR WHAT THEY WERE TELLING OTHER ACFT. WE HEARD THE TWR TELL AT LEAST 2 ACFT THAT THEY WERE 'CLRED TO LAND, FIELD IS AT MINIMUMS' (ASSUMED TO MEAN NORMAL MINIMUMS - 1 MI). I TOLD MY F/O THAT SINCE NO RVR WAS REPORTED, THE CTLING VISIBILITY WAS INFLT VISIBILITY (DETERMINED BY US PLTS). HE WAS TO CONTACT TWR PRIOR TO THE FAF, AND IF TWR DID NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT WX, WE WOULD CONTINUE WITH THE APCH. WE WOULD INCREASE DECISION HEIGHT BY 100'. BUT IF TWR ADVISED US THAT 'FIELD IS AT MINIMUMS', HE WAS TO ADVISE TWR THAT THE CAPT IS HIGH MINIMUMS AND THAT WE NEED TO ABANDON THE APCH AND WISH TO DIVERT TO SBN (SOUTH BEND, IN). I REASONED THAT THE TWR HAD ADVISED AT LEAST 2 ACFT PRIOR TO US, AND THAT THEY WOULD ADVISE US ALSO. TWR WAS CONTACTED PRIOR TO REACHING FAF AND WE WERE CLRED TO LAND, NO MENTION OF WX. WE CONTINUED WITH THE APCH, HAD THE RWY LIGHTS IN SIGHT PRIOR TO REACHING OUR REVISED DECISION HEIGHT, AND LANDED. I HAD FELT A LITTLE UNEASY ABOUT THIS DECISION AND DECIDED TO TALK TO SOME SENIOR CAPTS ABOUT IT AFTERWARD. I WISH TO POINT OUT THAT I NEVER FELT UNEASY FROM A SAFETY POINT OF VIEW, BUT RATHER FROM A LEGAL POINT OF VIEW. THESE CAPTS ASSURED ME THAT I WAS CORRECT IN MY THINKING THAT THE ATIS WAS NOT CTLING. BUT, I WAS AT FAULT FOR NOT ADVISING ATC OF MY HIGH MINIMUM STATUS AND ASKING FOR WX PRIOR TO INITIATING THE APCH. THE FACT THAT WE HEARD TWR INFORM OTHER ACFT THAT 'FIELD IS AT MINIMUMS' DID NOT MEAN THAT THE TWR WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR TELLING US. SINCE THE LAST WX WE HEARD WAS BELOW MY MINIMUMS, I SHOULD NOT HAVE SHOT THE APCH. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR ME IS SIMPLE -- I LEARNED MY LESSON AND WON'T DO IT AGAIN. EVEN THOUGH I NEVER HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE FLT, I DO WISH I HAD MADE A BETTER DECISION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.