Narrative:

I am a checkairman with our airline and I was in the process of giving IOE (initial operating experience) to a new first officer on the day that this situation occurred. I normally listen to a communications including ATIS but on this day the approach frequency was extremely busy so I elected to monitor approach control and let the first officer get the current ATIS. When he read to me the current WX, there was no indication of ILS approachs being used and I asked him if there were approachs to which he said no. We were being given vectors onto the final approach and being in the clouds, we had no view of the ground. Just outside the initial approach fix, I heard the controller clear the aircraft in front for an ILS approach and being already setup for a visibility, I hurriedly looked at the approach plate and setup the radios for the approach. I didn't notice that the marker beacon was not turned on and that the #2 radio, which was supposed to be setup for a cross reference was dialed to the wrong frequency. I thought everything was fine when cleared for the approach and maintained our altitude until what I thought was the final approach based on the cross right and started to descend. We broke out almost immediately only to find ourselves approximately 2 mi from the end of the runway. I made the decision to land but used an extreme deck angle to make the descent to the runway. Made landing and taxied into the gate. I again asked the first officer about the ATIS and that's when he said he didn't think that ATIS information was important. Well, he saw the outcome and then I saw the #2 radio on the wrong frequency. We both learned a valuable lesson that day. Earlier I said that other factors were involved; this particular aircraft had some maintenance and they had done some repainting in the cockpit and all morning I had mentioned to the first officer about the smell but I didn't pay any attention to it. By the time we finished that afternoon, I had a real bad headache but I didn't know why. I think that this might have had a small part in my decision making process. This also being our second day of flying and my having had 3 previous days of 14 hour duty days and driving to and from work 40 mins each way.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LACK OF CREW COORD AND COCKPIT MANAGEMENT CONTRIBUTE TO LOSS OF POSITIONAL AWARENESS AND STEEP DESCENT TO LNDG FOR ACR MDT.

Narrative: I AM A CHECKAIRMAN WITH OUR AIRLINE AND I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF GIVING IOE (INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE) TO A NEW F/O ON THE DAY THAT THIS SITUATION OCCURRED. I NORMALLY LISTEN TO A COMS INCLUDING ATIS BUT ON THIS DAY THE APCH FREQ WAS EXTREMELY BUSY SO I ELECTED TO MONITOR APCH CTL AND LET THE F/O GET THE CURRENT ATIS. WHEN HE READ TO ME THE CURRENT WX, THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF ILS APCHS BEING USED AND I ASKED HIM IF THERE WERE APCHS TO WHICH HE SAID NO. WE WERE BEING GIVEN VECTORS ONTO THE FINAL APCH AND BEING IN THE CLOUDS, WE HAD NO VIEW OF THE GND. JUST OUTSIDE THE INITIAL APCH FIX, I HEARD THE CTLR CLR THE ACFT IN FRONT FOR AN ILS APCH AND BEING ALREADY SETUP FOR A VIS, I HURRIEDLY LOOKED AT THE APCH PLATE AND SETUP THE RADIOS FOR THE APCH. I DIDN'T NOTICE THAT THE MARKER BEACON WAS NOT TURNED ON AND THAT THE #2 RADIO, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO BE SETUP FOR A CROSS REFERENCE WAS DIALED TO THE WRONG FREQ. I THOUGHT EVERYTHING WAS FINE WHEN CLRED FOR THE APCH AND MAINTAINED OUR ALT UNTIL WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE FINAL APCH BASED ON THE CROSS R AND STARTED TO DSND. WE BROKE OUT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY ONLY TO FIND OURSELVES APPROX 2 MI FROM THE END OF THE RWY. I MADE THE DECISION TO LAND BUT USED AN EXTREME DECK ANGLE TO MAKE THE DSNT TO THE RWY. MADE LNDG AND TAXIED INTO THE GATE. I AGAIN ASKED THE F/O ABOUT THE ATIS AND THAT'S WHEN HE SAID HE DIDN'T THINK THAT ATIS INFO WAS IMPORTANT. WELL, HE SAW THE OUTCOME AND THEN I SAW THE #2 RADIO ON THE WRONG FREQ. WE BOTH LEARNED A VALUABLE LESSON THAT DAY. EARLIER I SAID THAT OTHER FACTORS WERE INVOLVED; THIS PARTICULAR ACFT HAD SOME MAINT AND THEY HAD DONE SOME REPAINTING IN THE COCKPIT AND ALL MORNING I HAD MENTIONED TO THE F/O ABOUT THE SMELL BUT I DIDN'T PAY ANY ATTN TO IT. BY THE TIME WE FINISHED THAT AFTERNOON, I HAD A REAL BAD HEADACHE BUT I DIDN'T KNOW WHY. I THINK THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE HAD A SMALL PART IN MY DECISION MAKING PROCESS. THIS ALSO BEING OUR SECOND DAY OF FLYING AND MY HAVING HAD 3 PREVIOUS DAYS OF 14 HR DUTY DAYS AND DRIVING TO AND FROM WORK 40 MINS EACH WAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.