37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1436640 |
Time | |
Date | 201703 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Autothrottle/Speed Control |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Type 740 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Auto throttles were inoperative and I refused the aircraft. The WX at destination was forecast ts (thunderstorms) over the field; heavy rain; ceiling and vis 400/1 with moderate turbulence enroute and on arrival. I made the call that this was not the safest condition to operate the aircraft in with this WX forecast. I consulted with the dispatcher and he agreed with the refusal. In fact; he informed operations management prior to dispatching the flight in this condition that a refusal could likely result. Operations disregarded this input. The issue here is not the refusal but the pilot pushing that occurred immediately after the refusal. Within approximately 20 to 25 minutes after the refusal I received a call from [the] chief pilot's office from an on duty first officer flight manager. Upon answering the call the flight ops manager said 'hey; what's up.' my reply was 'who is this'; 'this is so and so [name]in the flight office'. I replied 'I don't know what you are referring to'. He stated 'well you just refused an aircraft and you are out of process'. Again I replied;' what process are you referring to'? He stated 'you are required to conference call with dispatch and maintenance when you refuse an aircraft'. I replied that the dispatcher and I had spoken and jointly refused the aircraft and the dispatcher contacted maintenance. We had no questions for maintenance and a conference call to inform maintenance was not necessary in this instance'. The flight manager then said that he could put me in contact with [local] flight standards if I had any questions. I had previously stated to him that I had no questions and his 'help was not needed in this matter'. Further; the flight manager stated that if I was in fact refusing the aircraft (which I had already done) that I was required to write a detailed [occurrence report] justifying why I was refusing the aircraft. The overall context of the call was not to help but rather to get me to take an aircraft that I deemed not safe given the conditions. I want to state for the record that the dispatcher was outstanding in his support of this refusal. The dispatcher did inform me that I might get another call from operations to update me on the aircraft swap. He said the operations person stated to him that if we didn't want to wait 4 or 5 hours for another aircraft we should reconsider our decision. I told the dispatcher to relay back that I would not compromise safety for convenience and that a call from ops to me was not necessary. The end result of this was that maintenance fixed the aircraft in about 45 minutes and we blocked out approximately 25 minutes late due to wheels up times.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 Captain reported pressure to accept an aircraft with inoperative auto throttles with the destination weather close to minimums. Captain reported the end result was that maintenance fixed the aircraft and they blocked out about 25 minutes late.
Narrative: Auto throttles were inoperative and I refused the aircraft. The WX at destination was forecast TS (Thunderstorms) over the field; heavy rain; ceiling and vis 400/1 with moderate turbulence enroute and on arrival. I made the call that this was not the safest condition to operate the aircraft in with this WX forecast. I consulted with the dispatcher and he agreed with the refusal. In fact; he informed operations management prior to dispatching the flight in this condition that a refusal could likely result. Operations disregarded this input. The issue here is not the refusal but the Pilot pushing that occurred immediately after the refusal. Within approximately 20 to 25 minutes after the refusal I received a call from [the] chief pilot's office from an on duty First Officer flight manager. Upon answering the call the flight ops manager said 'Hey; what's up.' My reply was 'who is this'; 'this is so and so [name]in the flight office'. I replied 'I don't know what you are referring to'. He stated 'well you just refused an aircraft and you are out of process'. Again I replied;' What process are you referring to'? He stated 'you are required to conference call with dispatch and maintenance when you refuse an aircraft'. I replied that the dispatcher and I had spoken and jointly refused the aircraft and the dispatcher contacted maintenance. We had no questions for maintenance and a conference call to inform maintenance was not necessary in this instance'. The flight manager then said that he could put me in contact with [local] flight standards if I had any questions. I had previously stated to him that I had no questions and his 'help was not needed in this matter'. Further; the flight manager stated that if I was in fact refusing the aircraft (which I had already done) that I was required to write a detailed [Occurrence Report] justifying why I was refusing the aircraft. The overall context of the call was not to help but rather to get me to take an aircraft that I deemed not safe given the conditions. I want to state for the record that the dispatcher was outstanding in his support of this refusal. The dispatcher did inform me that I might get another call from operations to update me on the aircraft swap. He said the operations person stated to him that if we didn't want to wait 4 or 5 hours for another aircraft we should reconsider our decision. I told the dispatcher to relay back that I would not compromise safety for convenience and that a call from ops to me was not necessary. The end result of this was that maintenance fixed the aircraft in about 45 minutes and we blocked out approximately 25 minutes late due to wheels up times.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.