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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1437397 |
Time | |
Date | 201704 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | SAN.Tower |
State Reference | CA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Small Transport |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Local |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.5 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Supervisor / CIC |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Aircraft X was handed off over as a VFR inbound. I accepted the handoff and when aircraft X checked in I advised them they were following aircraft Y and showed a slight overtake. I cleared them to land. Close in trail of aircraft X was aircraft Z. They had a 'vv' in their scratch pad so as per our letter of agreement with sct he was on a visual approach and had traffic he is following in sight. I told aircraft Z of their overtake with aircraft X and cleared them to land. Aircraft Z was still indicating an overtake on aircraft X ahead so after a mile or two tracking final I advised them of their overtake and told them the speed aircraft X was indicating. Aircraft Z then told me; 'ok I see them now'! This confused me a bit since according to his scratch pad entry he should have had that traffic in sight before sct switched aircraft Z to me. Aircraft Z than began to slow. I advised aircraft X I would need no delay off the runway due to traffic close in trail. While this was happening with aircraft X and aircraft Z; I had aircraft a who was turned in behind aircraft Z instead of extending downwind to follow his company aircraft B on a 12 mile final. Aircraft a quickly was indicating 180 knots overtaking aircraft Z on final. I reached out to aircraft a who was not on my frequency. I called over to TRACON to switch the aircraft a. As I was talking to TRACON aircraft a checked in. I advised aircraft a of their overtake on traffic and sent them around. Aircraft a questioned the instructions and mentioned they were not told of traffic. I sent aircraft a around at this time as he was about 1.5 miles from the aircraft Z. Aircraft a went around heading 275 climbing to 2500 feet. I did have all traffic in sight out the window; weather was clear and traffic was easy to spot.we used to have procedures not allowing sct to had us off an overtake inside a five mile final. This was removed due to adding that the tower will provide visual with traffic inside of a 5 mile final. I feel that the overtakes were unsafe. The traffic even though they indicated they had visual contact with preceding traffic did not have visual like their scratch pads indicated. I am not sure if any of this was an operational error. I feel it was unsafe not to be talking to a [large transport aircraft] following to small aircraft all inside of a 5 mile final. I would like someone to check the tapes and see if this was an operational error. I feel it was all done very poorly and with reckless regard for safety. Instead of extending aircraft a to follow and avoiding the whole situation. These types of issues happen at san all the time. Very dangerous and unnecessary overtakes and switches inside of 5 miles.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SAN Tower Controllers reported receiving multiple aircraft on final from the TRACON resulting in insufficient separation.
Narrative: Aircraft X was handed off over as a VFR inbound. I accepted the handoff and when Aircraft X checked in I advised them they were following Aircraft Y and showed a slight overtake. I cleared them to land. Close in trail of Aircraft X was Aircraft Z. They had a 'VV' in their scratch pad so as per our Letter of Agreement with SCT he was on a Visual Approach and had traffic he is following in sight. I told Aircraft Z of their overtake with Aircraft X and cleared them to land. Aircraft Z was still indicating an overtake on Aircraft X ahead so after a mile or two tracking final I advised them of their overtake and told them the speed Aircraft X was indicating. Aircraft Z then told me; 'Ok I see them now'! This confused me a bit since according to his scratch pad entry he should have had that traffic in sight before SCT switched Aircraft Z to me. Aircraft Z than began to slow. I advised Aircraft X I would need no delay off the runway due to traffic close in trail. While this was happening with Aircraft X and Aircraft Z; I had Aircraft A who was turned in behind Aircraft Z instead of extending downwind to follow his company Aircraft B on a 12 mile final. Aircraft A quickly was indicating 180 knots overtaking Aircraft Z on final. I reached out to Aircraft A who was not on my frequency. I called over to TRACON to switch the Aircraft A. As I was talking to TRACON Aircraft A checked in. I advised Aircraft A of their overtake on traffic and sent them around. Aircraft A questioned the instructions and mentioned they were not told of traffic. I sent Aircraft A around at this time as he was about 1.5 miles from the Aircraft Z. Aircraft A went around heading 275 climbing to 2500 feet. I did have all traffic in sight out the window; weather was clear and traffic was easy to spot.We used to have procedures not allowing SCT to had us off an overtake inside a five mile final. This was removed due to adding that the tower will provide visual with traffic inside of a 5 mile final. I feel that the overtakes were unsafe. The traffic even though they indicated they had visual contact with preceding traffic did NOT have visual like their scratch pads indicated. I am not sure if any of this was an operational error. I feel it was unsafe not to be talking to a [Large Transport Aircraft] following to small aircraft all inside of a 5 mile final. I would like someone to check the tapes and see if this was an operational error. I feel it was all done very poorly and with reckless regard for safety. Instead of extending Aircraft A to follow and avoiding the whole situation. These types of issues happen at SAN all the time. Very dangerous and unnecessary overtakes and switches inside of 5 miles.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.