Narrative:

While working local control east (owning runways 22L and 27), air carrier X, an large transport, was cleared to land runway 22L to hold short of runway 27. Air carrier X on short final announced he had to go around. I immediately told local control west (owning runway 22R) to leave his departure, an air carrier heavy jet, on runway heading. I then told air carrier to turn left heading 180 degrees and maintain 30 (I would have gone left to 140 degrees, but I would have gone into final vectors airspace). I then coordinated with departure control to let them know about go around, heading and altitude. Less than 5 seconds later when I saw no targets a factor on BRITE radar I turned air carrier X left to 140 degrees to maintain 30 and contact departure on 133.0. Within 5 seconds air carrier Y appeared, less than 1 mi ahead of air carrier X, climbing to 50. On initial contact with air carrier X, he told departure he had air carrier Y in sight and was maintaining visibility sep. Because of air carrier Y (a bos departure off runway 22R) not tagging up on the BRITE radar and 2 separate controllers working 2 runways separated by less than 1500' (considered 1 runway), these new procedures implemented at bos tower in 3/90 change form having 1 local controller and 1 local monitor to 2 local controllers. This happening made the new procedures at bos tower very unsafe. I think these new procedures ought to be looked at a lot closer. After 4 weeks of implementation, they are making things unsafe and a lot more difficult for both pilot and controller. Pilots have numerous frequency changes and are not on the frequency at the runway holding things up causing delays. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter experience: 9 yrs non-radar. Reporter stated radar sep had been lost prior to air carrier X stating that air carrier Y was in sight. Reporter had coordinated with local control west (training in progress), but was not told about air carrier Y. Tower supervisor instructed reporter to turn air carrier X to 140 degree heading for noise abatement. Reporter had coordinated 180 degree heading with departure control. Split local control positions are working much better now as controllers become more familiar with the procedures. Reporter was frustrated by lack of training prior ot implementation of the split positions, and the lack of supervisor assistance during the shake-out phase. Split local control positions are working relatively well now. Reporter does not consider the procedure unsafe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X HAD LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION FROM ACR Y. SYSTEM ERROR. SITUATION: NEW PROC (SPLIT LCL CTL POSITIONS).

Narrative: WHILE WORKING LCL CTL E (OWNING RWYS 22L AND 27), ACR X, AN LGT, WAS CLRED TO LAND RWY 22L TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27. ACR X ON SHORT FINAL ANNOUNCED HE HAD TO GO AROUND. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD LCL CTL W (OWNING RWY 22R) TO LEAVE HIS DEP, AN ACR HVY JET, ON RWY HDG. I THEN TOLD ACR TO TURN LEFT HDG 180 DEGS AND MAINTAIN 30 (I WOULD HAVE GONE LEFT TO 140 DEGS, BUT I WOULD HAVE GONE INTO FINAL VECTORS AIRSPACE). I THEN COORDINATED WITH DEP CTL TO LET THEM KNOW ABOUT GAR, HDG AND ALT. LESS THAN 5 SECS LATER WHEN I SAW NO TARGETS A FACTOR ON BRITE RADAR I TURNED ACR X LEFT TO 140 DEGS TO MAINTAIN 30 AND CONTACT DEP ON 133.0. WITHIN 5 SECS ACR Y APPEARED, LESS THAN 1 MI AHEAD OF ACR X, CLBING TO 50. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH ACR X, HE TOLD DEP HE HAD ACR Y IN SIGHT AND WAS MAINTAINING VIS SEP. BECAUSE OF ACR Y (A BOS DEP OFF RWY 22R) NOT TAGGING UP ON THE BRITE RADAR AND 2 SEPARATE CTLRS WORKING 2 RWYS SEPARATED BY LESS THAN 1500' (CONSIDERED 1 RWY), THESE NEW PROCS IMPLEMENTED AT BOS TWR IN 3/90 CHANGE FORM HAVING 1 LCL CTLR AND 1 LCL MONITOR TO 2 LCL CTLRS. THIS HAPPENING MADE THE NEW PROCS AT BOS TWR VERY UNSAFE. I THINK THESE NEW PROCS OUGHT TO BE LOOKED AT A LOT CLOSER. AFTER 4 WKS OF IMPLEMENTATION, THEY ARE MAKING THINGS UNSAFE AND A LOT MORE DIFFICULT FOR BOTH PLT AND CTLR. PLTS HAVE NUMEROUS FREQ CHANGES AND ARE NOT ON THE FREQ AT THE RWY HOLDING THINGS UP CAUSING DELAYS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR EXPERIENCE: 9 YRS NON-RADAR. RPTR STATED RADAR SEP HAD BEEN LOST PRIOR TO ACR X STATING THAT ACR Y WAS IN SIGHT. RPTR HAD COORDINATED WITH LCL CTL W (TRNING IN PROGRESS), BUT WAS NOT TOLD ABOUT ACR Y. TWR SUPVR INSTRUCTED RPTR TO TURN ACR X TO 140 DEG HDG FOR NOISE ABATEMENT. RPTR HAD COORDINATED 180 DEG HDG WITH DEP CTL. SPLIT LCL CTL POSITIONS ARE WORKING MUCH BETTER NOW AS CTLRS BECOME MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE PROCS. RPTR WAS FRUSTRATED BY LACK OF TRNING PRIOR OT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SPLIT POSITIONS, AND THE LACK OF SUPVR ASSISTANCE DURING THE SHAKE-OUT PHASE. SPLIT LCL CTL POSITIONS ARE WORKING RELATIVELY WELL NOW. RPTR DOES NOT CONSIDER THE PROC UNSAFE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.