Narrative:

I was relieving the radar controller on R57 who just had a systems error. He turned large transport X into medium large transport Y. I tried to turn medium large transport Y to increase sep which did not work. The back aircraft was too fast. Both aircraft were at FL350. The R57 controller did not see the second deal happening until I pointed it out to him. He turned large transport X 40 degrees right, then 90 degrees right which did not work. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter was standing near the supervisor's console when an error was detected in R57. Reporter was sent to the sector by the supervisor to relieve the controller involved so the investigation could begin. When the reporter arrived at the sector, he immediately started to assume the position. During the briefing, reporter saw another potential loss of sep starting to happen. He issued a turn to the aircraft that was being overtaken and the controller being relieved then resumed the position and did other things to try to avert a second operational error. All the remedial action were fruitless. Reporter stated that these kind of situations are caused by the lack of training or methods being used to train the new personnel in the center. He said that all to often, the new contract instructors do not screen out personnel that do not have an aptitude for ATC, but rely on the OJT instrs to weed out the trnees that are not capable of successfully completing the training program. He recommended a return to the old days of being more strict and everyone in the training network being more conscientious about failing the ones that must be failed.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION BETWEEN 2 ACRS AT THE SAME ALT IN AN OVERTAKE SITUATION.

Narrative: I WAS RELIEVING THE RADAR CTLR ON R57 WHO JUST HAD A SYSTEMS ERROR. HE TURNED LGT X INTO MLG Y. I TRIED TO TURN MLG Y TO INCREASE SEP WHICH DID NOT WORK. THE BACK ACFT WAS TOO FAST. BOTH ACFT WERE AT FL350. THE R57 CTLR DID NOT SEE THE SECOND DEAL HAPPENING UNTIL I POINTED IT OUT TO HIM. HE TURNED LGT X 40 DEGS RIGHT, THEN 90 DEGS RIGHT WHICH DID NOT WORK. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR WAS STANDING NEAR THE SUPVR'S CONSOLE WHEN AN ERROR WAS DETECTED IN R57. RPTR WAS SENT TO THE SECTOR BY THE SUPVR TO RELIEVE THE CTLR INVOLVED SO THE INVESTIGATION COULD BEGIN. WHEN THE RPTR ARRIVED AT THE SECTOR, HE IMMEDIATELY STARTED TO ASSUME THE POS. DURING THE BRIEFING, RPTR SAW ANOTHER POTENTIAL LOSS OF SEP STARTING TO HAPPEN. HE ISSUED A TURN TO THE ACFT THAT WAS BEING OVERTAKEN AND THE CTLR BEING RELIEVED THEN RESUMED THE POS AND DID OTHER THINGS TO TRY TO AVERT A SECOND OPERROR. ALL THE REMEDIAL ACTION WERE FRUITLESS. RPTR STATED THAT THESE KIND OF SITUATIONS ARE CAUSED BY THE LACK OF TRNING OR METHODS BEING USED TO TRAIN THE NEW PERSONNEL IN THE CENTER. HE SAID THAT ALL TO OFTEN, THE NEW CONTRACT INSTRUCTORS DO NOT SCREEN OUT PERSONNEL THAT DO NOT HAVE AN APTITUDE FOR ATC, BUT RELY ON THE OJT INSTRS TO WEED OUT THE TRNEES THAT ARE NOT CAPABLE OF SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETING THE TRNING PROGRAM. HE RECOMMENDED A RETURN TO THE OLD DAYS OF BEING MORE STRICT AND EVERYONE IN THE TRNING NETWORK BEING MORE CONSCIENTIOUS ABOUT FAILING THE ONES THAT MUST BE FAILED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.