Narrative:

Left frankfurt, arrived in the chicago area where we held for local thunderstorms. WX was partial obscuration 4W 2TF 49 degree/47 degree 030/11 KTS. We made an uneventful landing. On rollout, tower called and what I understood them to say was after turnoff to remain on their frequency. Neither the captain or the first officer answered so I replied with 'company identification roger'. (I was the international officer). Apparently what tower said was to hold short of the intersecting runway to 14L and to remain on their frequency. None of us understood this requirement to hold short. We did use the whole runway and taxied across the intersecting runway. Tower immediately cancelled a takeoff clearance it had given another aircraft. I do not believe the other aircraft had started its takeoff roll. Contributing factors. Tower called us to hold short halfway through our rollout. Because of the long flight (10 hours coming) and marginal WX conditions, I feel we (as a crew) were so concentrated on the landing and rollout that we honestly did not hear the requirement to hold short. Corrective actions. I feel I made a mistake by answering for the captain and first officer. Had I told them they had been called, the captain or first officer could have verified the rollout instructions. I feel tower needs to verify a verbal 'hold short' from a landing aircraft before releasing another aircraft for takeoff. I replied 'company identification roger'. All parties concerned need to understand communications become difficult after extended periods aloft compounded with marginal WX conditions. In our case we let down our guard once we landed. A lesson was learned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB UNAUTH RWY CROSSING ON ROLL OUT.

Narrative: LEFT FRANKFURT, ARRIVED IN THE CHICAGO AREA WHERE WE HELD FOR LCL TSTMS. WX WAS PARTIAL OBSCURATION 4W 2TF 49 DEG/47 DEG 030/11 KTS. WE MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. ON ROLLOUT, TWR CALLED AND WHAT I UNDERSTOOD THEM TO SAY WAS AFTER TURNOFF TO REMAIN ON THEIR FREQ. NEITHER THE CAPT OR THE F/O ANSWERED SO I REPLIED WITH 'COMPANY ID ROGER'. (I WAS THE INTL OFFICER). APPARENTLY WHAT TWR SAID WAS TO HOLD SHORT OF THE INTERSECTING RWY TO 14L AND TO REMAIN ON THEIR FREQ. NONE OF US UNDERSTOOD THIS REQUIREMENT TO HOLD SHORT. WE DID USE THE WHOLE RWY AND TAXIED ACROSS THE INTERSECTING RWY. TWR IMMEDIATELY CANCELLED A TKOF CLRNC IT HAD GIVEN ANOTHER ACFT. I DO NOT BELIEVE THE OTHER ACFT HAD STARTED ITS TKOF ROLL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. TWR CALLED US TO HOLD SHORT HALFWAY THROUGH OUR ROLLOUT. BECAUSE OF THE LONG FLT (10 HRS COMING) AND MARGINAL WX CONDITIONS, I FEEL WE (AS A CREW) WERE SO CONCENTRATED ON THE LNDG AND ROLLOUT THAT WE HONESTLY DID NOT HEAR THE REQUIREMENT TO HOLD SHORT. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. I FEEL I MADE A MISTAKE BY ANSWERING FOR THE CAPT AND F/O. HAD I TOLD THEM THEY HAD BEEN CALLED, THE CAPT OR F/O COULD HAVE VERIFIED THE ROLLOUT INSTRUCTIONS. I FEEL TWR NEEDS TO VERIFY A VERBAL 'HOLD SHORT' FROM A LNDG ACFT BEFORE RELEASING ANOTHER ACFT FOR TKOF. I REPLIED 'COMPANY ID ROGER'. ALL PARTIES CONCERNED NEED TO UNDERSTAND COMS BECOME DIFFICULT AFTER EXTENDED PERIODS ALOFT COMPOUNDED WITH MARGINAL WX CONDITIONS. IN OUR CASE WE LET DOWN OUR GUARD ONCE WE LANDED. A LESSON WAS LEARNED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.