Narrative:

On may wed, we reported for our flight from dfw to frankfurt. The aircraft had a placard on the automatic-throttle system and was apparently okay for dispatch. During the flight it became evident that the #1 throttle was binding badly at the forward end of its range. It felt like some rubber tongs grabbing it, requiring extra force and overshoot to make any setting. However, at the mid-range and below they seemed to operate normally. Imagine our amazement, two days later, when we had the same aircraft in frankfurt for the return trip. Not only had the plane not been fixed, it had been written up again inbound as, 'throttle seems to bind...etc.' the maintenance man approached us 5 mins prior to departure with a decision. He could make a 'write-off' that would be a sham, because he could not fix what he thought was the problem west/O a cancellation or very long delay of the flight. At this point, I told him to get on the phone with maintenance operations control (tulsa) and ask for their guidance. When he returned, we were 10 mins past departure time and the station supervisor was extremely agitated about the delay. The maintenance man offered this choice: cancel the flight, or do a superficial 'write-off'. We opted for the second choice, because we were assured it was not something that was a hazard, and because we were acquainted with the plane, having flown it over just 2 days prior. The flight was completed west/O incident, but the station manager initiated a delay code, charged to the flight crew, which I had to answer. I believe the delay was due to maintenance, was a reasonable precaution, considering our state of knowledge and the history of the plane. Pressure on crews to accept aircraft with problems is an ever present part of the job. It is my position that the captain and crew should have, and do have, the last word in these decisions; but when the marketing department had the power to hassle the performance of this function, then something is wrong. When conservative maintenance procedures give way to pressures to 'cover a trip,' then something is wrong. In this case, the maintenance operations center was quoted as saying, this plane should never have been dispatched over the north atlantic, the second time. I couldn't agree more. But was our decision to accept and fly the plane back to the states correct? Perhaps next time I would take the other course.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW COMPLAINT ABOUT COMPANY USE OF MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST REQUIREMENT AND OVER EMPHASIS ON SCHEDULE DEP.

Narrative: ON MAY WED, WE RPTED FOR OUR FLT FROM DFW TO FRANKFURT. THE ACFT HAD A PLACARD ON THE AUTO-THROTTLE SYS AND WAS APPARENTLY OKAY FOR DISPATCH. DURING THE FLT IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THE #1 THROTTLE WAS BINDING BADLY AT THE FORWARD END OF ITS RANGE. IT FELT LIKE SOME RUBBER TONGS GRABBING IT, REQUIRING EXTRA FORCE AND OVERSHOOT TO MAKE ANY SETTING. HOWEVER, AT THE MID-RANGE AND BELOW THEY SEEMED TO OPERATE NORMALLY. IMAGINE OUR AMAZEMENT, TWO DAYS LATER, WHEN WE HAD THE SAME ACFT IN FRANKFURT FOR THE RETURN TRIP. NOT ONLY HAD THE PLANE NOT BEEN FIXED, IT HAD BEEN WRITTEN UP AGAIN INBND AS, 'THROTTLE SEEMS TO BIND...ETC.' THE MAINT MAN APCHED US 5 MINS PRIOR TO DEP WITH A DECISION. HE COULD MAKE A 'WRITE-OFF' THAT WOULD BE A SHAM, BECAUSE HE COULD NOT FIX WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS THE PROB W/O A CANCELLATION OR VERY LONG DELAY OF THE FLT. AT THIS POINT, I TOLD HIM TO GET ON THE PHONE WITH MAINT OPS CTL (TULSA) AND ASK FOR THEIR GUIDANCE. WHEN HE RETURNED, WE WERE 10 MINS PAST DEP TIME AND THE STATION SUPVR WAS EXTREMELY AGITATED ABOUT THE DELAY. THE MAINT MAN OFFERED THIS CHOICE: CANCEL THE FLT, OR DO A SUPERFICIAL 'WRITE-OFF'. WE OPTED FOR THE SECOND CHOICE, BECAUSE WE WERE ASSURED IT WAS NOT SOMETHING THAT WAS A HAZARD, AND BECAUSE WE WERE ACQUAINTED WITH THE PLANE, HAVING FLOWN IT OVER JUST 2 DAYS PRIOR. THE FLT WAS COMPLETED W/O INCIDENT, BUT THE STATION MGR INITIATED A DELAY CODE, CHARGED TO THE FLT CREW, WHICH I HAD TO ANSWER. I BELIEVE THE DELAY WAS DUE TO MAINT, WAS A REASONABLE PRECAUTION, CONSIDERING OUR STATE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE HISTORY OF THE PLANE. PRESSURE ON CREWS TO ACCEPT ACFT WITH PROBS IS AN EVER PRESENT PART OF THE JOB. IT IS MY POS THAT THE CAPT AND CREW SHOULD HAVE, AND DO HAVE, THE LAST WORD IN THESE DECISIONS; BUT WHEN THE MARKETING DEPT HAD THE PWR TO HASSLE THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS FUNCTION, THEN SOMETHING IS WRONG. WHEN CONSERVATIVE MAINT PROCS GIVE WAY TO PRESSURES TO 'COVER A TRIP,' THEN SOMETHING IS WRONG. IN THIS CASE, THE MAINT OPS CTR WAS QUOTED AS SAYING, THIS PLANE SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN DISPATCHED OVER THE N ATLANTIC, THE SECOND TIME. I COULDN'T AGREE MORE. BUT WAS OUR DECISION TO ACCEPT AND FLY THE PLANE BACK TO THE STATES CORRECT? PERHAPS NEXT TIME I WOULD TAKE THE OTHER COURSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.