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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1486310 |
Time | |
Date | 201710 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | HCF.TRACON |
State Reference | HI |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Large Transport Low Wing 3 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 129 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 18 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 30 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT |
Narrative:
Two incidents happened with aircraft X. Both incidents were exactly the same. From what I was told; aircraft X had a 'special' route approved by the traffic management unit (tmu); that put aircraft X into an area where the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) was 120; but the tmu approved 110 as the altitude aircraft X could fly on his route. The aircraft went below the MVA; and it was unsafe.as soon as I took over the sector; I was informed that aircraft X would be entering my airspace. The supervisor who informed me handed me a hand drawn piece of paper that showed his route and his altitude. My first question was would the 110 altitude be clear of the 120 MVA. [Flm] said 'it should' and he stayed with me the entire time aircraft X was in my airspace. As the aircraft X approached the 120 MVA; supervisor instructed me to climb aircraft X to 120 because he would not clear the 120 MVA. Aircraft X refused the control instruction to climb. I asked if I should issue a 'brasher' to aircraft X; but [flm] told me not to. I did warn aircraft X about the minimum vectoring altitudes; but he still refused to climb. I also called R5 to tell them of aircraft X's refusal to take an altitude to clear the MVA. My phraseology may not have been perfect at the time; because I was not sure what we could; nor what we could not tell an aircraft participating in '[special operation].' I did have supervisor next to me at the time; and I would ask before I said any transmission. R10 and R9 are two different sectors. They need to be treated at two different sectors. When busy; R9 needs to be opened. Based on the level of traffic; R9 needs to be opened. In the past; there was almost a 3 way collision with three heavy aircraft because the sector was not opened. The NTSB was here to investigate (from what I was told) and the recommendation was to have R9 open and split from R10 during the busy hours. From what I recall; I believe the time R9 was to be open was [during business hours]. We really need to implement this again. Maui approach is too busy to always be combined.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: HCF TRACON controllers reported that a Special Operation aircraft was allowed to fly at an altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Narrative: Two incidents happened with Aircraft X. Both incidents were exactly the same. From what I was told; Aircraft X had a 'special' route approved by the Traffic Management Unit (TMU); that put Aircraft X into an area where the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) was 120; but the TMU approved 110 as the altitude Aircraft X could fly on his route. The aircraft went below the MVA; and it was unsafe.As soon as I took over the sector; I was informed that Aircraft X would be entering my airspace. The supervisor who informed me handed me a hand drawn piece of paper that showed his route and his altitude. My first question was would the 110 altitude be clear of the 120 MVA. [FLM] said 'it should' and he stayed with me the entire time Aircraft X was in my airspace. As the Aircraft X approached the 120 MVA; supervisor instructed me to climb Aircraft X to 120 because he would not clear the 120 MVA. Aircraft X refused the control instruction to climb. I asked if I should issue a 'Brasher' to Aircraft X; but [FLM] told me not to. I did warn Aircraft X about the minimum vectoring altitudes; but he still refused to climb. I also called R5 to tell them of Aircraft X's refusal to take an altitude to clear the MVA. My phraseology may not have been perfect at the time; because I was not sure what we could; nor what we could not tell an aircraft participating in '[Special Operation].' I did have supervisor next to me at the time; and I would ask before I said any transmission. R10 and R9 are TWO different sectors. They need to be treated at two different sectors. When busy; R9 needs to be opened. Based on the level of traffic; R9 needs to be opened. In the past; there was almost a 3 way collision with three heavy aircraft because the sector was not opened. The NTSB was here to investigate (from what I was told) and the recommendation was to have R9 open and split from R10 during the busy hours. From what I recall; I believe the time R9 was to be open was [during business hours]. We really need to implement this again. Maui Approach is too busy to always be combined.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.