Narrative:

Shortly after takeoff from lax when passing through about 300', we noticed the right engine oil quantity was extremely low. Not knowing if it was a faulty gauge or an accurate indication which meant impending engine failure I immediately elected to return to lax. The first officer called departure control and requested immediate return to the airfield. Departure requested the reason for our request and we stated low oil quantity indication on the right engine. Departure next asked if we were declaring an emergency and we said no. Departure provided us with very fine assistance. At some point we were turned over to approach control. We flew a downwind briefly at 5000' before descending. We stayed within about 10 NM of lax. About a 200-400' cloud layer had formed at about 1600' preventing us from having visibility contact from the field. The controller asked us a number of times if we had a visibility on the field, we replied no, and asked for vectors to final. It was a tight pattern. We were vectored through final, no problem, as we and the controller were aware of this and we were still about 6-7 mi from the runway. On correcting to final I descended to about 1650' when our clearance was to 2000'. Realizing I was low I corrected back towards 2000' and the controller also brought this error to our attention. Seconds later we were on G/south and landed shortly thereafter. Upon maintenance inspection it was found that the right oil quantity gauge was in error. I thought the controllers did an excellent job. Though we were vectored so as to overshoot final this was no problem and my only regret is that I descended through 2000' before being cleared. If there is any thought I could pass on to controllers it would be for them to be aware that when an aircraft has a problem immediately after takeoff requiring immediate return to landing that the crew is extremely busy, running checklists (after takeoff, climb, descent, approach, before landing), briefing F/as, conversing with departure and approach control, tuning and identing radios, briefing approach procedures, and in our case mentally going through engine failure shut down procedures, and single engine procedures should the engine fail. One is mentally very very active. So if from the controllers point of view it all seems rather quiet and calm with regards to radio contact with the aircraft, please remember that the aircrew is working at or near maximum capacity and that your guidance to a safe landing is most important. My thanks to the los angeles controllers for a job well done.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT WITH LOW OIL PRESSURE INDICATION RETURNS FOR LNDG AT LAX AND INADVERTENTLY GETS A LITTLE LOW ON THE APCH.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER TKOF FROM LAX WHEN PASSING THROUGH ABOUT 300', WE NOTICED THE R ENG OIL QUANTITY WAS EXTREMELY LOW. NOT KNOWING IF IT WAS A FAULTY GAUGE OR AN ACCURATE INDICATION WHICH MEANT IMPENDING ENG FAILURE I IMMEDIATELY ELECTED TO RETURN TO LAX. THE F/O CALLED DEP CTL AND REQUESTED IMMEDIATE RETURN TO THE AIRFIELD. DEP REQUESTED THE REASON FOR OUR REQUEST AND WE STATED LOW OIL QUANTITY INDICATION ON THE R ENG. DEP NEXT ASKED IF WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER AND WE SAID NO. DEP PROVIDED US WITH VERY FINE ASSISTANCE. AT SOME POINT WE WERE TURNED OVER TO APCH CTL. WE FLEW A DOWNWIND BRIEFLY AT 5000' BEFORE DSNDING. WE STAYED WITHIN ABOUT 10 NM OF LAX. ABOUT A 200-400' CLOUD LAYER HAD FORMED AT ABOUT 1600' PREVENTING US FROM HAVING VIS CONTACT FROM THE FIELD. THE CTLR ASKED US A NUMBER OF TIMES IF WE HAD A VIS ON THE FIELD, WE REPLIED NO, AND ASKED FOR VECTORS TO FINAL. IT WAS A TIGHT PATTERN. WE WERE VECTORED THROUGH FINAL, NO PROB, AS WE AND THE CTLR WERE AWARE OF THIS AND WE WERE STILL ABOUT 6-7 MI FROM THE RWY. ON CORRECTING TO FINAL I DSNDED TO ABOUT 1650' WHEN OUR CLRNC WAS TO 2000'. REALIZING I WAS LOW I CORRECTED BACK TOWARDS 2000' AND THE CTLR ALSO BROUGHT THIS ERROR TO OUR ATTN. SECONDS LATER WE WERE ON G/S AND LANDED SHORTLY THEREAFTER. UPON MAINT INSPECTION IT WAS FOUND THAT THE R OIL QUANTITY GAUGE WAS IN ERROR. I THOUGHT THE CTLRS DID AN EXCELLENT JOB. THOUGH WE WERE VECTORED SO AS TO OVERSHOOT FINAL THIS WAS NO PROB AND MY ONLY REGRET IS THAT I DSNDED THROUGH 2000' BEFORE BEING CLRED. IF THERE IS ANY THOUGHT I COULD PASS ON TO CTLRS IT WOULD BE FOR THEM TO BE AWARE THAT WHEN AN ACFT HAS A PROB IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF REQUIRING IMMEDIATE RETURN TO LNDG THAT THE CREW IS EXTREMELY BUSY, RUNNING CHKLISTS (AFTER TKOF, CLB, DSNT, APCH, BEFORE LNDG), BRIEFING F/AS, CONVERSING WITH DEP AND APCH CTL, TUNING AND IDENTING RADIOS, BRIEFING APCH PROCS, AND IN OUR CASE MENTALLY GOING THROUGH ENG FAILURE SHUT DOWN PROCS, AND SINGLE ENG PROCS SHOULD THE ENG FAIL. ONE IS MENTALLY VERY VERY ACTIVE. SO IF FROM THE CTLRS POINT OF VIEW IT ALL SEEMS RATHER QUIET AND CALM WITH REGARDS TO RADIO CONTACT WITH THE ACFT, PLEASE REMEMBER THAT THE AIRCREW IS WORKING AT OR NEAR MAX CAPACITY AND THAT YOUR GUIDANCE TO A SAFE LNDG IS MOST IMPORTANT. MY THANKS TO THE LOS ANGELES CTLRS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.