Narrative:

Issue: tow bar was disconnected from jet during pushback without parking brake set. Jet rolled forward an estimated 2-3 feet with push crew personnel in dangerously close proximity to nose landing gear (nlg); before I applied brakes and reset parking brake. Cause: jet was planning a post-pushback de-ice; and the iceman wanted the jet repositioned into the wind (90 degree from the jet orientation at the time). The pushback tug driver was communicating with me plus the iceman contributing to communication confusion and lapses in procedural 'challenge and responses' with the cockpit. When the jet stopped the push (and prior to repositioning for deice) I sensed the tug driver was being overloaded with information from his guys; (2) on the tow bar and the iceman. I wasn't monitoring the iceman / operations frequency. So; I clearly emphasized to the tug driver at least 3 times via the intercom communication system (ics) that the parking brake was 'not set' in order to avoid shearing the nose pin or damaging the strut since we had yet to position the jet in its final resting spot for deice examination and possible application. The engines were never started. The voice command request to 'set brakes' nor 'disconnect headset' was never communicated to the cockpit. Next; I saw the tug drive off; but two ramp personnel; one holding the wands in the 'hold position' (wands crossed) was still in the vicinity of the nlg. Within nanoseconds; the jet felt like it was moving and I immediate applied normal brakes and subsequently the parking brake. The iceman was well outside the radius of the jet. Quite startled by the sequence of events and exposure to a ground safety mishap; I requested the tug driver return to the jet and reestablish communication via flashing the taxi light. The first officer made the same request via the operations frequency. Simultaneously; we requested the iceman to continue his inspection to determine if we would need deice. A couple of minutes later he determined the jet was 'clean' and he departed the area. Meantime; the tug driver arrived and plugged in to the ics.my first question was 'did the jet move without being connected to the tow bar ' and he responded that it did. I recreated the sequence of events and specifically asked did he remember me telling him that the brakes were 'not set' at least 3 times- he told me; yes. At this point; I emphasized the critical need for safety and especially for the pushback crew and the reason for very standardized procedures and voice communication between the cockpit and ground crew. He was very remorseful and respectful. He mentioned that his associates on the push crew were relatively new. Since bad news doesn't get better with time; I told him that I would be initiating a safety report and recommended that he let his manager know about the sequence of events leading up to the uncommanded jet movement with ground personnel in close vicinity to the nlg. I recommended that they review their procedures and provide additional training for this evolution.it's my opinion that the iceman request to position the jet into the wind for deice led the cascade in a series of events that eventually broke the safety chain. Contributing factors was a training issue with the new personnel and the possibility of the most experienced member of the push team having to juggle a lot of balls that included working the office desk. Lastly; grr operates mainline and regional jets and I highly suspect that the pushback procedures and voice commands are not the same. Figuratively speaking; luck was on our side and we 'dodged a bullet' this morning and only feelings were hurt. It goes without saying; this process needs to be a well-oiled machine and cannot be taken lightly. Seeing how the tug driver was trying to handle multiple functions while monitoring inexperienced personnel; maybe worker fatigue should be examined and workloads redistributed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain reported the pushback crew disconnected the tow-bar without using proper communication and SOP; leading to the aircraft rolling towards personnel.

Narrative: Issue: Tow bar was disconnected from jet during pushback without parking brake set. Jet rolled forward an estimated 2-3 feet with push crew personnel in dangerously close proximity to Nose Landing Gear (NLG); before I applied brakes and reset parking brake. Cause: Jet was planning a post-pushback de-ice; and the Iceman wanted the jet repositioned into the wind (90 degree from the jet orientation at the time). The pushback tug driver was communicating with me plus the Iceman contributing to communication confusion and lapses in procedural 'challenge and responses' with the cockpit. When the jet stopped the push (and prior to repositioning for deice) I sensed the tug driver was being overloaded with information from his guys; (2) on the tow bar and the Iceman. I wasn't monitoring the Iceman / Operations frequency. So; I clearly emphasized to the tug driver at least 3 times via the Intercom Communication System (ICS) that the parking brake was 'not set' in order to avoid shearing the nose pin or damaging the strut since we had yet to position the jet in its final resting spot for deice examination and possible application. The engines were never started. The voice command request to 'set brakes' nor 'disconnect headset' was never communicated to the cockpit. Next; I saw the tug drive off; but two ramp personnel; one holding the wands in the 'hold position' (wands crossed) was still in the vicinity of the NLG. Within nanoseconds; the jet felt like it was moving and I immediate applied normal brakes and subsequently the parking brake. The Iceman was well outside the radius of the jet. Quite startled by the sequence of events and exposure to a ground safety mishap; I requested the tug driver return to the jet and reestablish communication via flashing the taxi light. The First Officer made the same request via the Operations frequency. Simultaneously; we requested the Iceman to continue his inspection to determine if we would need deice. A couple of minutes later he determined the jet was 'clean' and he departed the area. Meantime; the tug driver arrived and plugged in to the ICS.My first question was 'did the jet move without being connected to the tow bar ' and he responded that it did. I recreated the sequence of events and specifically asked did he remember me telling him that the brakes were 'not set' at least 3 times- he told me; yes. At this point; I emphasized the critical need for safety and especially for the pushback crew and the reason for very standardized procedures and voice communication between the cockpit and ground crew. He was very remorseful and respectful. He mentioned that his associates on the push crew were relatively new. Since bad news doesn't get better with time; I told him that I would be initiating a Safety Report and recommended that he let his manager know about the sequence of events leading up to the uncommanded jet movement with ground personnel in close vicinity to the NLG. I recommended that they review their procedures and provide additional training for this evolution.It's my opinion that the Iceman request to position the jet into the wind for deice led the cascade in a series of events that eventually broke the safety chain. Contributing factors was a training issue with the new personnel and the possibility of the most experienced member of the push team having to juggle a lot of balls that included working the office desk. Lastly; GRR operates mainline and regional jets and I highly suspect that the pushback procedures and voice commands are not the same. Figuratively speaking; luck was on our side and we 'dodged a bullet' this morning and only feelings were hurt. It goes without saying; this process needs to be a well-oiled machine and cannot be taken lightly. Seeing how the tug driver was trying to handle multiple functions while monitoring inexperienced personnel; maybe worker fatigue should be examined and workloads redistributed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.